Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects\' beliefs on contributions and allow us to conclude that, firstly, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, secondly, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs.

On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Confianza del consumidor en la compra a través de Internet: una propuesta de modelización basada en la jerarquía de aprendizaje estándar

[ES] Este trabajo se encuadra dentro de los estudios centrados en el análisis del comportamiento de compra del consumidor en Internet. Nos centramos en la adaptación del modelo de la jerarquía de efectos basado en su variante de la jerarquía estándar de aprendizaje para proponer teóricamente un modelo conceptual que explica cómo las creencias —i.e. diseño, velocidad de interacción, beneficios sociales y privacidad— y actitudes del consumidor hacia Internet, como medio de comunicación, pueden considerarse como determinantes plausibles de la confianza en la compra online. Asimismo, en nuestro modelo se plantea que las opiniones del consumidor respecto a la compra a distancia también deben ejercer una influencia sobre sus valoraciones de Internet, como medio de comunicación y, especialmente, de compra.

El papel de internet en la convergencia cultural: un análisis teórico basado en la aproximación constructivista dinámica desde la perspectiva de las interacciones online de los consumidores

[ES] Este trabajo plantea y analiza, con un enfoque teórico, el papel que puede tener Internet como factor impulsor clave de la convergencia cultural entre países. En este respecto, se reflexiona en torno a una propuesta teórica central, tomando como base principal la aproximación cultural constructivista dinámica. En esencia, se teoriza sobre cómo los valores compartidos por parte de los individuos (consumidores) procedentes de diferentes culturas en este medio, fruto de procesos interactivos e iterativos de comunicación online, pueden ser transferidos de manera plausible a cada una de sus culturas primarias o de origen, fomentando, por tanto, la aproximación de las mismas en el largo plazo.

Posibilidades de la compraventa B2C por teléfono móvil en comparación con Internet

[ES] Las nuevas tecnologías han supuesto una gran oportunidad para mejorar la gestión empresarial. Recientemente el teléfono móvil está ofreciendo grandes posibilidades a nivel comercial: ha incorporado televisión, cámara, radio, chat y ahora se están introduciendo las empresas en el campo de la publicidad a través del móvil y en otros países también en la venta por el móvil. Pese a la proliferación de trabajos sobre distribución comercial y sobre comercio electrónico, los trabajos que exploran las posibilidades y retos del teléfono móvil y que lo comparan con Internet para la compraventa son escasos.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

Learning in Network Games

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use this information to estimate learning types using maximum likelihood methods. There is substantial heterogeneity in learning types. However, the vast majority of our participants' decisions are best characterized by reinforcement learning or (myopic) best-response learning. The distribution of learning types seems fairly stable across contexts. Neither network topology nor the position of a player in the network seem to substantially affect the estimated distribution of learning types.

A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for convex games the SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel coincide.

Fuentes de información en internet en el área de economía y empresa

Hoy en día la información sufre una evolución y transformación constantes, y para cualquier análisis o estudio hay que tener muy en cuenta las fuentes de información existentes en internet. El objetivo de este artículo es hacer un recorrido por la red centrando el interés en la selección de fuentes de información económica y empresarial. A la hora de seleccionar las fuentes electrónicas disponibles hay que tener en cuenta la diversa tipología documental existente: publicaciones periódicas, monografías, workingpapers, tesis, informes, actas de congresos, normas, patentes, etc.

Playing games with words cultural transfer in David Lynch's Blue Velvet

Eguíluz, Federico; Merino, Raquel; Olsen, Vickie; Pajares, Eterio; Santamaría, José Miguel (eds.)

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.