Relocating the American Dream : The America of the 1960s as Portrayed by the New Journalists Norman Mailer, Hunter S. Thompson, and Tom Wolfe

The concept of the American Dream was subject to a strong re-evaluation process in the 1960s, as counterculture became a prominent force in American society. A massive generation of young people, moved by the Vietnam War, the hippie movement, and psychedelic experimentation, created substantial social turbulence in their efforts to break out of conventional patterns and to create a new kind of society. This thesis outlines and analyses the concept of the American Dream in popular imagination through three works of new journalism. My primary data consists of Tom Wolfe’s The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test (1967), Hunter S. Thompson’s Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey to the Heart of the American Dream (1971), and Norman Mailer’s Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History (1968). In defining the American Dream, I discuss the history of the concept as well as its manifestations in popular culture. Because of its elusive and amorphous nature, the concept of the American Dream can only be examined in cultural texts that portray the values, sentiments, and customs of a certain era. I have divided the analytical section of my thesis into three parts. In the first part I examine how the authors discuss the American society of their time in relation to ideology, capitalism, and the media. In the second part I focus on the Vietnam War and the controversy it creates in relation to the notions of freedom and patriotism. In the third part I discuss how the authors portray the countercultural visions of a better America that challenged the traditional interpretations of the American Dream. I also discuss the dark side of the new dream: the problems and disillusions that came with the effort to change the world. This thesis is an effort to trace the relocation of the American Dream in the context of the 1960s counterculture and new journalism. It hopes to provide a valuable addition to the cultural history of the sixties and to the effort of conceptualizing the American Dream.

Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet vuosina 1259-83 : Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä

In my master thesis I analyse Byzantine warfare in the late period of the empire. I use military operations between Byzantines and crusader Principality of Achaia (1259–83) as a case study. Byzantine strategy was based (in “oriental manner”) on using ambushes, diplomacy, surprise attacks, deception etc. Open field battles that were risky in comparison with their benefits were usually avoided, but the Byzantines were sometimes forced to seek open encounter because their limited ability to keep strong armies in field for long periods of time. Foreign mercenaries had important place in Byzantine armies and they could simply change sides if their paymasters ran out of resources. The use of mercenaries with short contracts made it possible that the composition of an army was flexible but on the other hand heterogeneous – in result Byzantine armies were sometimes ineffective and prone to confusion. In open field battles Byzantines used formation that was made out from several lines placed one after another. This formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles. Byzantines might have also used other kinds of formations. The Byzantines were not considered equal to Latins in close combat. West-Europeans saw mainly horse archers and Latin mercenaries on Byzantine service as threats to themselves in battle. The legitimacy of rulers surrounding the Aegean sea was weak and in many cases political intrigues and personal relationships can have resolved the battles. Especially in sieges the loyalty of population was decisive. In sieges the Byzantines used plenty of siege machines and archers. This made fast conquests possible, but it was expensive. The Byzantines protected their frontiers by building castles. Military operations against the Principality of Achaia were mostly small scale raids following an intensive beginning. Byzantine raids were mostly made by privateers and mountaineers. This does not fit to the traditional picture that warfare belonged to the imperial professional army. It’s unlikely that military operations in war against the Principality of Achaia caused great demographic or economic catastrophe and some regions in the warzone might even have flourished. On the other hand people started to concentrate into villages which (with growing risks for trade) probably caused disturbance in economic development and in result birth rates might have decreased. Both sides of war sought to exchange their prisoners of war. These were treated according to conventional manners that were accepted by both sides. It was possible to sell prisoners, especially women and children, to slavery, but the scale of this trade does not seem to be great in military operations treated in this theses.

Herrat, jätkät ja sotataito : Kansalaissotilas- ja ammattisotilasarmeijan rakentuminen 1920- ja 1930-luvulla

Gentlemen, Lads and the Art of War The Construction of Citizen Soldier- and Professional Soldier Armies into the Miracle of the Winter War During the 1920s and 1930s The Miracle of the Winter War was not a myth - at least according to them, who were making that miracle to happen. This study is not just about the Armed Forces and society, but moreover a study about civil society inside the organization of armed forces. Conscription kept Finnish military organization (and is still keeping) very closely connected with civil society and therefore there is no need to locate the possible critical misunderstandings brought by two different identity-based approaches. The great performance of the Armed Forces during the Second World War was not made of superior art of war. It was not the high level of discipline either. Art of war is basically a (deep level) cultural level equation that has more to do with culturally absorbed schemes of meaning making than rational decision-making. Naturally attrition based approach to effect-making directed the organizational methods in attrition based organisational practices, where there were only minor possibilities to practice any manoeuvre-based organisational behaviour. The practice and method of leadership lent similarly to the attrition-based thinking, which directed the organisational cultural thoughts towards composition that confirmed antagonism between gentlemen and lads . This setting has been absorbed and learned through cultural socialisation and was therefore not a product of the military organisation itself. The Finnish Armed Forces included two different communities (gentlemen and lads) within the same organisation as there were both the official and the unofficial organisations presented. This caused problems as they both made meaning-making processes simultaneously. These organisations had their own overlapping and in most cases also contradictory social meanings. The unofficial organisation has been overshadowed by the vast number of studies concerning the official organisation. The main reason for this systematic neglect is based on the reality of the attitudes and living conditions of the micro-level organisation which produced (perhaps) too realistic and repulsive viewpoints that are presenting a picture of a national level identity process in a way that is separating it from the ideals made to verify the ethos of national values. Complaining, griping, grumbling and moaning are usually situated in a category of abnormal and unwanted behaviour. However, within the context of a citizen soldier army community this was more of a characteristic feature of that organisation (in Finland) and therefore it was crucially important to locate the context of that abnormal behaviour. According to this study, it was not a malicious act but moreover seriously formed efforts in trying to use common sense in the chaos citizen soldiers faced when they were uniformed and placed in an unfamiliar process of disciplinary measures and frictions and competition between different ranks. There is much evidence that reinforces the argument that what seemed to be the most unconventional behaviour was finally the most efficient in a sense of military performance.

The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War

The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.