Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

Financial liberalization and sectoral reallocation of capital in South Africa

We examine the impact of financial reforms on efficient reallocation of capital within and between sectors in South Africa using firm-level panel data for the period 1991–2008. The measure of efficient allocation of capital is based on the Tobin’s Q. We find that financial reforms are associated with improvements in within-sector, but not between-sector allocation of capital. These results imply that for South Africa to unleash the potential for take-off that is often associated with reallocation of resources from the primitive to modern sectors, reforms that focus beyond the financial sector are necessary. While more research is necessary to determine what would fully constitute such additional reforms, our analysis shows that reforms that improve the quality of economic institutions may be a step in the right the direction.

Corporate philanthropy, reputation risk management and shareholder value: A study of Australian corporate giving

This study examines the role of corporate philanthropy in the management of reputation risk and shareholder value of the top 100 ASX listed Australian firms for the three years 2011-2013. The results of this study demonstrate the business case for corporate philanthropy and hence encourage corporate philanthropy by showing increasing firms’ investment in corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax, increases the likelihood of an increase in shareholder value. However, the proviso is that firms must also manage their reputation risk at the same time. There is a negative association between corporate giving and shareholder value (Tobin’s Q) which is mitigated by firms’ management of reputation. The economic significance of this result is that for every cent in the dollar the firm spends on corporate giving, Tobin’s Q will decrease by 0.413%. In contrast, if the firm increase their reputation by 1 point then Tobin’s Q will increase by 0.267%. Consequently, the interaction of corporate giving and reputation risk management is positively associated with shareholder value. These results are robust while controlling for potential endogeneity and reverse causality. This paper assists both academics and practitioners by demonstrating that the benefits of corporate philanthropy extend beyond a gesture to improve reputation or an attempt to increase financial performance, to a direct collaboration between all the factors where the benefits far outweigh the costs.

Corporate Governance in China (summary section only)

The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.

The impact of stock option incentives on investment and firm value

This paper analyzes the relations among firm-level stock option portfolio incentives, investment, and firm value based on a sample of Finnish firms during the time period 1987 – 2000. Utilizing exact and complete information regarding stock option portfolio characteristics, we find some evidence that firm investment is increasing in the incentives to increase stock price (delta) and risk (vega). Furthermore, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between both incentive effects and firm value (Tobin’s Q). In contrast, when we allow for stock option incentives, investment, and firm value to be simultaneously determined, we find no evidence that investment is increasing in incentives. However, even after controlling for endogeneity, we find that both incentive effects arising from stock option compensation display a positive and significant effect on firm value. Finally, in contradiction to earlier findings, we observe that neither Tobin’s Q nor investment drives incentives.

What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?

This paper analyzes factors driving the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. We examine determinants of the scope of plans, exercise price, target group, and dividend protection. The scope is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to proxies for monitoring costs. The scope is also greater in broad-based plans, and in plans with dividend protection. Prior stock return is found to be negatively related to the size of the premium (out-of-the-moneyness), whereas dividend protection increases the premium. The results also suggest that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. Furthermore, the likelihood of granting broad-based plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints, and decreasing in firm size. Broad-based plans are also more likely among firms in growth industries. We find support that the likelihood of dividend protection is decreasing in foreign ownership. In addition, firms paying zero-dividends are less likely to include dividend protection, whereas higher unsystematic risk is associated with a greater likelihood of including dividend protection.

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance:Evidence from Finland

This paper examines the association between corporate governance attributes and firm performance of Finnish firms during 1990 – 2000. The empirical results suggest that corporate governance matters for firm performance. First, univariate test results indicate that firms characterized by a high (efficient) level of corporate governance have delivered greater stock returns, are higher valued based on the measure of Tobin’s Q, and exhibit higher ratios of cash flow to assets, on average, in comparison to their counterparts characterized by a low (inefficient) level of corporate governance. Second, controlling for a number of well-known determinants of stock returns, we find evidence that firms categorized by inefficient corporate governance have delivered inferior returns to shareholders during the investigation period. Finally, after controlling for several common determinants of firm value, we find that firms characterized by efficient corporate governance have been valued higher during the investigation period, measured by Tobin’s Q.

Company financial performance: Does board size matter? Case of the EUROSTOXX50 index

[EN] This study analyzes the relationship between board size and economic-financial performance in a sample of European firms that constitute the EUROSTOXX50 Index. Based on previous literature, resource dependency and agency theories, and considering regulation developed by the OECD and European Union on the normative of corporate governance for each country in the sample, the authors propose the hypotheses of both positive linear and quadratic relationships between the researched parameters. Using ROA as a benchmark of financial performance and the number of members of the board as measurement of the board size, two OLS estimations are performed. To confirm the robustness of the results the empirical study is tested with two other similar financial ratios, ROE and Tobin s Q. Due to the absence of significant results, an additional factor, firm size, is employed in order to check if it affects firm performance. Delving further into the nature of this relationship, it is revealed that there exists a strong and negative relation between firm size and financial performance. Consequently, it can be asseverated that the generic recommendation one size fits all cannot be applied in this case; which conforms to the Recommendations of the European Union that dissuade using generic models for all countries.

The cost of multiple large shareholders

Previous research argues that large non-controlling shareholders enhance firm value because they deter expropriation by the controlling shareholder. We propose that the conflicting incentives faced by large shareholders may induce a nonlinear relationship between the relative size of large shareholdings and firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we present evidence that there are costs of having a second (and third) largest shareholder, especially when the largest shareholdings are similar in size. Our results are robust to various relative size proxies, firm performance measures, model specifications, and potential endogeneity issues.

Enterprise risk management adoption: An empirical investigation of its effects on firm performance

Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is gaining relevance among financial and non-financial companies but its benefits still are uncertain. This paper aims at investigating the relationship between ERM adoption and firm performance based on a sample of 1130 non-financial companies belonging to the STOXX® index. A content analysis of individual accounts is performed to distinguish adopters, and a regression analysis explores the effect of ERM adoption on firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s Q. The findings suggest that there is a statistical significant positive effect of ERM adoption on firm performance, meaning that firms are benefiting from the implementation of this process.

The relationship between the education level of successor's and the firm performance in German publicly listed family firms- an empirical analysis

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how far the education level of the second or third generation of publicly traded German family firms affects the post-succession firm performance. By conducting a correlational and regression design, the aim is to examine how several variables influence the performance of family firms. Performance measures, for example ROA and Tobin’s q and variables, like Education level and succession periods, examine analytically that a positive succession trend will occur. However, with the used model, only a less rigid model shows empirical evidence.

Finite-Sample Inference Methods for Simultaneous Equations and Models with Unobserved and Generated Regressors

We propose finite sample tests and confidence sets for models with unobserved and generated regressors as well as various models estimated by instrumental variables methods. The validity of the procedures is unaffected by the presence of identification problems or \"weak instruments\", so no detection of such problems is required. We study two distinct approaches for various models considered by Pagan (1984). The first one is an instrument substitution method which generalizes an approach proposed by Anderson and Rubin (1949) and Fuller (1987) for different (although related) problems, while the second one is based on splitting the sample. The instrument substitution method uses the instruments directly, instead of generated regressors, in order to test hypotheses about the \"structural parameters\" of interest and build confidence sets. The second approach relies on \"generated regressors\", which allows a gain in degrees of freedom, and a sample split technique. For inference about general possibly nonlinear transformations of model parameters, projection techniques are proposed. A distributional theory is obtained under the assumptions of Gaussian errors and strictly exogenous regressors. We show that the various tests and confidence sets proposed are (locally) \"asymptotically valid\" under much weaker assumptions. The properties of the tests proposed are examined in simulation experiments. In general, they outperform the usual asymptotic inference methods in terms of both reliability and power. Finally, the techniques suggested are applied to a model of Tobin’s q and to a model of academic performance.

Debt composition and exchange rate balance sheet effects in Brazil: A firm level analysis

In this paper we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990’s. We start by assessing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change in the exchange rate risk than small firms. We then proceed to investigate if and how exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment. Contrary to earlier findings (Bleakley and Cowan, 2002), we found that firms more indebted in foreign currency tend to invest less when there is an exchange rate devaluation. We tried different controls for the competitiveness effect. First, we control directly for the effect of the exchange rate on exports and imported inputs. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin’s q can provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a negative exchange rate balance sheet effect in Brazil. The results concerning the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment are statistically significant and robust across the different specifications. We tested the results across different periods, classified according to the macroeconomic environment. Our findings suggest that the negative exchange rate balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating exchange rate period. We also found that exchange rate devaluations have important negative impact on both cash flows and sales of indebted firms. Furthermore, the impact of exchange rate variations is asymmetric, and the significant effect detected when no asymmetry is imposed is engendered by exchange rate devaluations.

Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance

We argue in this paper that executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. Based on this idea we develop and test a hypothesis about how CEOs’ power to influence decisions will affect firm performance: since managers’ opinions may differ, firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power should experience more variability in firm performance. Thus performance depends on the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables. By focusing on this interaction we are able to use firm-level characteristics to test predictions that are related to unobservable managerial characteristics. Using such firmlevel characteristics of the Executive Office we develop a proxy for the CEO’s power to influence decisions and provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our proxy for CEO influence power. The results are robust across various tests designed to detect differences in variability.

Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly, greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition.