32 resultados para Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Kirkon vai valtion kirjat? : Uskontokuntasidonnaisuuden ongelma Suomen väestökirjanpidossa 1839-1904
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The Population Register – run by the Church or the state? The problem posed by the obligation to belong to a religious community in the registration of births and deaths in Finland between 1839 and 1904 The Lutheran Church of Finland is the nation’s largest church; approximately 82 per cent of Finns were members in 2007. The Church ran an official register of its members until 1999, when the state then undertook this task. The registration of births and deaths by the Church has a long history dating back to the 17th century, when Bishop Johannes Gezelius Sr. decreed that all parish members would have to be recorded in parish registers. These registers were used to control how well parish members knew the Christian doctrine and, gradually, also if they were literate. Additionally, the Church attempted to ensure by means of the parish registers that parish members went to Holy Communion annually. Since everyone was a member of the Lutheran Church, the state also took advantage of the parish registers and used them for the purposes of tax collection and conscription. The main research theme of “The Population Register – run by the Church or the state?” goes back to these times. The actual research period covers the years of 1839–1904. At that time Finland was under Russian rule, although autonomous. In the late 19th century the press and different associations in Finland began to engage in public debate, and the country started moving from a submissive society to a civic one. The identity of the Lutheran Church also became more prominent when the Church Act and the General Synod were realised in 1869. A few years earlier, municipal and parish administrations had been separated, but the general registration of births and deaths was left to the Church to see to. In compliance with the constitution of the country, all the inhabitants in principle still had to be Lutheran. In practice, the situation was different. The religious and ideological realms diversified, and the Lutheran concept of religion was no longer acceptable to everyone. The conflict was reflected in the registration of births and deaths, which was linked to the Lutheran Church and its parish registers. Nobody was allowed to leave the Church, there was no civil register, and the Lutheran Church did not consent to record unbaptized children in the parish registers. Therefore such children were left without civil rights. Thus the obligation to belong to a religious community had become a problem in the registration of births and deaths. The Lutheran clergy also appealed to the 1723 privileges, according to which they had been exempted from the drawing up of additional population registers. In 1889 Finland passed the Dissenters Act. By virtue of this act the Baptists and the Methodists left the state Church, but this was not the case with the members of the free churches. The freethinkers had to retain their church membership, as the law did not apply to them. This meant that the unbaptized children of the members of the free churches or those of freethinkers were still not entered in any registers. The children were not able to go to school, work for the state or legally marry. Neither were they able to inherit property, as they did not legally exist. The system of parish registers was created when everyone was required to be a member of the Lutheran Church, but it did not work when liberal attitudes eventually penetrated the sphere of religion, too. The government´s measures to solve the problem were slow and cautious, partly because Finland was part of Russia, partly because there were only about 100 unbaptized children. As the problem group was small and the state´s resources were limited, no general civil register was established. The state accepted the fact that in spite of the problems, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the congregations of dissenters were the only official establishments to run populations registers in the country, and for social purposes, too. In 1900 the Diet of Finland finally approved a limited civil register, which unbaptized children and unregistered foreigners would be recorded in. Due to political reasons the civil register did not come into existence until 1917, after the actual research period.
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From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.
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National identity signifies and makes state s defence- and foreign policy behaviour meaningful. National consciousness is narrated into existence by narratives upon one s own exceptionalism and Otherness of the other nations. While national identity may be understood merely as a self-image of a nation, defence identity refers to the borders of Otherness and issues that have been considered as worth defending for. As national identities and all the world order models are human constructions, they may be changed by the human efforts as well; states and nations may deliberately promote communitarian or even cosmopolitan equality and tolerance without borders of Otherness. The main research question of the thesis is: How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era? The main empirical argument of the thesis is: Poland is a narrated idea of a Christian Catholic nation-state, which the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland as well as a majority of the Polish nation share. Polish defence identity has been almost impenetrable to contextual foreign and defence policy interactions during the post-Cold War era. While Christian religious ontology binds corporate Poland together, allowing her to survive any number of military and political catastrophes, it simultaneously brings her closer to the USA, raises tensions in the infidel EU-context, and restrains corporate Poland s pursuit of communitarian, or even cosmopolitan, global equality and tolerance. It is not the case that corporate Poland s foreign and defence policy orientation is instinctively Atlanticist by nature, as has been argued. Rather, it has been the State s rational project to overcome a habituated and reified fear of becoming geopolitically sandwiched between Russian and German Others by leaning on the USA; among the Polish nation, support for the USA has been declining since 2004. It is not corporate Poland either that has turned into a constructive European , as has been argued, but rather the Polish nation that has, at least partly, managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to a betrayal by Europe narrative, since it favours the EU as much as it favours NATO. It seems that in the Polish case a truly common European CFSP vis-à-vis Russia may offer a solution that will emancipate the Polish State from its habituated EU-sceptic role identity and corporate Poland from its narrated borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany, but even then one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one on a common stand towards Russia would satisfy the Poles themselves.
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In this thesis I examine the U.S. foreign policy discussion that followed the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. In the politically charged setting that preceded the presidential elections, the subject of the debate was not only Washington's response to the crisis in the Caucasus but, more generally, the direction of U.S. foreign policy after the presidency of George W. Bush. As of November 2010, the reasons for and consequences of the Russia-Georgia war continue to be contested. My thesis demonstrates that there were already a number of different stories about the conflict immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. I want to argue that among these stories one can discern a “neoconservative narrative” that described the war as a confrontation between the East and the West and considered it as a test for Washington’s global leadership. I draw on the theory of securitization, particularly on a framework introduced by Holger Stritzel. Accordingly, I consider statements about the conflict as “threat texts” and analyze these based on the existing discursive context, the performative force of the threat texts and the positional power of the actors presenting them. My thesis suggests that a notion of narrativity can complement Stritzel’s securitization framework and take it further. Threat texts are established as narratives by attaching causal connections, meaning and actorship to the discourse. By focusing on this process I want to shed light on the relationship between the text and the context, capture the time dimension of a speech act articulation and help to explain how some interpretations of the conflict are privileged and others marginalized. I develop the theoretical discussion through an empirical analysis of the neoconservative narrative. Drawing on Stritzel’s framework, I argue that the internal logic of the narrative which was presented as self-evident can be analyzed in its historicity. Asking what was perceived to be at stake in the conflict, how the narrative was formed and what purposes it served also reveals the possibility for alternative explanations. My main source material consists of transcripts of think tank seminars organized in Washington, D.C. in August 2008. In addition, I resort to the foreign policy discussion in the mainstream media.
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The Cold War era was characterized by ideological struggles that had a major impact on economic decision-making, and also on management practice. To date, however, these ideological struggles have received little attention from management and organizational scholars. To partially fill this research gap, we focus on the role of the media in these ideological struggles. Our starting point is that the media both reflect more general societal debates but also act as an agency promoting specific kinds of ideas and ideologies. In this sense, the media exercise significant power in society; this influece, however, is often subtle and easily dismissed in historical analyses focusing on political and corporate decision-making. In this article, we focus on the role of business journalism in the ideological struggles of the Cold War era. Our case in point is Finland, which is arguably a particularly interesting example due to its geo-political position between East and West. Our approach is socio-historical: we focus on the emergence and development of business journalism in the context of the specific struggles in the Finnish political and economic fields. Our analysis shows how the business journalists struggled between nationalist, pro-Soviet and pro-West political forces, but gradually developed into an increasingly influential force promoting neo-liberal ideology.
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For the past two centuries, nationalism has been among the most influential legitimizing principles of political organization. According to its simple definition, nationalism is a principle or a way of thinking and acting which holds that the world is divided into nations, and that national and political units should be congruent. Nationalism can thus be divided into two aspects: internal and external. Internally, the political units, i.e., states, should be made up of only one nation. Externally each nation-state should be sovereign. Transnational national governance of rights of national minorities violates both these principles. This study explores the formation, operation, and effectiveness of the European post-Cold War minorities system. The study identifies two basic approaches to minority rights: security and justice. These approaches have been used to legitimize international minority politics and they also inform the practice of transnational governance. The security approach is based on the recognition that the norm of national self-determination cannot be fulfilled in all relevant cases, and so minority rights are offered as a compensation to the dissatisfied national groups, reducing their aspiration to challenge the status quo. From the justice perspective, minority rights are justified as a compensatory strategy against discrimination caused by majority nation-building. The research concludes that the post-Cold War minorities system was justified on the basis of a particular version of the security approach, according to which only Eastern European minority situations are threatening because of the ethnic variant of nationalism that exists in that region. This security frame was essential in internationalising minority issues and justifying the swift development of norms and institutions to deal with these issues. However, from the justice perspective this approach is problematic, since it justified double standards in European minority politics. Even though majority nation-building is often detrimental to minorities also in Western Europe, Western countries can treat their minorities more or less however they choose. One of the main contributions of this thesis is the detailed investigation of the operation of the post-Cold War minorities system. For the first decade since its creation in the early 1990s, the system operated mainly through its security track, which is based on the field activities of the OSCE that are supported by the EU. The study shows how the effectiveness of this track was based on inter-organizational cooperation in which various transnational actors compensate for each other s weaknesses. After the enlargement of the EU and dissolution of the membership conditionality this track, which was limited to Eastern Europe from the start, has become increasingly ineffective. Since the EU enlargement, the focus minorities system has shifted more and more towards its legal track, which is based on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe). The study presents in detail how a network of like-minded representatives of governments, international organizations, and independent experts was able strengthen the framework convention s (originally weak) monitoring system considerably. The development of the legal track allows for a more universal and consistent, justice-based approach to minority rights in contemporary Europe, but the nationalist principle of organization still severely hinders the materialization of this possibility.
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In this thesis I examine the U.S. foreign policy discussion that followed the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. In the politically charged setting that preceded the presidential elections, the subject of the debate was not only Washington's response to the crisis in the Caucasus but, more generally, the direction of U.S. foreign policy after the presidency of George W. Bush. As of November 2010, the reasons for and consequences of the Russia-Georgia war continue to be contested. My thesis demonstrates that there were already a number of different stories about the conflict immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. I want to argue that among these stories one can discern a “neoconservative narrative” that described the war as a confrontation between the East and the West and considered it as a test for Washington’s global leadership. I draw on the theory of securitization, particularly on a framework introduced by Holger Stritzel. Accordingly, I consider statements about the conflict as “threat texts” and analyze these based on the existing discursive context, the performative force of the threat texts and the positional power of the actors presenting them. My thesis suggests that a notion of narrativity can complement Stritzel’s securitization framework and take it further. Threat texts are established as narratives by attaching causal connections, meaning and actorship to the discourse. By focusing on this process I want to shed light on the relationship between the text and the context, capture the time dimension of a speech act articulation and help to explain how some interpretations of the conflict are privileged and others marginalized. I develop the theoretical discussion through an empirical analysis of the neoconservative narrative. Drawing on Stritzel’s framework, I argue that the internal logic of the narrative which was presented as self-evident can be analyzed in its historicity. Asking what was perceived to be at stake in the conflict, how the narrative was formed and what purposes it served also reveals the possibility for alternative explanations. My main source material consists of transcripts of think tank seminars organized in Washington, D.C. in August 2008. In addition, I resort to the foreign policy discussion in the mainstream media.
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XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.
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XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.
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The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.