Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option (ESO) disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001 to 2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements’ continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive ESO information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders’ Association), and regulatory intervention.

Essays on Stock Option Compensation and the Role of Incentives and Risk (summary section only)

Managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased rapidly around the world. Early empirical research showed that pay-for-performance sensitivity resulting from stock ownership and stock options appeared to be quite low during the 1970s and early 1980s in the U.S. However, recent empirical research from the U.S. shows an enormous increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity. The global trend has also reached Finland, where stock options have become a major ingredient of executive compensation. The fact that stock options seem to be an appealing form of remuneration from a theoretical point of view combined with the observation that the use of this compensation form has increased significantly during the recent years, implies that research on the dynamics of stock option compensation is highly relevant for the academic community, as well as for practitioners and regulators. The research questions of the thesis are analyzed in four separate essays. The first essay examines whether stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms are consistent with predictions from principal-agent theory. The second essay explores one of the major puzzles in the compensation literature by studying determinants of stock option contract design. In theory, optimal contract design should vary according to firm characteristics. However, in the U.S., variation in contract design seems to be surprisingly low, a phenomenon generally attributed to tax and accounting considerations. In Finland, however, firms are not subject to stringent contracting restrictions, and the variation in contract design tends, in fact, to be quite substantial. The third essay studies the impact of price- and risk incentives arising from stock option compensation on firm investment. In addition, the essay explores one of the most debated questions in the literature, in particular, the relation between incentives and firm performance. Finally, several strands of literature in both economics and corporate finance hypothesize that economic uncertainty is related to corporate decision-making. Previous research has shown that risk tends to slow down firm investment. In the fourth essay, it is hypothesized that firm risk slows down growth from a more universal perspective. Consistent with this view, it is shown that risk not only tends to slow down firm investment, but also employment growth. Moreover, the essay explores whether the nature of firms’ compensation policies, in particular, whether firms make use of stock option compensation, affects the relation between risk and firm growth. In summary, the four essays contribute to the current understanding of stock options as a form of equity incentives, and how incentives and risk affect corporate decision-making. By this, the thesis promotes the knowledge related to the modern theory of the firm.

Factors Driving Stock Option Grants - Empirical Evidence from Finland

This study contributes to the executive stock option literature by looking at factors driving the introduction of such a compensation form on a firm level. Using a discrete decision model I test the explanatory power of several agency theory based variables and find strong support for predictability of the form of executive compensation. Ownership concentration and liquidity are found to have a significant negative effect on the probability of stock option adoption. Furtermore, I find evidence of CEO ownership, institutional ownership, investment intensity, and historical market return having a significant and a positive relationship to the likelihood of adopting a executive stock option program.

The impact of stock option incentives on investment and firm value

This paper analyzes the relations among firm-level stock option portfolio incentives, investment, and firm value based on a sample of Finnish firms during the time period 1987 – 2000. Utilizing exact and complete information regarding stock option portfolio characteristics, we find some evidence that firm investment is increasing in the incentives to increase stock price (delta) and risk (vega). Furthermore, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between both incentive effects and firm value (Tobin’s Q). In contrast, when we allow for stock option incentives, investment, and firm value to be simultaneously determined, we find no evidence that investment is increasing in incentives. However, even after controlling for endogeneity, we find that both incentive effects arising from stock option compensation display a positive and significant effect on firm value. Finally, in contradiction to earlier findings, we observe that neither Tobin’s Q nor investment drives incentives.

What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?

This paper analyzes factors driving the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. We examine determinants of the scope of plans, exercise price, target group, and dividend protection. The scope is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to proxies for monitoring costs. The scope is also greater in broad-based plans, and in plans with dividend protection. Prior stock return is found to be negatively related to the size of the premium (out-of-the-moneyness), whereas dividend protection increases the premium. The results also suggest that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. Furthermore, the likelihood of granting broad-based plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints, and decreasing in firm size. Broad-based plans are also more likely among firms in growth industries. We find support that the likelihood of dividend protection is decreasing in foreign ownership. In addition, firms paying zero-dividends are less likely to include dividend protection, whereas higher unsystematic risk is associated with a greater likelihood of including dividend protection.

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Essays on Stock Options, Incentives, and Managerial Action

Executive compensation and managerial behavior have received an increasing amount of attention in the financial economics literature since the mid 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of managerial compensation, especially how stock option compensation is linked to the actions undertaken by the management. Furthermore, managerial compensation is continuously and heatedly debated in the media and an emerging consensus from this discussion seems to be that there still exists gaps in our knowledge of optimal contracting. In Finland, the first executive stock options were introduced in the 1980s and throughout the last 15 years it has become increasingly popular for Finnish listed firms to use this type of managerial compensation. The empirical work in the thesis is conducted using data from Finland, in contrast to most previous studies that predominantly use U.S. data. Using Finnish data provides insight of how market conditions affect compensation and managerial action and provides an opportunity to explore what parts of the U.S. evidence can be generalized to other markets. The thesis consists of four essays. The first essay investigates the exercise policy of the executive stock option holders in Finland. In summary, Essay 1 contributes to our understanding of the exercise policies by examining both the determinants of the exercise decision and the markets reaction to the actual exercises. The second essay analyzes the factors driving stock option grants using data for Finnish publicly listed firms. Several agency theory based variables are found to have have explanatory power on the likelihood of a stock option grant. Essay 2 also contributes to our understanding of behavioral factors, such as prior stock return, as determinants of stock option compensation. The third essay investigates the tax and stock option motives for share repurchases and dividend distributions. We document strong support for the tax motive for share repurchases. Furthermore, we also analyze the dividend distribution decision in companies with stock options and find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. We thus document that the cutting of dividends found in previous U.S. studies can be avoided by dividend protection. In the fourth essay we approach the puzzle of negative skewness in stock returns from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. We suggest that negative skewness in stock returns is generated by management disclosure practices and find proof for this. More specifically, we find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when non-scheduled firm specific news is disclosed.

Executive Stock Options: Exercise Policy and Market Reaction

In this paper I investigate the exercise policy, and the market reaction to that, of the executive stock option holders in Finland. The empirical tests are conducted with aggregated firm level data from 34 firms and 41 stock option programs. I find some evidence of an inverse relation between the exercise intensity of the options holders and the future abnormal return of the company share price. This finding is supported by the view that information about future company prospect seems to be the only theoretical attribute that could delay the exercise of the options. Moreover, a high concentration of exercises in the beginning of the exercise window is predicted and the market is expected to react to deviations from this. The empirical findings however show that the market does not react homogenously to the information revealed by the late exercises.

The Acceleration of Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123 (R)

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the expensing of stock options with FAS 123 (R). As of March 2006, 749 companies had accelerated the vesting of their employee stock options and avoided a reduction in their reported profits that otherwise would have occurred under the new standard. There are many different motives for the acceleration strategy, and the focus of this study is to determine whether shareholders viewed these motives as either positive or negative. A favorable return subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder's viewed management's motives as positive. An unfavorable return subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder's viewed management's motives as negative. The evidence from this study suggests that shareholders reacted favorably, on average, to acceleration announcements. However, these results lack statistical significance and are based on a small sample, thus, they should be interpreted with caution.

The meaning of implied volatility in pricing stock options traded in options markets

Ph.D. in the Faculty of Business Administration

Asymmetries in Business Cycles

Esta disertación busca estudiar los mecanismos de transmisión que vinculan el comportamiento de agentes y firmas con las asimetrías presentes en los ciclos económicos. Para lograr esto, se construyeron tres modelos DSGE. El en primer capítulo, el supuesto de función cuadrática simétrica de ajuste de la inversión fue removido, y el modelo canónico RBC fue reformulado suponiendo que des-invertir es más costoso que invertir una unidad de capital físico. En el segundo capítulo, la contribución más importante de esta disertación es presentada: la construcción de una función de utilidad general que anida aversión a la pérdida, aversión al riesgo y formación de hábitos, por medio de una función de transición suave. La razón para hacerlo así es el hecho de que los individuos son aversos a la pérdidad en recesiones, y son aversos al riesgo en auges. En el tercer capítulo, las asimetrías en los ciclos económicos son analizadas junto con ajuste asimétrico en precios y salarios en un contexto neokeynesiano, con el fin de encontrar una explicación teórica de la bien documentada asimetría presente en la Curva de Phillips.

The relationship between implied and realized volatility : evidence from the Australian stock index option market

This paper examines the relationship between the volatility implied in option prices and the subsequently realized volatility by using the S&P/ASX 200 index options (XJO) traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) during a period of 5 years. Unlike stock index options such as the S&P 100 index options in the US market, the S&P/ASX 200 index options are traded infrequently and in low volumes, and have a long maturity cycle. Thus an errors-in-variables problem for measurement of implied volatility is more likely to exist. After accounting for this problem by instrumental variable method, it is found that both call and put implied volatilities are superior to historical volatility in forecasting future realized volatility. Moreover, implied call volatility is nearly an unbiased forecast of future volatility.

Risk Minimizing Option Pricing in a Semi-Markov Modulated Market

We address risk minimizing option pricing in a semi-Markov modulated market where the floating interest rate depends on a finite state semi-Markov process. The growth rate and the volatility of the stock also depend on the semi-Markov process. Using the Föllmer–Schweizer decomposition we find the locally risk minimizing price for European options and the corresponding hedging strategy. We develop suitable numerical methods for computing option prices.