Social Cognition is not Reducible to Theory of Mind. When Children use Deontic Rules to Predict Others' Behaviors
Data(s) |
01/11/2011
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Resumo |
The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deonticreasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point tothe existence of such non-mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviourof others. In Study 1, young children (3- and 4-year-olds) were told different versionsof classic false-belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a ruleor a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, theperformance of 3-year-olds, who fail traditional false-belief tasks, significantly improved.In Study 2, 3-year-olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and touse it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified versionof the false-belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the socialcognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involvemind reading. |
Identificador |
http://serval.unil.ch/?id=serval:BIB_8C7EA5454F48 doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.2010.02019.x |
Idioma(s) |
en |
Fonte |
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 910-928 |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article article |