Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.

Kansan raittiudeksi ja kotien onneksi : Naisten kieltolakimielipiteet ja toiminta kieltolain puolesta ja sitä vastaan 1919 - 1932

It is often maintained that the Prohibition Act (in force from 1 June 1919 to 5 April 1932) still influences both the Finnish alcohol policy and notions about alcohol. This study focuses on the development of women s opinions concerning Prohibition in Finland. What role did the formulation and expression of women s opinions and women's actions play in the final outcome of the Prohibition Act? What do the debate on Prohibition and women s activities for and against the legislation tell us about the status and possibilities of women to exert influence in the Finnish society of the Prohibition era? Women s opinions are particularly interesting since they deviated radically from what has generally been assumed. It was expected that the referendum of 1931 would result in a resounding vote of 100% in favour of Prohibition, but the outcome was a majority vote against it. Over 65% of the women who cast their vote in the referendum wanted a full repeal of Prohibition. The study approaches the history of Prohibition by combining methods and theories of the history of mentalities and social history with gender history. Women are examined as a heterogeneous group with dissimilar objectives and differing ways of acting and thinking. The research material consists of press materials, archival materials from organisations, personal materials and statistics from the Prohibition period. Both discourses and practices are examined; the object of the research is best described by Michel Foucault's concept of dispositif. When participating in the public debate on Prohibition, women based their right to express their opinions and take part in action on an ideological continuum spanning a hundred years, according to which home and family were central areas of women s interest. This idea was linked to questions of morality and social policy. On the other hand, women presented themselves as working taxpayers, voters and equal citizens. The most crucial issue in women's discussions was whether Prohibition improved or worsened the temperance of fathers, husbands and sons. The dichotomies town dweller - countryside dweller, Swedish-speaking Finnish-speaking, and middle class - working class were highly significant backgrounds both as factors dividing women and in public discussions regarding Prohibition. The 1931 referendum showed that the lines of demarcation drawn during the preceding debate did not materialise in political action in line with these dichotomies: the dispositif did not correspond to the discourse. Contrary to what was expressed in public, a great number of women among the labour and rural classes, among inland inhabitants and among Finnish-speakers were also against Prohibition. The media and organisations defended temperance and Prohibition almost until the end of the Prohibition era. This discourse was in conflict with the discourse of everyday conversations and practices in which alcohol was present.

Trade Blocs and the Cold War : The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976

The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.