Essays on Stock Options, Incentives, and Managerial Action

Executive compensation and managerial behavior have received an increasing amount of attention in the financial economics literature since the mid 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of managerial compensation, especially how stock option compensation is linked to the actions undertaken by the management. Furthermore, managerial compensation is continuously and heatedly debated in the media and an emerging consensus from this discussion seems to be that there still exists gaps in our knowledge of optimal contracting. In Finland, the first executive stock options were introduced in the 1980s and throughout the last 15 years it has become increasingly popular for Finnish listed firms to use this type of managerial compensation. The empirical work in the thesis is conducted using data from Finland, in contrast to most previous studies that predominantly use U.S. data. Using Finnish data provides insight of how market conditions affect compensation and managerial action and provides an opportunity to explore what parts of the U.S. evidence can be generalized to other markets. The thesis consists of four essays. The first essay investigates the exercise policy of the executive stock option holders in Finland. In summary, Essay 1 contributes to our understanding of the exercise policies by examining both the determinants of the exercise decision and the markets reaction to the actual exercises. The second essay analyzes the factors driving stock option grants using data for Finnish publicly listed firms. Several agency theory based variables are found to have have explanatory power on the likelihood of a stock option grant. Essay 2 also contributes to our understanding of behavioral factors, such as prior stock return, as determinants of stock option compensation. The third essay investigates the tax and stock option motives for share repurchases and dividend distributions. We document strong support for the tax motive for share repurchases. Furthermore, we also analyze the dividend distribution decision in companies with stock options and find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. We thus document that the cutting of dividends found in previous U.S. studies can be avoided by dividend protection. In the fourth essay we approach the puzzle of negative skewness in stock returns from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. We suggest that negative skewness in stock returns is generated by management disclosure practices and find proof for this. More specifically, we find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when non-scheduled firm specific news is disclosed.