Taxes and decision rights in multinationals

We examine how a multinational's choice to centralize or decentralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in multinational enterprises (MNEs)—here, as a strategic precommitment device and a tax manipulation instrument—we show that centralization is more profitable when tax differentials are large. When tax differentials are small, decentralization can be performed in two different ways each providing the highest profits in a particular range of the tax differential. Hence, the paper emphasizes the organizational flexibility that MNEs have in pursuing tax optimization.

Cywilnoprawne granice optymalizacji podatkowej w zakresie podatku dochodowego od osób prawnych (analiza struktur planowania podatkowego)

Wydział Prawa i Administracji

The generation of virtual prototypes for performance optimization

I am suspicious of tools without a purpose - tools that are not developed in response to a clearly defined problem. Of course tools without a purpose can still be useful. However the development of first generation CAD was seriously impeded because the solution came before the problem. We are in danger of repeating this mistake if we do not clarify the nature of the problem that we are trying to solve with the next generation of tools. Back in the 1980s I used to add a postscript slide at the end of CAD conference presentations and the applause would invariably turn to concern. The slide simple asked: can anyone remember what it was about design that needed aiding before we had computer aided design?