6 resultados para "Marrakesh Treaty"

em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki


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Certain software products employing digital techniques for encryption of data are subject to export controls in the EU Member States pursuant to Community law and relevant laws in the Member States. These controls are agreed globally in the framework of the so-called Wassenaar Arrangement. Wassenaar is an informal non-proliferation regime aimed at promoting international stability and responsibility in transfers of strategic (dual-use) products and technology. This thesis covers provisions of Wassenaar, Community export control laws and export control laws of Finland, Sweden, Germany, France and United Kingdom. This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter discusses the ratio of export control laws and the impact they have on global trade. The ratio is originally defence-related - in general to prevent potential adversaries of participating States from having the same tools, and in particular in the case of cryptographic software to enable signals intelligence efforts. Increasingly as the use of cryptography in a civilian context has mushroomed, export restrictions can have negative effects on civilian trade. Information security solutions may also be took weak because of export restrictions on cryptography. The second chapter covers the OECD's Cryptography Policy, which had a significant effect on its member nations' national cryptography policies and legislation. The OECD is a significant organization,because it acts as a meeting forum for most important industrialized nations. The third chapter covers the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Arrangement is covered from the viewpoint of international law and politics. The Wassenaar control list provisions affecting cryptographic software transfers are also covered in detail. Control lists in the EU and in Member States are usually directly copied from Wassenaar control lists. Controls agreed in its framework set only a minimum level for participating States. However, Wassenaar countries can adopt stricter controls. The fourth chapter covers Community export control law. Export controls are viewed in Community law as falling within the domain of Common Commercial Policy pursuant to Article 133 of the EC Treaty. Therefore the Community has exclusive competence in export matters, save where a national measure is authorized by the Community or falls under foreign or security policy derogations established in Community law. The Member States still have a considerable amount of power in the domain of Common Foreign and Security Policy. They are able to maintain national export controls because export control laws are not fully harmonized. This can also have possible detrimental effects on the functioning of internal market and common export policies. In 1995 the EU adopted Dual-Use Regulation 3381/94/EC, which sets common rules for exports in Member States. Provisions of this regulation receive detailed coverage in this chapter. The fifth chapter covers national legislation and export authorization practices in five different Member States - in Finland, Sweden, Germany, France and in United Kingdom. Export control laws of those Member States are covered when the national laws differ from the uniform approach of the Community's acquis communautaire. Keywords: export control, encryption, software, dual-use, license, foreign trade, e-commerce, Internet

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The aim of this research was to study how European churches contributed to the shaping of the Constitutional Treaty during the work of the Convention on the future of Europe through the public discussion forum, established by the Convention for this specific purpose in the years 2002 2003. In particular, this study sought to uncover the areas of interest brought up by the churches in their contributions, the objectives they pursued, and the approaches and arguments they employed to reach those objectives. The data for this study comprised all official submissions by European churches and church alliances to the Forum, totalling 21 contributions. A central criterion for inclusion of the data was that the organization can reasonably be assumed to represent the official position of one or more Christian churches within the European Union before the 2004 expansion. The contributing churches and organizations represent the vast majority of Christians in Europe. The data was analyzed using primarily qualitative content analysis. The research approach was a combination of abductive and inductive inference. Based on the analysis a two-fold theoretical framework was adopted, focusing on theories of public religion, secularization and deprivatization of religion, and of legitimation and collective identity. The main areas of interest found in the contributions of the churches were the value foundation of the European Union, which is demanded to coherently permeate all policies and actions of the EU, and the social dimension of Europe, which must be given equal status to the political and economic dimensions. In both areas the churches claim significant experience and expertise, which they want to see recognized in the Constituional Treaty through a formally guaranteed status for churches and religious communities in the EU. In their contributions the churches show a strong determination to secure a significant role for both religion and religious communities in the public life of Europe. As for the role of religion, they point out to its potential as a motivating and cohesive force in society and as a building block for a collective European identity, which is still missing. Churches also pursue a substantial public role for themselves beyond the spiritual dimension, permeating the secular areas of the social, political and economic dimensions. The arguments in suppport of such role are embedded in their interest and expertise in spiritual and other fundamental values and their broad involvement in providing social services. In this context churches use expressions inclusive of all religions and convictions, albeit clearly advocating the primacy of Europe's Christian heritage. Based on their historical role, their social involvement and their spiritual mission they use the public debate on the Constitutional Treaty to gain formal legitimacy for the public status of religion and religious communities, both nationally and on a European level, through appropriate provisions in the constitutional text. In return they offer the European Union ways of improving its own legitimacy by reducing the democratic and ideological deficit of the EU and advancing the development a collective European identity.

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From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

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In the post-World War II era human rights have emerged as an enormous global phenomenon. In Finland human rights have particularly in the 1990s moved from the periphery to the center of public policy making and political rhetoric. Human rights education is commonly viewed as the decisive vehicle for emancipating individuals of oppressive societal structures and rendering them conscious of the equal value of others; both core ideals of the abstract discourse. Yet little empirical research has been conducted on how these goals are realized in practice. These factors provide the background for the present study which, by combining anthropological insights with critical legal theory, has analyzed the educational activities of a Scandinavian and Nordic network of human rights experts and PhD students in 2002-2005. This material has been complemented by data from the proceedings of UN human rights treaty bodies, hearings organized by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the analysis of different human rights documents as well as the manner human rights are talked of in the Finnish media. As the human rights phenomenon has expanded, human rights experts have acquired widespread societal influence. The content of human rights remains, nevertheless, ambiguous: on the one hand they are law, on the other, part of a moral discourse. By educating laymen on what human rights are, experts act both as intermediaries and activists who expand the scope of rights and simultaneously exert increasing political influence. In the educational activities of the analyzed network these roles were visible in the rhetorics of legality and legitimacy . Among experts both of these rhetorics are subject to ongoing professional controversy, yet in the network they are presented as undisputable facts. This contributes to the impression that human rights knowledge is uncontested. This study demonstrates how the network s activities embody and strengthen a conception of expertise as located in specific, structurally determined individuals. Simultaneously its conception of learning emphasizes the adoption of knowledge by students, emphasizing the power of experts over them. The majority of the network s experts are Nordic males, whereas its students are predominantly Nordic females and males from East-European and developing countries. Contrary to the ideals of the discourse the network s activities do not create dialogue, but instead repeat power structures which are themselves problematic.

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The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

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This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.