Matti Laurila : Jääkäriupseeri, suojeluskuntapäällikkö, rintamakomentaja

Matti Laurila (1895 1983) This is a biographical research of a Jaeger officer, a Civil Guard Chief, a Field Commander Matti Laurila. A broader practice of qualitative methods was utilized in the research. The main aim is a permanent reconstruction and reinterpretation of past events through the experiences of the study object. The life and times of Laurila are intertwined with the crucial events that led to the Finnish Declaration of Independence. Afterwards he helped to ensure that the young republic also stayed independent. As a Jaeger in the winter of 1917 Laurila witnessed an incident he would never forget. After disobeying a direct order, Sven Saarikoski from Lapua was shot dead by his commanding officer, K. A. Ståhlberg, on the ice of the river Aa. Laurila faced the horrors of war at closer quarters, for he lost his father and his brother in the battle of Länkipohja on 16th March 1918. This battle was a major turning point for Laurila and profoundly influenced the rest of his life. The relationship between Laurila and his superiors was problematic almost throughout his military career, haunted as he was by the memory of Sven Saarikoski's execution and the losses in Länkipohja The position of Laurila as an authority in South Ostrobothnia was a key factor in preventing the extreme right from rallying enough Civil Guard troops to escalate the embryonic Mäntsälä rebellion of 1932. After the rebellion Laurila routinely opposed anything he saw as a threat to the independence of the Civil Guard. He would flatly refuse to even consider the integration of the Civil Guard into the national defence force. His uncompromising stand in this matter annoyed some among the higher ranking officers. After the Winter War Laurila got himself into a dispute with Jaeger Colonel H. E. Hannuksela that would have long-lasting consequences. The conflicts between them became widely known in the attack phase of the Continuation War in 1941 at the latest. Laurila had to give up his military career at the end of 1944. In the years that followed he did what he could to ensure that the South Ostrobothnia Civil Guard patrimony remained in the province. Laurila's position as a respected authority in South Ostrobothnia remained unchanged until his death.

Essays on Banking Crises

This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme and central bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors associated with long-lasting banking crises. The first essay analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries (LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a significant factor of banking crises. The second essay aims at determining whether a country s powerful CB can lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB s autonomy for a set of countries over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB s authority is disentangled with respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB s chief executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of a crisis, the government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures. The third essay examines the CRP and other explanatory variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with the durations of crises.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Kuluttaminen ja ylhäisaatelin elämäntapa 1700-luvun Ruotsissa

Consumption and the lifestyle of the high nobility in eighteenth-century Sweden This monograph is an analysis of the lifestyle, consumption and private finances of the Swedish high nobility during the eighteenth century (ca 1730 1795). It describes the lifestyle of one noble house, the House of Fersen. The Fersen family represents the leading political, economic and cultural elite in eighteenth-century Sweden. The analysis concentrates on Count Carl von Fersen (1716 1786) and his brother Count Axel von Fersen (1719 1794), their spouses and children. Carl von Fersen was a courtier whilst Axel von Fersen was an officer and one of the leaders of the Francophile Hat party. His son, Axel von Fersen the younger, was in his time an officer and a favourite of Gustavus III, King of Sweden, as well as a favourite and trusted confidant of Marie-Antoinette, Queen of France. The research is based upon the Fersen family s private archives, the Counts personal account books, probate inventories, letters and diaries. The study discusses the Fersens landed property and investments in ironworks and manufacturing, the indebtedness of the high nobility, high offices in civil administration, the militia and at court, as well as marriages as the foundations of noble wealth and power. It analyses the Count von Fersens revenue and expenditure, their career options and personal expenses, their involvement in the building and decorating of palaces, and the servants in service of the Fersen family as well as the ideal nobleman and his consumption. Central themes are inheritance, children s education, marriages and ladies preparing their trousseaux, the nobility ordering luxury goods from France, the consumption of Counts and Countesses before and after marrying and having children, the pleasures of a noble life as well as the criticism of luxury and sumptuousness. The study contributes to the large body of research on consumption and nobility in the eighteenth century by connecting the lifestyle, consumption and private finances of the Swedish high nobility to their European context. Key words: nobility, Fersen, lifestyle, consumption, private finances, Sweden, eighteenth century