Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

Endogenous Unions Formation

This paper analyzes the process of endogenous union formation in the context of a sequential bargaining model between a firm and several unions and tries to explain why workers may be represented by several unions of different sizes. We show that the equilibrium number of unions and their relative size depend on workers' attitudes toward the risk of unemployment and union configuration is independent of labor productivity.

The Impact of Firm Level Contracting on Wage Levels and Inequality: Spain 1995-2002

This paper provides microeconomic evidence on the variation over time of the firm-specific wage premium in Spain from 1995 to 2002, and its impact on wage inequality. We make use of two waves of a detailed linked employer-employee data set. In addition, a new data set with financial information on firms is used for 2002 to control as flexibly as possible for differences in the performance of firms (aggregated at industry level). To our knowledge, there is no microeconomic evidence on the dynamics of the firm-specific wage premium for Spain or for any other country with a similar institutional setting. Our results suggest that there is a clear tendency towards centralization in the collective bargaining process in Spain over this seven-year period, that the firm-level contract wage premium undergoes a substantial decrease, particularly for women, and finally that the "centralization" observed in the collective bargaining process has resulted in a slight decrease in wage inequality.

The effect of firm-level contracts on the structure of wages: evidence from matched employer-employee data

Revised: 2006-11

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Consumer Expertise or Credit Risk? An empirical analysis of mortgage pricing

Loan mortgage interest rates are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process. Credit risk, consumer cross-buying potential, bundling, financial market competition and other features affecting the bargaining power of the parties could affect price. We argue that, since mortgage loan is a complex product, consumer expertise could be a relevant factor for mortgage pricing. Using data on mortgage loan prices for a sample of 1055 households for the year 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005), and including credit risk, costs, potential capacity of the consumer to generate future business and bank competition variables, the regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Other factors such as credit risk and consumer cross-buying potential do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices. Our empirical results are affected by the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on this issue.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

The Relevance of Relative Position in Ultimatum Games

This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position.

Hitzarmen kolektiboen ultraktibitatearen desagerpena

[EU]Lan erreforma indarrean sartu arte, hitzarmen kolektiboen negoziazioen porrotak, aurreko hitzarmenak indarraldia mantentzen jarraitzen zuela zekarren kontrako akordiorik egon ezean. Egun ordea, indarraldi hori urtebetera mugatu egiten da, eta hala, behin epe hori igarota eraginkortasuna galduko du, kontrako akordiorik ez badago, eta beraz, goragoko hitzarmena aplikatuko da (existitzen bada). Erreforma honek, hitzarmenen birnegoziazioa sustatzea eta lan baldintzen petrifikaziorik ez gertatzea du helburu. Baina, araudi berriak, interpretazio arazo ugari sortzen dituenez, lan honekin, eman daitezkeen erantzun posibleak landuko ditugu; eta auzitegiek zein irizpide jarraitu duten aztertuko da. Hitz gakoak: hitzarmen kolektiboa, ultraktibitatea, indarraldia, goragoko hitzarmen kolektiboa.

Enplegua eta Lan Harremanen aldaketak XXI.mendean.

[EU] Gradu amaierako lan honetan, XXI.mendeko Lan Erreforma adierazgarrienak kronologikoki erakusten dira, hauetako bakoitzean, hurrengo lau aldagai hauen analisiaren bitartez, hain zuzen, kontratazioak eta enplegua, langabezia, pentsioak eta negoziazio kolektiboa. Gainera, ELA, LAB, CCOO eta UGT sindikatuei elkarrizketa bat burutu zaie, erreformei buruzko iritzia jaso eta kolektibo bakoitzaren ezinegonak eta parekotasunak ezagutzeko helburuarekin. Era honetan, analisi zehatz honen bidez, XXI.mendean zehar enpleguan eta lan harremanetan emandako aldaketak islatzea da funtsezko xedea.