Exchange relationships in building services maintenance activity : a test of transaction cost economics and the resource dependency view

The firm is faced with a decision concerning the nature of intra-organizational exchange relationships with internal human resources and the nature or inter-organizational exchange relationships with market firms. In both situations, the firm can develop an exchange that ranges from a discrete exchange to a relational exchange. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Dependency View (RDV) represent alternative efficiency-based explanations fo the nature of the exchange relationship. The aim of the paper is to test these two theories in respect of air conditioning maintenance in retail centres. Multiple sources of information are genereated from case studies of Australian retail centres to test these theories in respoect of internalized operations management (concerning strategic aspects of air conditioning maintenance) and externalized planned routine air conditioning maintenance. The analysis of the data centres on pattern matching. It is concluded that the data supports TCE - on the basis of a development in TCE's contractual schema. Further research is suggested towards taking a pluralistic stance and developing a combined efficiency and power hypothesis - upon which Williamson has speculated. For practice, the conclusions also offer a timely cautionary note concerning the adoption of one approach in all exchange relationships.

Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Share

PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants.

Integrating the resource-based view and transaction cost economics in immigrant business performance

This paper presents a new integrated framework that integrates the resource-based view and transaction cost economics to explain the phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship. We extend the existing literature on immigrant entrepreneurship by identifying different types of ethnic network resources and demonstrating how these resources interact with transaction costs in the context of Chinese immigrants. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical framework which identifies mechanisms immigrant entrepreneurs use to strategically deploy resources to minimize costs and maximize performance outcomes.

Information sharing with key suppliers : a transaction cost theory perspective

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explain variations in discretionary information shared between buyers and key suppliers. The paper also aims to examine how the extent of information shared affects buyers’ performance in terms of resource usage, output, and flexibility. ----- ----- Design/methodology/approach: The data for the paper comprise 221 Finnish and Swedish non-service companies obtained through a mail survey. The hypothesized relationships were tested using partial least squares modelling with reflective and formative constructs.----- ----- Findings: The results of the study suggest that (environmental and demand) uncertainty and interdependency can to some degree explain the extent of information shared between a buyer and key supplier. Furthermore, information sharing improves buyers’ performance with respect to resource usage, output, and flexibility.----- ----- Research limitations/implications: A limitation to the paper relates to the data, which only included buyers.Abetter approach would have been to collect data from both, buyers and key suppliers. Practical implications – Companies face a wide range of supply chain solutions that enable and encourage collaboration across organizations. This paper suggests a more selective and balanced approach toward adopting the solutions offered as the benefits are contingent on a number of factors such as uncertainty. Also, the risks of information sharing are far too high for a one size fits all approach.----- ----- Originality/value: The paper illustrates the applicability of transaction cost theory to the contemporary era of e-commerce. With this finding, transaction cost economics can provide a valuable lens with which to view and interpret interorganizational information sharing, a topic that has received much attention in the recent years.

Modelling the intention to adopt cloud computing services : a transaction cost theory perspective

This paper uses transaction cost theory to study cloud computing adoption. A model is developed and tested with data from an Australian survey. According to the results, perceived vendor opportunism and perceived legislative uncertainty around cloud computing were significantly associated with perceived cloud computing security risk. There was also a significant negative relationship between perceived cloud computing security risk and the intention to adopt cloud services. This study also reports on adoption rates of cloud computing in terms of applications, as well as the types of services used.

Networks and RegionalCompetitiveness: Towards a Transaction Cost Approach of Small-Scale Cooperation

A preoccupation with competition often dominates the study of governance. A focus on competition often unnecessarily precludes the possibility that regional institutions can suspend competition in certain areas and facilitate cooperation among potential rivals, thereby potentially contributing to their mutual success. In many ways companies cooperating through these types of networks have a greater degree of flexibility than firms which are forced to rely solely on hierarchies or markets for solutions to their problems. In order to fully understand how such networks work, this article first parses out differences in definitions of networks in order to understand how the type of network mentioned above actually differs from other uses of this term. Then it develops a theory of governance that goes beyond hierarchies and markets by demonstrating how this type of network can lead to reductions in transaction costs. This claim is illustrated on hand from examples of alternative forms of organization in Germany and Italy.

The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

Interpreting risk allocation mechanism in public-private partnership projects : an empirical study in a transaction cost economics perspective

Risk allocation in public-private partnership (PPP) projects is currently claimed as capability driven. While lacking theoretical support, the claim is often 'violated' by current industrial practice. There is thus a need for formal mechanisms to interpret why a particular risk is retained by government in one project while transferred to private partners in another. From the viewpoint of transaction cost economics (TCE), integrated with the resource-based view (RBV) of organizational capabilities, this paper proposed a theoretical framework for understanding risk allocation practice in PPP projects. The theories underlying the major constructs and their links were articulated. Data gathered from an industry-wide survey were used to test the framework. The results of multiple linear regression (MLR) generally support the proposed framework. It has been found that partners' risk management routine, mechanism, commitment, cooperation history, and uncertainties associated with project risk management could serve to determine the risk allocation strategies adopted in a PPP project. This theoretical framework thus provides both government and private agencies with a logical and complete understanding of the process of selecting the allocation strategy for a particular risk in PPP projects. Moreover, it could be utilized to steer the risk allocation strategy by controlling certain critical determinants identified in the study. Study limitations and future research directions have also been set out.

Allocating risks in public-private partnership projects using a transaction cost economics approach - a case study

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects are often characterised by increased complexity and uncertainty due to their idiosyncrasy in the management and delivery processes such as long-term lifecycle, incomplete contracting, and the multitude of stakeholders. An appropriate risk allocation is particularly crucial to achieving project success. This paper focuses on the risk allocation in PPP projects and argues that the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory can integrate the economics part, which is currently missing, into the risk management research. A TCE-based approach is proposed as a logical framework for allocating risks between public and private sectors in PPP projects. A case study of the Southern Cross Station redevelopment project in Australia is presented to illustrate the approach. The allocation of important risks is put under scrutiny. Lessons learnt are discussed and alternative management approaches drawing on TCE theory are proposed.