从赌博游戏中的损失厌恶行为看情感预测与体验在决策中的作用

In Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson and Gilbert’s (2006) study on affective forecast, they found that people have a tendency to overestimate affective reactions in gains and losses, and people expect losses to have greater hedonic impact than gains of equal magnitude. Because of thus affective forecasting error, people prefer to irrationally avoid losses. Loss aversion is then seen as both a wealth-maximizing error and an affect-maximizing error. The present study examined the relationships among affective forecast, affective experience and loss aversion, and tested Kermer et al.’s (2006) conclusion that people’s loss aversion is an affective forecasting error. In experiment 1, we examined the relationship between affective forecast and loss aversion. Kermer et al.’s (2006) hypothesized that when people expect losses to have greater hedonic impact than gains, they will accept the gambling task, and when people expect gains to have greater hedonic impact than losses, they will refuse the gambling task. We found that (1) individuals with lower loss aversion had a greater tendency to accept a gambling task than those with higher loss aversion; (2) individuals with lower loss aversion expected losses and gains to have smaller affective impacts than those with higher loss aversion. Thus, people never exactly calculated their forecasting affective. In experiment 2, we examined the relationship between affective forecast and affective experience. Consistent with Kermer et al.’s (2006) finding, we found that our participants tended to overestimate affective reactions in gains as well as losses. More interestingly, Kermer et al.’s (2006) found that participants’ predictions for a loss were significantly more distant from experienced emotions than were their predictions for a win, we, however, found the opposite —participants’ predictions for a win were significantly more distant from the experienced emotions than were their predictions for a loss. These experiments further validated the relations between affection and decision making, and contributed to our understanding on the affective reactions to future events. Our study imply that it was not the exact calculation of affective forecast on decision outcomes, but rather the magnitude of affection on outcomes, that influenced people’s affective decision making. It indicated that those with lower magnitude of affection would less like to avoid losses, and thus more like to accept a gambling task.

不确定性类型对概率表达和概率判断的影响

The present research firstly reviewed the experimental literature on probability expression and probability judgment, hypothesizing that individuals’ preference of probability expressions (verbal probability vs. numerical probability) and tendency for overextremity in probability judgment might differ with respect to different types of uncertainty. Five studies were conducted to test this hypothesis. In Study 1, questionnaires were used to explore the communication preference among Chinese-speaking people. Study 2 adapted the View of Uncertainty Questionnaire to explore the difference of verbal answers to three kinds of uncertainty. Study 3 and Study 4 used methods of the paper-and-pencil questionnaire and the laboratory experiment, respectively, to test the effects of uncertainty types on the preference of probability expressions and on the tendency for over-extreme probability judgment. Finally, Study 5 focused on individuals’ preference of probability expressions under various kinds of scenarios. The results were as follows: 1. The Communication Model Preference paradox phenomenon appears to be even more pronounced in the Chinese culture than in American English cultural settings. 2. The Chinese prefer more verbal probability expressions when communicating uncertainty in a weather-forecasting context than in a general context. 3. Sample groups with lower level of westernization tend to give more extreme answers and less probabilistic answers. 4. Types of uncertainty did have effects on individuals’ tendency for over-extreme probability judgment: under a traditional probability judgment task, people tend to be more over-extreme on internal uncertainty events than on external uncertainty events; however, this result is reversed under a gambling task. 5. Individuals’ preference for verbal probability expressions is more salient on internal uncertain events than on external uncertain events.