It��mafia : Uhkakuvapolitiikka, rikosilmi��t ja kulttuuriset merkitykset

The Eastern Mafia Threat policy, crime phenomena, and cultural meanings An interdisciplinary research on the crime phenomena and the threat policy relating to the organized crime and the mafia of Russia and Estonia is based on 151 expert interviews, statistics, documents, research literature, and press material. The main part of the material consists of interviews of the Finnish, Estonian and Russian police authorities specialized in the problem of organized crime, and the reports on the crime situation drawn up in the Finnish diplomatic representations in Tallinn and St Petersburg. The interviews have been gathered in the years 1996-2001. The main theoretical tools of the research are constructivist research on social problems, and political psychology. Definitional processes of social problems and cultural semantic structures behind them are identified in the analysis and connected to the analysis of the crime cases. Both in the Anglo-American and Russian cultural frames there appears an inflated and exaggerated talk, according to which the mafia rules everything in Russia and is spreading everywhere. There is the traditional anti-Semitic paranoia in the core of this cultural symbiosis produced by Russian legal nihilism, the theory of totalitarianism of Sovietology, and the inertia of Russian anti-capitalism. To equate the Sicilian Mafia with Russia is an anachronism, since no empirical proof of systematic uncontrolled violence or absolute power vacuum in Russia can be found. In the Anglo-American policy of threat images, "the Russian mafia" was seen as a commodified conspiracy theory, which the police, the media, and the research took advantage of, blurring the line between fact and fiction. In Finland, the evolution of the policy of threat images proceeded in three phases: Initially, extensive rolling of refugees and criminals from Russia to Finland was emphasized in the beginning of the 1990's. In the second phase, the eastern mafia was said to infiltrate all over Finnish society and administration. Finland was, however, found immune to this kind of spreading. In the third phase, in the 21st century, the organized crime of Finland was said to be lead from abroad. In Finland, the policy of threat images was especially canalised to moral panics connected to "eastern prostitution". In Estonia, the policy of threat images emphasized the crime organized by the Russian authorities and politicians in order to weaken Estonia. In Russia, the policy of threat images emphasized the total criminalizing of society caused by criminal capitalism. In every country, the policy of threat images was affected by a so-called large-group identity, a term by Vamik Volkan, in which a so-called chosen trauma caused a political paranoia of an outer and inner danger. In Finland, procuring, car theft, and narcotics crimes were at their widest arranged by the Finnish often with the help of the Estonians. The Russians had no influence in the most serious violent crimes in Finland, although the number of assassinations were at least 5, 000 in Russia in the 1990's. In Russia, the assassinations were on one hand connected to marital problems, on the other hand to the pursuit of public attention and a hoped-for effect by the aid of the murder of an influential person. In the white-collar crime phenomena between Finland and Russia, the Finnish state and Finnish corporations gained remarkable benefit of the frauds aimed at the states of the Soviet Union and Russia in 1980's-21st century. The situation of Estonia was very difficult compared to that of Russia in the 1990's, which was manifested in the stagnation of the Estonian police and judicial authorities, the crimes of the police and the voluntary paramilitary organization, bomb explosions, the rebellion called "the jaeger crisis" in the voluntary paramilitary organization, and the "blood autumn" of Eastern Virumaa, in other words terror. The situation of Estonia had a powerful effect on the crime situation of Finland and on the security of the Finnish diplomats. In the continuum of the Finnish policy of threat images, Russia and the Russians were, however, presented as a source of a marked danger.

Towards a United States of Africa? Combining Zambian and AU level debate.

Globalisaatio on luonut uuden maailmanj��rjestelm��n jonka my��t�� yksitt��isten valtioiden vaikutusvalta on v��hentynyt entisest����n. T��m�� pit���� paikkansa erityisesti kehittyvien maiden kohdalla, esimerkiksi Afrikassa. Afrikka on pyrkinyt taistelemaan globalisaation tuomia negatiivisia vaikutuksia vastaan alueellistumisen ja maanosan yhten��isyytt�� ajavien hankkeiden kautta jo vuosikymmenien ajan, mutta toistaiseksi tulokset eiv��t ole olleet vakuttavia. T��ll�� hetkell�� Afrikan Unionissa keskustellaan hankkeesta muodostaa Afrikan Yhdysvallat. Aiemmista hankkeista poiketen t��m��n uuden aloitteen ajatus perustuu ylikansallisuudelle, jossa yksitt��iset valtiot luovuttavat valtaansa ylikansallisille elimille, kuten Afrikan Unionin hallitukselle. N��in ollen on t��rke���� tarkastella aloitetta Afrikan Yhdysvaltojen perustamiseksi ja arvioida, voisiko t��llainen ylikansallinen organisaatio auttaa Afrikkaa k����nt��m����n globalisaation haittavaikutukset my��nteisiksi. T��m�� Pro Gradu-tutkielma v��itt���� sen olevan mahdollista, mutta vain siin�� tapauksessa ett�� Afrikka on valmis hyv��ksym����n yhten��isyyden rajoitukset. Aiemman tutkimuksen v��hyyden vuoksi on my��s tarpeen tutkia Afrikan Yhdysvalloista kansallisilla tasoilla k��yt��v���� keskustelua. T��m��n vuoksi t��ss�� tutkielmassa painotetaan esimerkkimaa Sambian kautta yhden Afrikan Unionin j��senmaan keskin��ist�� keskustelua aiheesta ja verrataan sit�� Afrikan Unionin tason keskusteluun. Tutkielma sis��lt���� kirjallisuuskatsauksen sek�� tapaustutkimuksen. Tutkimusaineisto koostuu sambialaisista sanomalehtiotteista sek�� Sambian valtion ja Afrikan Unionin virallisista asiakirjoista. P����asiallisena tutkimusmenetelm��n�� on laadullinen sis��ll��nanalyysi. Teoreettinen viitekehys perustuu afrikkalaisen valtion ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan, alueellistumisen, globalisaation hallinnan, pan-afrikkalaisuuden ja poliittisen integraation teorioihin sek�� historialliseen katsaukseen Afrikan yhten��isyydest��. Perimm��isen�� tarkoituksena on lis��t�� ymm��rryst�� afrikkalaisesta valtiosta ja politiikasta. Tutkimuksen tulosten mukaan on havaittavissa aukko valtioiden virallisten toimijoiden n��kemysten ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan huolenaiheiden v��lill��. Viralliset toimijat n��ytt��v��t olevan kansalaisyhteiskuntaa vahvemmin Afrikan Yhdysvaltojen kannalla. Virallisten toimijoiden korostaessa Afrikan aatteellista yhten��isyytt�� kansalaisyhteiskunta on huolissaan sen toteutumisesta k��yt��nn��ss��. Esiin nousee my��s kysymys 'afrikkalaisesta' identiteetist�� ja kansalaisuudesta sek�� kommunikaatiosta valtion ja kansalaisten v��lill��.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs��� shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia���s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article ���Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence��� by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs��� behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article ���A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights��� by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs��� behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekij��t lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden j��lkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by R��sen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosensch��ld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland��s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden��s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country��s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Bl��cher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany��s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland��s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud��s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in R��sen��s all-inclusive historical approach.

Kiista, eheys, unohdus : Vapaussodan muistaminen suojeluskunnan ja veteraaniliikkeen toiminnassa 1918-1944

Conflict, Unity, Oblivion: Commemoration of the Liberation War by the Civic Guard and the Veterans�� Union in 1918-1944 The Finnish Civil War ended in May 1918 as a victory for the white side. The war was named by the winners as the Liberation War and its legacy became a central theme for public commemorations during the interwar period. At the same time the experiences of the defeated were hindered from becoming a part of the official history of Finland. The commemoration of the war was related not only to the war experience but also to a national mission, which was seen fulfilled with the independence of Finland. Although the idea of the commemoration was to form a unifying non-political scene for the nation, the remembrance of the Liberation War rather continued than sought to reconcile to the conflict of 1918. The outbreak of the war between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939 immediately affected the memory culture. The new myth of the Miracle of the Winter War, which referred to the unity shown by the people, required a marginalization of controversial memory of the Liberation War. This study examines from the concepts of public memory and narrative templates how the problematic experience of a civil war developed to a popular public commemoration. Instead of dealing with the manipulative and elite-centered grandiose commemoration projects, the study focuses on the more modest local level and emphasizes the significance of local memory agents and narrative templates of collective memory. The main subjects in the study are the Civil Guard and the Veterans�� Union. Essential for the widespread movement was the development of the Civic Guard from a wartime organization to a peacetime popular movement. The guards, who identified themselves trough the memories and the threats of civil war, formed a huge network of memory agents in every corner of the country. They effectively linked both local memory with official memory and the civic society with the state level. Only with the emergence of the right wing veteran movement in the 30ies did the tensions grow between the two levels of public memory. The study shows the diversity of the commemoration movement of the Liberation War. It was not only a result of a nation-state project and political propaganda, but also a way for local communities to identify and strengthen themselves in a time of political upheaval and uncertainty.

Lippu, uhri, kansakunta : Ryhm��kokemukset ja -rajat Suomessa 1917 1945

This dissertation deals with the notions of sacrifice and violence in connection with the Fin��nish flag struggles between 1917 and 1945. The study begins with the basic idea that sacrificial thinking is a key element in nationalism and the social cohesion of large groups. The method used in the study combines anthropological notions of totemism with psychoanalytical object relation theory. The aim is to explore the social and psychological elements of the Finnish national flag and the workers flags during the times of crisis and nation building. The phenomena and concepts addressed include self-sacrifice, scapegoating, remembrance of war, inclusion, and exclusion. The research is located at the intersection of nationalism studies and the cultural history of war. The analysis is based primarily on the press debates, public speeches and archival sources of the civic organizations that promoted the Finnish flag. The study is empirically divided into three sections: 1) the years of the Revolution and the Civil War (1917 1918), 2) the interwar period (1919 1938), and 3) the Second World War (1939 1945). The research demonstrates that the modern national flags and workers flags in Finland maintain certain characteristics of primitive totems. When referred to as a totem the flag means an emotionally charged symbol, a reservoir of the collective ideals of a large group. Thus the flag issue offers a path to explore the perceptions and memory of sacrifice and violence in the making of the First Republic . Any given large group, for example a nation, must conceptually pursue a consensus on its past sacrifices. Without productive interpretation sacrifice represents only meaningless violence. By looking at the passions associated with the flag the study also illuminates various group identities, boundaries and crossings of borders within the Finnish society at the same time. The study shows further that the divisive violence of the Civil War was first overcome in the late 1930s when the social democrats adopted a new perception of the Red victims of 1918 they were seen as part of the birth pains of the nation, and not only the martyrs of class struggle. At the same time the radical Right became marginalized. The study also illuminates how this development made the Spirit of the Winter War possible, a genuine albeit brief experience of horizontal brother and sisterhood, and how this spirit was reflected in the popular adoption of the Finnish flag. The experience was not based only on the external and unifying threat posed by the Soviet Union: it was grounded in a sense of unifying sacrifice which reflected a novel way of understanding the nation and its past sacrifices. Paradoxically, the newly forged consensus over the necessity and the rewards of the common sacrifices of the Winter War (1939 1940) made new sacrifices possible during the Continuation War (1941 1944). In spite of political discord and war weariness, the concept of a unified nation under the national flag survived even the absurdity of the stationary war phase. It can be said that the conflict between the idea of a national community and parliamentary party politics dissolved as a result of the collective experience of the Second World War.

The Art of Adaptation : A study on the Europeanization of Finland's foreign and security policy

This study examines how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. It points to a growing interplay and misfit between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. It is concluded that the deepening European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy has played a significant role in a number of transformations in the Finnish policies since 1995. New, more European, meanings have been attached to the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. Neutrality and traditional peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle groups. Traditional small state identity has been recast more and more as small member stateness . At the same time Finland has entered an era of post-consensus in national foreign and security policy. A key theoretical argument in the background of the study is that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptation pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This means that Europeanization is principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory on state identity. Foreign and security policy is defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts are seen as the vehicles of identity production. It is concluded that for Finland, participation in the EU s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification. Concerning the Finnish attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it is concluded that they mainly relate to the compatibility of the potential development of EU s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy when Finland joined the EU, the analysis shows that its impact has continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. The primary research material includes official Finnish foreign and security policy documentation and the related parliamentary debates from 1994 to 2007. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.

Political Risk in Credit Evaluation: Empirical Studies and Survey Results

Financing trade between economic agents located in different countries is affected by many types of risks, resulting from incomplete information about the debtor, the problems of enforcing international contracts, or the prevalence of political and financial crises. Trade is important for economic development and the availability of trade finance is essential, especially for developing countries. Relatively few studies treat the topic of political risk, particularly in the context of international lending. This thesis explores new ground to identify links between political risk and international debt defaults. The core hypothesis of the study is that the default probability of debt increases with increasing political risk in the country of the borrower. The thesis consists of three essays that support the hypothesis from different angles of the credit evaluation process. The first essay takes the point of view of an international lender assessing the credit risk of a public borrower. The second investigates creditworthiness assessment of companies. The obtained results are substantiated in the third essay that deals with an extensive political risk survey among finance professionals in developing countries. The financial instruments of core interest are export credit guaranteed debt initiated between the Export Credit Agency of Finland and buyers in 145 countries between 1975 and 2006. Default events of the foreign credit counterparts are conditioned on country-specific macroeconomic variables, corporate-specific accounting information as well as political risk indicators from various international sources. Essay 1 examines debt issued to government controlled institutions and conditions public default events on traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to selected political and institutional risk factors. Confirming previous research, the study finds country indebtedness and the GDP growth rate to be significant indicators of public default. Further, it is shown that public defaults respond to various political risk factors. However, the impact of the risk varies between countries at different stages of economic development. Essay 2 proceeds by investigating political risk factors as conveivable drivers of corporate default and uses traditional accounting variables together with new political risk indicators in the credit evaluation of private debtors. The study finds links between corporate default and leverage, as well as between corporate default and the general investment climate and measeures of conflict in the debtor country. Essay 3 concludes the thesis by offering survey evidence on the impact of political risk on debt default, as perceived and experienced by 103 finance professionals in 38 developing countries. Taken together, the results of the thesis suggest that various forms of political risk are associated with international debt defaults and continue to pose great concerns for both international creditors and borrowers in developing countries. The study provides new insights on the importance of variable selection in country risk analysis, and shows how political risk is actually perceived and experienced in the riskier, often lower income countries of the global economy.

���Empire is a state of mind��� ��� Imagining Eurasia in Russia ���

Ty��ss��ni tarkastelen ven��l��ist�� neo-euraasianistista liikett�� ja tapoja joilla liikkeen aktivistit rakentavat Euraasiasta yhten��ist�� kokonaisuutta ja imperiumia. Keskeisi�� tutkimuskysymyksi��ni ovat: Mik�� imperiumi on ja mitk�� ovat sen keskeisi�� motivaatioita ja teemoja? Kuinka imperiumin idea rakentuu tai k��sitet����n ja t��m��n voi tulkita? Mink��laisia seurauksia voi tulkita heid��n tavallaan Euraasia n��hd�� olevan? Materiaalina k��yt��n haastatteluja, jotka on ker��tty Moskovassa kev����ll�� 2008, ja liikkeen kirjallisia tuotoksia (lehdet ja Internet -sivut). Neo-euraasianistisella liikkeell�� tarkoitan t��ss�� ty��ss�� Kansainv��list�� Euraasianistista liikett�� (Me��dunarodnoe Evrazijskoe Dvi��enie) ja sen alahaaraa Euraasianistista Nuorisoliittoa (Evrazijskij Sojuz Molod����i). Liike perustettiin virallisesti 2003, mutta rakentaa vahvasti historiallista yhteytt�� 1930 -luvun klassiseen eurasianismiin. T��m��n lis��ksi sen diskurssissa on paljon neuvostoliittolaisia, fasistisia, uuskonservatiivisia ja nationalistisia piirteit��. Liikkeen johtohahmo on filosofi-geopoliitikko Alexandr Dugin. Ty��n tausta-ajatuksena minua kiinnostaa etenkin nk. ��lymyst��n tai intelligenttien vaikutus nationalismiin tai sosiaalisia ryhmi�� m����rittelevien diskurssien kehitykseen ja muutokseen.Tarkastelen materiaalia diskurssianalyyttisesta n��k��kulmasta. N��en diskurssianalyysin sen tutkimisena, miten sosiaalista todellisuutta tuotetaan erilaisissa sosiaalisissa k��yt��nn��iss��. Samalla n��iden diskurssien tutkiminen, foucautlaisen perinteen my��t��, tarkastelee kriittisesti niiden tuottamia (aktualisoituneita sek�� potentiaalisia) valtasuhteita. K��yt��n ty��ss��ni my��s Benedict Andersonin kuvitellun yhteis��n (imagined communities) k��sitett��, joka auttaa hahmottamaan tapaa, jolla tutkimuskohteeni rakentavat imperiumia yhteis��n��. Aktivistien puheessa imperiumi (imperi��) tulee esiin p����asiallisesti positiivisesti ja ���heid��n omanaan,��� kun taas termi imperialismi (imperializm) p����osin negatiivisena, liittyen etenkin keskeisen�� vihollisena pidettyihin Yhdysvaltoihin. Esiin nousee monta toisiinsa liittyv���� teemaa, jotka jaottelen viideksi p����teemaksi. N��ist�� tarkastelen l��hemmin imperiumia ���kaikkien kansojen hyv��ntekij��n�� (poliittinen puoli)���, ulkoisen voiman l��hteen�� (historiallis-geopoliittinen puoli) sek�� kollektiivisen subjektin luojana (imperialistis-nationalistinen puoli). Pyrin kontekstualisoimaan diskurssin ja tarkastelemaan tapoja, joilla se ammentaa motiiveja my��s historiallis-kulttuurisista tavoista hahmottaa aluetta ja sen asukkaita. K��sittelen my��s kansan, kansakunnan, etnoksen ja nationalismin k��sitteit�� ja sit��, miten ne nousevat neo-eurasianistisessa diskursissa esiin. Imperiaalisen nationalismin (imperskij nacionalizm) k��site auttaa ymm��rt��m����n niit�� tapoja, jolla liike tekee sek�� pes��eroa nationalismiin ett�� samalla hy��dynt���� monia nationalistisen diskurssin perusteemoja. Er��s liikkeen diskurssin keskeisist�� eroista niin sanottuun nationalismin valtavirtaan on ���kansakunnan (naci��)��� k��sitteen vahva negatiivinen konnotaatio. Sen vastakohtana esiin nostetaan vahvasti kansan (narod) k��site. Samalla kuitenkin etnisen ven��l��isen (russkij) k��sitett�� k��ytet����n tavallista laajemmin ja kattavammin kuin tavallisesti, ja ennen kaikkea Ven��j�� nousee imperiumin keskeisimm��ksi tekij��ksi. Euraasialaiseen imperiumiin liitetyist�� positiivistista mielikuvista k��sittelen tarkemmin monikansallisuuden ja kansojen kodin ideaa, joka nousee mielest��ni huomattavaksi retoriseksi taustaksi kaikessa materiaalissa. T��h��n liittyy vahvasti my��s saman teeman sivujuonne, eli imperiumin ���vapauttava��� rooli. Tulkitsen, ett�� liikkeen imperiumi -diskurssilla on instrumentaalinen luonne: se legitimoi aktivistien vaatimuksia varsinkin entisen Neuvostoliiton alueen suhteen. ���Euraasialaisen kansan��� ajatus toimii mahdollisena Euraasiaa yhteisen�� tekij��n�� ���Neuvostokansan��� tilalla. Sen taustalla materiaalistani p����tellen siint��v��t kuitenkin enemm��nkin Ven��j�� ja ven��l��is -spesifit vaateet kuin koko Euraasia. Pohdin my��s kansakunnan (nation) hyljeksimisen syit�� ja k��sitteen sopivuutta Ven��j��lle, kuten my��s ven��l��isyyden k��sitteiden kerrostuneisuutta. Kokonaisuudessaan imperiumi tuli esiin abstraktina, utopistisena ja ���totaalisena��� kokonaisuutena.