Social cognition, language acquisition and the development of the theory of mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive achievement that enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the prediction and explanation of behavior. Most normally developing children acquire ToM between the ages of 3 and 5 years, but serious delays beyond this chronological and mental age have been observed in children with autism, as well is in those with severe sensory impairments. We examine data from Studies of ToM in normally developing children and those with deafness, blindness, autism and Williams syndrome, as well as data from lower primates, in a search for answers to key theoretical questions concerning the origins, nature and representation of knowledge about the mind. In answer to these, we offer a framework according to which ToM is jointly dependent upon language and social experience, and is produced by a conjunction of language acquisition with children's growing social understanding, acquired through conversation and interaction with others. We argue that adequate language and adequate social skills are jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally necessary, for producing ToM. Thus our account supports a social developmental theory of the genesis of human cognition, inspired by the work of Sellars and Vygotsky.

Theory of mind and peer acceptance in preschool children

Two studies tested the hypothesis that preschool children's theory of mind ability is related to their levels of peer acceptance. In Study 1, 78 children between the ages of 4 and 6 provided peer nominations that allowed determination of social preference and social impact scores, and classification in one of five peer status groups (following Coie & Dodge, 1983). Children were also tested on five different theory of mind tasks. The results showed that theory of mind scores were significantly related to social preference scores in a subsample of children who were over 5 years old. Further, popular children were found to score higher on theory of mind tasks than children classified as rejected. Study 2 replicated and extended the first study with a new sample of 87 4- to 6-year-old children. Study 2 included measures of peer acceptance, theory of mind ability and verbal intelligence, as well as teacher ratings of prosocial and aggressive behaviours. The results of Study 2 showed that for the total group of children, prosocial behaviour was the best predictor of social preference scores. When the Study 2 sample was split into older and younger children, theory of mind ability was found to be the best predictor of social preference scores for the older children (over age 5), while aggressive and prosocial behaviours were the best predictors of peer acceptance in the younger children. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that the impact of theory of mind ability on peer acceptance is modest but increases with children's age.

Opening windows into the mind: mothers' preferences for mental state explanations and children's theory of mind

A new questionnaire, the Maternal Mental State Input Inventory (MMSII) was created to measure mothers' preferences for introducing and elaborating on mental states in conversation with their young children. In two studies, the questionnaire was given to mothers of young children, and the children's theory of mind (ToM) development was assessed with standard tasks. In both studies, the questionnaire exhibited good internal reliability, and significant correlations emerged between mothers' self-reported preferences for elaborated, explanatory talk about the mental states and children's theory of mind performance. Further, mothers' conversational preferences, as measured by the MMSII, were the best predictors of children's theory of mind development when relevant control variables were included in the analyses. These results converge with naturalistic observational research that has demonstrated links between mothers' conversational styles and their children's theory of mind. They go further in suggesting that mothers' tendencies toward elaborated, explanatory talk about a range of mental states is particularly beneficial to children's theory of mind development. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Theory of mind tasks and executive functions: A systematic review of group studies in neurology.

A growing number of studies have been addressing the relationship between theory of mind (TOM) and executive functions (EF) in patients with acquired neurological pathology. In order to provide a global overview on the main findings, we conducted a systematic review on group studies where we aimed to (1) evaluate the patterns of impaired and preserved abilities of both TOM and EF in groups of patients with acquired neurological pathology and (2) investigate the existence of particular relations between different EF domains and TOM tasks. The search was conducted in Pubmed/Medline. A total of 24 articles met the inclusion criteria. We considered for analysis classical clinically accepted TOM tasks (first- and second-order false belief stories, the Faux Pas test, Happe's stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and Cartoon's tasks) and EF domains (updating, shifting, inhibition, and access). The review suggests that (1) EF and TOM appear tightly associated. However, the few dissociations observed suggest they cannot be reduced to a single function; (2) no executive subprocess could be specifically associated with TOM performances; (3) the first-order false belief task and the Happe's story task seem to be less sensitive to neurological pathologies and less associated to EF. Even though the analysis of the reviewed studies demonstrates a close relationship between TOM and EF in patients with acquired neurological pathology, the nature of this relationship must be further investigated. Studies investigating ecological consequences of TOM and EF deficits, and intervention researches may bring further contributions to this question.

The longitudinal association between social functioning and theory of mind in first episode psychosis

Introduction. There is some cross-sectional evidence that theory of mind ability is associated with social functioning in those with psychosis but the direction of this relationship is unknown. This study investigates the longitudinal association between both theory of mind and psychotic symptoms and social functioning outcome in first-episode psychosis. Methods. Fifty-four people with first-episode psychosis were followed up at 6 and 12 months. Random effects regression models were used to estimate the stability of theory of mind over time and the association between baseline theory of mind and psychotic symptoms and social functioning outcome. Results. Neither baseline theory of mind ability (regression coefficients: Hinting test 1.07 95% CI 0.74, 2.88; Visual Cartoon test 2.91 95% CI 7.32, 1.51) nor baseline symptoms (regression coefficients: positive symptoms 0.04 95% CI 1.24, 1.16; selected negative symptoms 0.15 95% CI 2.63, 2.32) were associated with social functioning outcome. There was evidence that theory of mind ability was stable over time, (regression coefficients: Hinting test 5.92 95% CI 6.66, 8.92; Visual Cartoon test score 0.13 95% CI 0.17, 0.44). Conclusions. Neither baseline theory of mind ability nor psychotic symptoms are associated with social functioning outcome. Further longitudinal work is needed to understand the origin of social functioning deficits in psychosis.

Hemispheric asymmetry and theory of mind: Is there an association?

Introduction. In autism and schizophrenia attenuated/atypical functional hemispheric asymmetry and theory of mind impairments have been reported, suggesting common underlying neuroscientific correlates. We here investigated whether impaired theory of mind performance is associated with attenuated/atypical hemispheric asymmetry. An association may explain the co-occurrence of both dysfunctions in psychiatric populations. Methods. Healthy participants (n 129) performed a left hemisphere (lateralised lexical decision task) and right hemisphere (lateralised face decision task) dominant task as well as a visual cartoon task to assess theory of mind performance. Results. Linear regression analyses revealed inconsistent associations between theory of mind performance and functional hemisphere asymmetry: enhanced theory of mind performance was only associated with (1) faster right hemisphere language processing, and (2) reduced right hemisphere dominance for face processing (men only). Conclusions. The majority of non-significant findings suggest that theory of mind and functional hemispheric asymmetry are unrelated. Instead of ''overinterpreting'' the two significant results, discrepancies in the previous literature relating to the problem of the theory of mind concept, the variety of tasks, and the lack of normative data are discussed. We also suggest how future studies could explore a possible link between hemispheric asymmetry and theory of mind.

Theory of mind and cognitive processes in aging and Alzheimer type dementia: a systematic review.

OBJECTIVES: Theory of mind (ToM) performance in aging and dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT) has been a growing interest of researchers and recently, theoretical trends in ToM development have led to a focus on determining the cognitive skills involved in ToM performance. The aim of the present review is to answer three main questions: How is ToM assessed in aging and DAT? How does ToM performance evolve in aging and DAT? Do cognitive processes influence ToM performance in aging and DAT? METHOD: A systematic review was conducted to provide a targeted overview of recent studies relating ToM performance with cognitive processes in aging and DAT. RESULTS: RESULTS suggest a decrease in ToM performance, more pronounced in complex ToM tasks. Moreover, the review points up the strong involvement of executive functions, especially inhibition, and reasoning skills in ToM task achievement. CONCLUSION: Current data suggest that the structure of ToM tasks itself could lead to poor performance, especially in populations with reduced cognitive abilities.

Theory of mind and social functioning in first episode psychosis

There is evidence of associations between social functioning and theory of mind performance and between social functioning and negative symptoms in chronic psychosis. This study investigates these associations in those with first episode psychosis who are unaffected by factors related to long-term mental illness. Our first hypothesis states that there is an association between theory of mind and social functioning. The second hypothesis states that there is no association between symptoms of psychosis and social functioning. Methods. Fifty-two individuals with first episode psychosis were assessed for social functioning, theory of mind ability (using the Hinting test with verbal stimuli and the Visual Cartoon test with pictorial stimuli), and symptoms of psychosis. Multivariable logistic regression was used to examine associations. Results. Social functioning and theory of mind were associated when measured by the Hinting test (OR 1.70, 95% CI 1.08, 2.66), but not with the Visual Cartoon test (ToM jokes OR 0.61, 95% CI 0.15, 2.53). There was no association between social functioning and symptoms (psychotic symptoms; OR 0.95, 95% CI 0.81, 1.12; selected negative symptoms; OR 1.33, 95% CI 0.78, 2.25). Conclusions. Theory of mind assessed by verbal stimuli is associated with social functioning in a population with first episode psychosis. These findings may be related to language disorders in psychosis.

Social Cognition is not Reducible to Theory of Mind. When Children use Deontic Rules to Predict Others' Behaviors

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deonticreasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point tothe existence of such non-mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviourof others. In Study 1, young children (3- and 4-year-olds) were told different versionsof classic false-belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a ruleor a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, theperformance of 3-year-olds, who fail traditional false-belief tasks, significantly improved.In Study 2, 3-year-olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and touse it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified versionof the false-belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the socialcognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involvemind reading.