Esiselvitys Luoteis-Venäjän ja Kaakkois-Suomen aluetaloudellisesta, kulttuurisesta ja sosiaalisesta integraatiokehityksestä

Esiselvityksen tarkoituksena on esittää arvio Luoteis-Venäjän ja Kaakkois-Suomen integraation tämänhetkisestä tilanteesta sekä keskeisimmistä edellytyksistä ja esteistä. Raportin ensimmäisessä osassa käsitellään kohdealueiden taustaa, toisessa osassa integroitumisen edellytyksiä ja esteitä sekä kolmannessa osassa Kaakkois-Suomen mahdollisuuksia ja vetovoimatekijöitä. Luoteis-Venäjällä on ollut suuri merkitys Kaakkois-Suomen kehityksessä ja se nähdään edelleen suurimpana mahdollisuutena minkä suhteen alueella voidaan kehittyä. Suurimmiksi ongelmiksi haastattelujen perusteella nousivat bisnekseen itseensä perustuvat ongelmat sekä resurssien puute. Lisäksi kykenemättömyys sopeutua paikalliseen kulttuuriin, kielitaidon ja kulttuurintuntemuksen puute, asenneongelmat sekä Venäjällä kasvava protektionismi ja maan oikeusvaltiostatuksen puute nähtiin suurena esteenä. Sopimukset sekä Venäjällä toimiminen niin liiketoiminnassa kuin koulutus- ja tutkimussektorilla ovat saaneet mystisiä piirteitä. Integraation edellytyksinä esiin nousivat halu kansainvälistyä sekä valmius panostaa ajallisesti ja rahallisesti. Muut edellytykset riippuvat valitusta toimintamallista. Toimintaympäristöön integroitumisen edellytyksenä pidettiin toimivia suhteita paikallishallintoon ja henkilökunnan venäläistämistä. Suomalaisten menestymisen edellytyksiä pidettiin hyvänä. Koulutus- ja tutkimussektorilla esiin nousivat perusrahoituksen puuttuminen, Suomi-keskeisyys sekä asenneongelmat. Venäläinen partneri on kuitenkin olennainen ja yhteistoiminnan edellytyksenä pidettiin verkostojen luomista. Koulutusviennin osalta esiin nousivat johtamis- ja projektihallinnon tarjonta. Ongelmana nähtiin yliopistojen välinen kilpailu ja toiveena oli parempi yhteistoiminta korkeakoulujen kesken. Julkisen sektorin puolella suurimmaksi ongelmaksi nousivat toimijoiden suuri määrä sekä niiden välinen kilpailu Kaakkois-Suomessa ja Luoteis-Venäjällä. Myös Kouvolan ja Kotkan sekä rautatien ja E18-tien välinen kilpailu haittaavat alueen kehitystä. Lisäksi alueelta puuttuu poliittinen omistajuus asialle sekä vahva keulakuva. Integraation tulisi toteutua julkisen sektorin ja yritysten yhteistyönä. Valtiolta toivottiin viisumikysymyksen pikaista ratkaisua, eikä viisumin poistumisen mahdollisia negatiivisia vaikutuksia pidetty suurena ongelmana. Kymenlaakson rakennemuutos nähtiin mieluummin mahdollisuutena kuin haittana. Sen sijaan yliopiston puute luo leiman alueelle, ja LUT:n vaikutusta toivottiin koko Kaakkois-Suomeen. Alueen infran todettiin olevan toimiva ja kehittämiseen kaivattiin aloitteellisuutta sekä nopeita toimia. Logistiikkaan pidettiin Kaakkois-Suomen vahvuutena, mutta liiallisen keskittymisen rautateihin tai satamiin nähtiin hidastavan kehitystä. Toimijoiden toivottiin yhdistyvän ja muodostavan ketjuja sekä keskittyvän alueen omiin vahvuuksiin, joista toivottiin selvitystä. Alueen kehittämisen kannalta esiin nousi vaatimuksia korkeamasta palvelutasosta sekä kielen ja kulttuurin tuntemuksen lisäämisestä. Erityisesti matkailun alalle sekä kulttuurivaihtoon kaivattiin kehitystä, isoja hankkeita ja rajaseudun sekä omaa brändiä. Lisäksi Lappeenrannan lentokenttää ja nopeaa junayhteyttä tulisi hyödyntää enemmän, sekä panostaa matkailijoiden opastukseen. Alueen vetovoimatekijöinä nähtiin erilaiset terveys-, hoito- ja kuntoutuspalvelut, sekä huoltotoiminnot. Paperiteollisuuden puolella tulisi yhdistää ekologia, ekonomia ja teknologia sekä saada uusia innovaatioita. Lisäksi Kaakkois-Suomessa tulisi keskittyä logistiikkaan, digitaaliseen viestintään, uusiutuviin energioihin sekä tietointensiiviseen työhön. Alueen venäläisistä yrityksistä ja mahdollisista investointikohteista kaivattiin lisäselvityksiä. Integroituminen yhteiskuntaan vaatii poikkihallinnollisia toimita ja kielikoulutuksen aikaista aloittamista. Maakuntaliiton panostusta toivottiin erityisesti suhteiden luomiseen Suomessa ja Venäjällä, alueen logistiikan painopistealueiden määrittelemiseen sekä kulttuurisen integraation huomioimiseen strategioissaan.

Kelan järjestämän kuntoutuksen kohdentuminen ja vaikutukset työkykyyn kunnallisilla työpaikoilla

Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin Kansaneläkelaitoksen (Kelan) järjestämän kuuden yleisimmän työssä käyvälle väestölle tarkoitetun kuntoutusmuodon kohdentumista kuntatyöntekijöille (n = 67 106 henkilöä). Lisäksi selvitettiin Kelan järjestämän tuki- ja liikuntaelinkuntoutuksen ja ASLAKkurssien vaikutuksia työkykyyn sekä verrattiin kahta fibromyalgiaa sairastaville tarkoitettua kuntoutusmuotoa. Muuttujatiedot kerättiin työnantajien omista ja kansallisista rekistereistä. Naiset olivat Kelan järjestämässä kuntoutuksessa yliedustettuina ja määräaikaisessa työsuhteessa työskentelevät aliedustettuina. Selkäkipukuntoutukseen osallistuneiden ja työnantajien palveluksessa seurannan loppuun saakka olleiden vuosittaiset hyvin pitkät sairauspoissaolot vähenivät kolmen kuntoutuksen jälkeisen vuoden ajaksi. Niskakipukuntoutukseen osallistuneilla ei todettu tätä muutosta. ASLAK-kuntoutukseen osallistuneiden sairauspoissaolopäivät ja hyvin pitkät sairauspoissaolokerrat vähenivät kuntoutusvuonna ja kolmena sen jälkeisenä vuonna samalle tasolle kuin kuntoutukseen osallistumattomilla kaltaistetuilla verrokeilla. Työkyvyttömyyseläkkeen riski oli kuntoutujilla neljän kuntoutuksen jälkeisen vuoden aikana verrokkeja pienempi. Fibromyalgiaa sairastavien kahden kuntoutusmuodon (fibromyalgiakurssi ja epäspesifinen tules-kuntoutus) vertailussa ei kuntoutuksen vaikutuksissa työkykykyyn todettu eroa. Kelan järjestämän kuntoutuksen sisällössä tarvitaan kriittistä arviointia, tutkimusta ja kehitystyötä, jotta yhteiskunnan odotus vaikuttavuudesta toteutuu.

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

Conspectus florae Fennicae vol. VII Dicotyledoneae: pars VI Compositae.

Kielet ruotsi, latina ja suomi. Typis impr. 1924-1926.

Acta Societatis pro fauna et flora Fennica

Kielet saksa ja ruotsi. Nimiösivulla teksti Helsingforsiae 1924-27.

Acta Societatis pro fauna et flora Fennica

Kielet saksa ja ruotsi. Nimiösivulla teksti Helsingforsiae 1924-29.

Acta Societatis pro fauna et flora Fennica

Kielet suomi ja saksa. Nimiösivulla teksti Helsingforsiae 1935-36.

Bibliotheca zoologica Fenniae opera annorum 1901-1930

Suomessa vuosina 1901-1930 julkaistun eläintieteellisen kirjallisuuden bibliografia.

Suomalaiset lääkärit ja Suomen Lääkäriliitto osana hyvinvointivaltiota ja sen terveyspolitiikkaa

Tässä julkaisussa selvitetään Suomen Lääkäriliiton ideoita (makrotaso) ja lääkäreiden (mikrotaso) mielipiteitä hyvinvointivaltiosta ja sen terveyspolitiikasta. Makrotason aineiston muodostavat erilaiset julkiset dokumentit. Aineistot ovat pääosin vuosilta 1970–2007. Dokumentteja analysoidaan sekä määrällisen että laadullisen sisällönanalyysin tai erittelyn keinoin. Mikrotason aineiston muodostaa vuonna 2007 kerätty kyselyaineisto (n = 1 092). Sitä analysoidaan kuvailevin tilastollisin menetelmin ja logistisen regressioanalyysin keinoin. Tulosten perusteella Suomen Lääkäriliitto koki julkisen vallan puuttumisen uhkaksi rakennettaessa universaalia terveydenhuoltojärjestelmää. Uhka kuitenkin väheni julkisen sektorin jatkuvasti laajentuessa. Toisaalta jatkuvana vaatimuksena Lääkäriliiton dokumenteissa esiintyy 1970-luvulta lähtien yksityisen sektorin roolin lisäämisvaateet. 1990-luvun laman jälkeisenä aikana yksityiseen sektoriin liittyvät ideat ovat tulleet yhä selkeämmiksi ja konkreettisemmiksi. Argumenteissaan Lääkäriliitto ei tuo juurikaan esille omia taloudellisia intressejään vaan vetoaa useammin yleiseen hyvään. Kyselyaineistosta tehtyjen analyysien mukaan lääkärit kokevat sosiaaliturvan muuta väestöä useammin liian laajaksi. Lääkärit eivät kuitenkaan halua erityisen voimakkaasti markkinoistaa terveydenhuoltoa, jopa verrattaessa muuhun väestöön. Parhaiten lääkäreiden mielipiteitä sosiaaliturvasta ja terveydenhuoltojärjestelmästä selittävät poliittinen orientaatio ja työskentelysektori. Nuorten lääkäreiden mielipiteet sosiaaliturvasta ja terveydenhuoltojärjestelmästä eivät ole erityisen radikaaleja. Lopuksi tutkimuksessa verrattiin mikro- ja makrotasoa keskenään. Tulosten perusteella Suomen Lääkäriliitto on selvästi radikaalimpi näkemyksissään markkinoistumisesta kuin lääkärit keskimäärin.

Acta Societatis pro fauna et flora Fennica

Kielet saksa ja ruotsi.

Acta Societatis pro fauna et flora Fennica

Kielet saksa ja ruotsi.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.