From Habits to Social Structures : Pragmatism and Contemporary Social Theory

Pragmatism has sometimes been taken as a catchphrase for epistemological stances in which anything goes. However, other authors argue that the real novelty and contribution of this tradition has to do with its view of action as the context in which all things human take place. Thus, it is action rather than, for example, discourses that should be our starting point in social theory. The introductory section of the book situates pragmatism (especially the ideas of G. H. Mead and John Dewey) within the field and tradition of social theory. This introductory also contextualizes the main core of the book which consists of four chapters. Two of these chapters have been published as articles in scientific journals and one in an edited book. All of them discuss the core problem of social theory: how is action related to social structures (and vice versa)? The argument is that habitual action is the explanation for the emergence of social structures from our action. Action produces structures and social reproduction takes place when action is habitualized; that is, when we develop social dispositions to act in a certain manner in familiar environments. This also means that even though the physical environment is the same for all of us, our habits structure it into different kinds of action possibilities. Each chapter highlights these general insights from different angles. Practice theory has gained momentum in recent years and it has many commonalities with pragmatism because both highlight the situated and corporeal character of human activity. One famous proponent of practice theory is Margaret Archer who has argued that the pragmatism of G. H. Mead leads to an oversocialized conception of selfhood. Mead does indeed present a socialized view of selfhood but this is a meta-sociological argument rather than a substantial sociological claim. Accordingly, one can argue that in this general sense intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and not the other way around. Such a view does not indicate that our social relation would necessarily "colonize" individual action because there is a place for internal conversations (in Archer s terminology); it is especially in those phases of action where it meets obstacles due to the changes of the environment. The second issue discussed has the background assumption that social structures can fruitfully be conceptualized as institutions. A general classification of different institution theories is presented and it is argued that there is a need for a habitual theory of institutions due to the problems associated with these other theories. So-called habitual institutionalism accounts for institutions in terms of established and prevalent social dispositions that structure our social interactions. The germs of this institution theory can be found in the work of Thorstein Veblen. Since Veblen s times, these ideas have been discussed for example, by the economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson. His ideas on the evolution of institutions are presented but a critical stance is taken towards his tendency of defining institutions with the help of rules because rules are not always present in institutions. Accordingly, habitual action is the most basic but by no means the only aspect of institutional reproduction. The third chapter deals with theme of action and structures in the context of Pierre Bourdieu s thought. Bourdieu s term habitus refers to a system of dispositions which structure social fields. It is argued that habits come close to the concept of habitus in the sense that the latter consists of particular kinds of habits; those that are related to the reproduction of socioeconomic positions. Habits are thus constituents of a general theory of societal reproduction whereas habitus is a systematic combination of socioeconomic habits. The fourth theme relates to issues of social change and development. The capabilities approach has been associated with the name of Amartya Sen, for example, and it underscores problems inhering in economistic ways of evaluating social development. However, Sen s argument has some theoretical problems. For example, his theory cannot adequately confront the problem of relativism. In addition, Sen s discussion lacks also a theory of the role of the public. With the help of arguments derived from pragmatism, one gets an action-based, socially constituted view of freedom in which the role of the public is essential. In general, it is argued that a socially constituted view of agency does not necessarily to lead to pessimistic conclusions about the freedom of action.

Proofs, Paradoxes, and Probabilities : The Logical Turn of Philosophy in Finland

This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.