Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Salaisen evankelistan salaliitto : Uusin keskustelu Klemens Aleksandrialaisen kirjeestä Theodorokselle

This thesis is an assessment of the hoax hypothesis, mainly propagated in Stephen C. Carlson's 2005 monograph "The Gospel Hoax: Morton Smith's Invention of Secret Mark", which suggests that professor Morton Smith (1915-1991) forged Clement of Alexandria's letter to Theodore. This letter Smith claimed to have discovered as an 18th century copy in the monastery of Mar Saba in 1958. The Introduction narrates the discovery story of Morton Smith and traces the manuscript's whereabouts up to its apparent disappearance in 1990 following with a brief history of scholarship of the MS and some methodological considerations. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the arguments for the hoax (mainly by Stephen C. Carlson) and against it (mainly Scott G. Brown). Chapter 2 looks at the MS in its physical aspects, and chapter 3 assesses its subject matter. I conclude that some of the details fit reasonably well with the hoax hypothesis, but on the whole the arguments against it are more persuasive. Especially Carlson's use of QDE-analysis (Questioned Document Examination) has many problems. Comparing the handwriting of Clement's letter to Morton Smith's handwriting I conclude that there are some "repeated differences" between them suggesting that Smith is not the writer of the disputed letter. Clement's letter to Theodore derives most likely from antiquity though the exact details of its character are not discussed in length in this thesis. In Chapter 4 I take a special look at Stephen C. Carlson's arguments which propose that Morton Smith hid clues of his identity to the MS and the materials surrounding it. Comparing these alleged clues to known pseudoscientific works I conclude that Carlson utilizes here methods normally reserved for building a conspiracy theory; thus Carlson's hoax hypothesis has serious methodological flaws in respect to these hidden clues. I construct a model of these questionable methods titled "a boisterous pseudohistorical method" that contains three parts: 1) beginning with a question that from the beginning implicitly contains the answer, 2) considering everything will do as evidence for the conspiracy theory, and 3) abandoning probability and thinking literally that everything is connected. I propose that Stephen C. Carlson utilizes these pseudoscientific methods in his unearthing of Morton Smith's "clues". Chapter 5 looks briefly at the literary genre I title "textual puzzle -thriller". Because even biblical scholarship follows the signs of the times, I propose Carlson's hoax hypothesis has its literary equivalents in fiction in titles like Dan Brown's "Da Vinci Code" and in academic works in titles like John Dart's "Decoding Mark". All of these are interested in solving textual puzzles, even though the methodological choices are not acceptable for scholarship. Thus the hoax hypothesis as a whole is alternatively either unpersuasive or plain bad science.