A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags

In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms.

Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs

Revised 2008-08.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Public Economic Theory (2008), 10(4), 563-594.

Does Immigration Raise Natives’ Income? National and Regional Evidence from Spain

How immigration affects the labor market of the host country is a topic of major concern for many immigrant-receiving nations. Spain is no exception following the rapid increase in immigrant flows experienced over the past decade. We assess the impact of immigration on Spanish natives’ income by estimating the net immigration surplus accruing at the national level and at high immigrant-receiving regions while taking into account the imperfect substitutability of immigrant and native labor. Specifically, using information on the occupational densities of immigrants and natives of different skill levels, we develop a mapping of immigrant-to-native self-reported skills that reveals the combination of natives across skills that would be equivalent to an immigrant of a given self-reported skill level, which we use to account for any differences between immigrant self-reported skill levels and their effective skills according to the Spanish labor market. We find that the immigrant surplus amounts to 0.04 percent of GDP at the national level and it is even higher for some of the main immigrant-receiving regions, such as Cataluña, Valencia, Madrid, and Murcia.

The New Keynesian Monetary Model: Does it Show the Comovement Between Output and Inflation in the U.S.?

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2008), 32(May), pp. 1466-1488.

How Does the New Keynesian Monetary Model Fit in the U.S. and the Eurozone? an Indirect Inference Approach

This paper estimates a standard version of the New Keynesian monetary (NKM) model under alternative specifications of the monetary policy rule using U.S. and Eurozone data. The estimation procedure implemented is a classical method based on the indirect inference principle. An unrestricted VAR is considered as the auxiliary model. On the one hand, the estimation method proposed overcomes some of the shortcomings of using a structural VAR as the auxiliary model in order to identify the impulse response that defines the minimum distance estimator implemented in the literature. On the other hand, by following a classical approach we can further assess the estimation results found in recent papers that follow a maximum-likelihood Bayesian approach. The estimation results show that some structural parameter estimates are quite sensitive to the specification of monetary policy. Moreover, the estimation results in the U.S. show that the fit of the NKM under an optimal monetary plan is much worse than the fit of the NKM model assuming a forward-looking Taylor rule. In contrast to the U.S. case, in the Eurozone the best fit is obtained assuming a backward-looking Taylor rule, but the improvement is rather small with respect to assuming either a forward-looking Taylor rule or an optimal plan.

The Importance of Stock Market Returns in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules: a Structural Approach

This paper estimates a standard version of the New Keynesian Monetary (NKM) model augmented with financial variables in order to analyze the relative importance of stock market returns and term spread in the estimated U.S. monetary policy rule. The estimation procedure implemented is a classical structural method based on the indirect inference principle. The empirical results show that the Fed seems to respond to the macroeconomic outlook and to the stock market return but does not seem to respond to the term spread. Moreover, policy inertia and persistent policy shocks are also significant features of the estimated policy rule.

Term Structure and the Estimated Monetary Policy Rule in the Eurozone

Published as an article in: Spanish Economic Review, 2008, vol. 10, issue 4, pages 251-277.

The Comovement between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Instruments during the Post-War Period in the U.S.

This paper empirically studies the dynamic relationship between monetary and fiscal policies by analyzing the comovements between the Fed funds rate and the primary deficit/output ratio. Simple economic thinking establishes that a negative correlation between Fed rate and deficit arises whenever the two policy authorities share a common stabilization objective. However, when budget balancing concerns lead to a drastic deficit reduction the Fed may reduce the Fed rate in order to smooth the impact of fiscal policy, which results in a positive correlation between these two policy instruments. The empirical results show (i) a significant negative comovement between Fed rate and deficit and (ii) that deficit and output gap Granger-cause the Fed funds rate during the post-Volcker era, but the opposite is not true.

Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building

In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses.

Social Housing under Oligopoly

In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.

Social Security, Education, Retirement and Growth

In this paper we analyze the effects of social security policies in an unfunded, earnings-related social security system on the incentives to education investment and voluntary retirement, on growth and on income inequality. Growth is endogenously driven by human capital investment, individuals differ in their innate (learning) ability at birth, and the pension scheme includes a minimum pension. More skilled individuals spend more on education, minimum pensions reduce low skill individuals' incentives to invest in human capital, there is no monotonic relationship between per capita growth and income inequality.

Non-Stationary Demand in a Durable Goods Monopoly

In a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price level she wishes than when she cannot. Moreover, the equilibrium under a monopolist with commitment power may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist without commitment ability. These results affect the desired regulation of a durable goods monopolist in this context.

Optimal Correction for Guessing in Multiple-Choice Tests

Building on Item Response Theory we introduce students’ optimal behavior in multiple-choice tests. Our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high, because although correction for guessing discriminates against risk-averse subjects, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that the penalty prevents. This result obtains when knowledge is binary or partial, under different normalizations of the score, when risk aversion is related to knowledge and when there is a pass-fail break point. We also find that the mean degree of difficulty should be close to the mean level of knowledge and that the variance of difficulty should be high.

The Impact of Firm Level Contracting on Wage Levels and Inequality: Spain 1995-2002

This paper provides microeconomic evidence on the variation over time of the firm-specific wage premium in Spain from 1995 to 2002, and its impact on wage inequality. We make use of two waves of a detailed linked employer-employee data set. In addition, a new data set with financial information on firms is used for 2002 to control as flexibly as possible for differences in the performance of firms (aggregated at industry level). To our knowledge, there is no microeconomic evidence on the dynamics of the firm-specific wage premium for Spain or for any other country with a similar institutional setting. Our results suggest that there is a clear tendency towards centralization in the collective bargaining process in Spain over this seven-year period, that the firm-level contract wage premium undergoes a substantial decrease, particularly for women, and finally that the "centralization" observed in the collective bargaining process has resulted in a slight decrease in wage inequality.