Matti Laurila : Jääkäriupseeri, suojeluskuntapäällikkö, rintamakomentaja

Matti Laurila (1895 1983) This is a biographical research of a Jaeger officer, a Civil Guard Chief, a Field Commander Matti Laurila. A broader practice of qualitative methods was utilized in the research. The main aim is a permanent reconstruction and reinterpretation of past events through the experiences of the study object. The life and times of Laurila are intertwined with the crucial events that led to the Finnish Declaration of Independence. Afterwards he helped to ensure that the young republic also stayed independent. As a Jaeger in the winter of 1917 Laurila witnessed an incident he would never forget. After disobeying a direct order, Sven Saarikoski from Lapua was shot dead by his commanding officer, K. A. Ståhlberg, on the ice of the river Aa. Laurila faced the horrors of war at closer quarters, for he lost his father and his brother in the battle of Länkipohja on 16th March 1918. This battle was a major turning point for Laurila and profoundly influenced the rest of his life. The relationship between Laurila and his superiors was problematic almost throughout his military career, haunted as he was by the memory of Sven Saarikoski's execution and the losses in Länkipohja The position of Laurila as an authority in South Ostrobothnia was a key factor in preventing the extreme right from rallying enough Civil Guard troops to escalate the embryonic Mäntsälä rebellion of 1932. After the rebellion Laurila routinely opposed anything he saw as a threat to the independence of the Civil Guard. He would flatly refuse to even consider the integration of the Civil Guard into the national defence force. His uncompromising stand in this matter annoyed some among the higher ranking officers. After the Winter War Laurila got himself into a dispute with Jaeger Colonel H. E. Hannuksela that would have long-lasting consequences. The conflicts between them became widely known in the attack phase of the Continuation War in 1941 at the latest. Laurila had to give up his military career at the end of 1944. In the years that followed he did what he could to ensure that the South Ostrobothnia Civil Guard patrimony remained in the province. Laurila's position as a respected authority in South Ostrobothnia remained unchanged until his death.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Keittiömaailman matkassa 20 vuotta : Tutkimus erään keittiökalustevalmistajan johtavan markkina-aseman rakentamisesta ja säilyttämisestä

A View into the World of Kitchen: Development and retention of a leading position in the market of kitchen interiors - a case study of 20 years. This study focuses on the development of a kitchen interiors company, presently called Novart Inc., into the leading company of the industry from 1980´s to the present. The objective of the study is to describe the effects of strategic choices, the decisions of the management and the owner´s direction and control to the build up and the retaining of the leading position in the market. From theory point of view, strategic choices refer to com-pany purchases as corporate-level strategies, and business and marketing strategies. The empirical research was carried out in two phases and it is based on various company documents and records, and on the intensive interviews of seven key executives in the company. An abductive research design was utilized. The company gained the leading position in the kitchen market in Finland by company purchases, and the company has been able to retain the position. Firstly the goal was to expand to retail market and, secondly, the company has maintained the balance of supply and demand by closing the purchased production units when needed. The simultaneous use of these two strategic goals is a kind of a new observation, and the strategy may be suitable only for market leaders. During the latter part of the research period the strategy of com-pany purchases has been abandoned and the leading position in the market has been main-tained by developing systematically business and marketing capability. In the business and marketing strategies the distribution channels and the brands have been emphasized. During the research period the company has almost totally abandoned the long distribution channels and started to use its own channels built and named after the main brands. These are A la Carte, Parma and Petra. At the moment, in the beginning of the 21st century, a new distribution channel, the concept of the Kitchen World, is being built in addition to the channels mentioned above. The management´s decision making and the implementation the decisions have been well-considered. The executives emphasized the valuing of the importance of the decisions dif-ferently except the two decisions named the most important ones, i.e., the decisions to start own production of the raw material and to concentrate the business only to one company. The executive staff has also succeeded in managing crisis and threats of bankruptcy, and the company has been managed profitable. During all the four terms of ownership: Puolimatka Corporation, the Hankkija/Novera Corporation, the ownership period of the "bank", and the Nobia Corporate the ownership direction and control has been somewhat different. All the owners have paid attention to economic issues. The direction of cash flows and investments was at its strongest during the Hankkija/Novera term. For the last owner Nobia the production and marketing of the kitchen interiors has been the core business, which thus has strengthened the business and marketing capabilities of the target company of this research. A common denominator during all the four terms of ownership has been owners' trust gained by the professional skills of the management of the target company. This has lead to greater independence of the management of the company and less owners´ direction. Keywords: leading position, marketing strategy, management decisions, acquisition, corporate governance