A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags
| Data(s) |
01/02/2012
01/02/2012
01/09/2008
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms. |
| Identificador |
1988-088X http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6611 RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200808 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II |
| Relação |
DFAEII 2008.08 |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Palavras-Chave | #optimal punishments #detection lags #collusion sustainability |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
