Squeezing-induced complete transparency in two-level systems

The modification of the statistical properties of vacuum fluctuations, via quadrature squeezing, can dramatically reduce the absorptive and dispersive properties of two-level atoms. We show that for some range of parameter values the system exhibits zero absorption accompanied by zero dispersion of the probe field. This complete transparency is attributed to the coherent population oscillations induced by the squeezed vacuum.

Monocular transparency is not a new form of unpaired stereopsis

Howard and Duke (2003) generated stereograms with a grey transparent square offset from a vertical bar in one eye, and a vertical bar with a gap in the other eye. They argued that these displays were 'without conventional disparity' and that the metrical depth experienced was a new form of unpaired stereopsis due to 'transparency rather than occlusion'. Another possibility is that the perceived depth in these displays was obtained from horizontal contours. To test this possibility, we generated three displays that contained similar horizontal contourterminations, but were inconsistent with transparency. Reliable depth was seen in all stimuli. We conclude that in our stimuli, and those of Howard and Duke, transparency is not responsible for the perception of depth, which appears to be based instead on disparate horizontal contour terminations. Our results also show that disparate contours of opposite contrast polarity can generate depth.

Commercial-in-confidence: An obituary to transparency?

This article addresses the issue of accountability and transparency in relation to the use of commercial-in-confidence clauses to withhold information. The issue is contentious. On the one hand some like the Senate Finance and Public Administration Reference Committee (SFPARC) argue that: 'Put simply there can be no accountability if there is no information' (SFPARC 2000). On the other hand, an alternative view is: 'I think that the sanctity of contract... [is] a fundamental pillar of our legal system, and if private businesses enter into contracts with governments that specify confidentiality, then that ought to be respected' (Paterson 1999). This paper is an abridged version of a keynote address to CPA Australia (Queensland Division) Audit Intensive Day 2000, Brisbane Hilton, 10 November 2000.

Transparency of the municipal public management: a study from the homepages of the large Brazilian municipalities

This study attempts to check the transparency level of information in public administration published in the homepages of 96 municipalities included among the 100 most populous in Brazil and what characteristics and socioeconomic indicators of the municipalities can contribute to explain the level of transparency observed. The level of transparency in public administration was established from a research model called Transparency Index Municipal Public Management (ITGP-M) constructed based on international codes of good governance and transparency, the Brazilian legislation and the experiences of previous studies of similar nature conducted in Brazil and abroad. The empirical evidence point to low levels of transparency, incompatible with the level of socioeconomic development of municipalities. Moreover, we can conclude that, overall, there is an association between the socioeconomic conditions of the municipalities and the levels of transparency in the disclosure of information about public administration observed in sites of large municipalities as in this study.

Transparency in project bond ratings: Assessment of rating methodologies and development of a proven rating simulator

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Transparency in financial reporting by European Foundations

The increasing role of the European Foundations, urges for more transparency. The prevalent accounting frameworks in which they operate and report their activities are mostly based on national laws. This lack of harmonization, limits comparison between European foundations. Thus, this Work Project analyzes the current financial reporting by European foundations, and evaluates the similarities, differences and data availability between countries. The research provides evidence about little information available, deficiency in the financial reporting, within and between countries. The research recommends the need to ensure uniformity by providing a clear definition for public-benefit purpose, harmonization of laws and financial reporting.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Access to information in Switzerland : From secrecy to transparency

Access to information legislations are now present in over 50 countries world-wide. Lagging behind some of its own Cantons, the Swiss Federal government was until recently one of the few hold outs in Europe. But, in December 2004, the Confederation voted the 'Loi sur la Transparence de l'administration' or Law on Transparency (LTrans) a Law that came into effect in July 2006. This paper presents an overview of the new Law and underlines the main institutional challenges to its introduction in Switzerland.

Comrades or Culprits? Donor Engagement and Budget Transparency in Aid Dependent Countries

Budget transparency has come to be considered a key aspect of governance. Over the past decade, donors have invested increasing resources in strengthening processes through which budget transparency in developing countries can be enhanced. According to the 2008 Open Budget Index (OBI) Report, however, aid dependency and budget transparency appear to be inversely correlated. This article looks at the role of donor agencies in promoting or preventing budget transparency in aid dependent countries. It analyzes data for a sample of 16 aid-dependent countries included in the OBI, to test some preliminary hypotheses and select six countries for which more detailed findings are then presented. All of these countries have implemented reforms aimed at enhancing budget transparency, with substantial donor support. These, however, often had only limited success, partly because they were not well adapted to the local context, and partly because donors put limited emphasis on improving public access to budget information. Donor efforts were also often offset by other characteristics of donor interventions, namely their fragmentation, lack of transparency, and limited use of program aid modalities such as budget support and pooled sector funding.

From Opacity to Transparency? The Place of Organized Interests within the European Institutions

Regulació dels Grup d'interès en la governança europea és crucial per a una comprensió completa de com s'exerceix el poder a la Unió Europea (UE) i per a una descripció més precisa de com funciona el sistema polític de la UE (i dels seus principis subjacents). Un dels temes principals aquí és com els interessos privats o particulars comprometre amb un interès general o públic encarnat en una forma o altra per aquells que actuen per a la UE. Donada la varietat de temes sensibles en joc, no és d'estranyar que la qüestió de la regulació es troba amb una resistència considerable, sobre tot en la Comissió. No obstant això, els recents obstacles a la integració europea han tingut l'efecte de rellançar un debat que fa que l'ètica i la transparència de les peces centrals de l'agenda. Dinàmiques polítiques actuals semblen donar testimoni d'una creixent receptivitat de la UE a les reivindicacions del moviment ALTER-EU que busca un entorn molt més regulat per cabilderos i funcionaris comunitaris.

Market Transparency, Market Quality and Sunshine Trading

This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We find that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Key words: Market Microstructure, Transparency, Prior Information, Market Quality, Sunshine Trading