Inequality, state ownership and the European Union: How economic context and economic ideology shape support for the European Union

This article investigates the extent to which economic ideology affects people's support for European Union integration and how this is conditioned by economic context. We argue that people on the economic left who live in a country with conditions of high income inequality and little state ownership will support European integration, because more integration would move public policy in a left-wing direction. By contrast, people on the left who live in a country with conditions of low income inequality and widespread public ownership are likely to be eurosceptic, as further integration would result in a more right-wing public policy. We empirically confirm our hypotheses and discuss the implications for European Union democracy.

State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

The effects of state ownership in the internationalization of emerging multinationals

Esta tese é um compendio de três trabalhos de pesquisa que visam analisar o efeito da participação do estado na estrutura de propriedade das Multinacionais de Países Emergentes (EMNEs). A participação do estado como acionista é um fenómeno que pode trazer novas contribuições no âmbito da governança corporativa, administração da empresa e a tomada de decisões estratégicas. Os estudos aqui inclusos permitem identificar, a partir de momentos, diferentes, até que ponto o estado, na posição de proprietário da EMNE, pode impactar a mesma. Os trabalhos vão desde os mecanismos de escolha de firmas nas quais investir ate o impacto no ritmo de internacionalização das empresas, explicando também os mecanismos que o estado usa para ganhar aceso à tomada de decisões por meio de mudanças na governança corporativa

Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.

Privatisation, state ownership and productivity:evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between the transfer of ownership between the public and private sectors of Chinese industry, and its impacts on performance. We link ownership changes to productivity growth, and demonstrate that privatisation contributes significantly. We offer an extension that is generally ignored in the literature, in looking at firms that are taken back into state ownership, and evaluating the productivity growth effects of this. Further, we highlight the well-understood simultaneity problems, and demonstrate the hazard of ignoring the issue by comparing various estimators, including the modified control function approach. In general, the results stress the importance of allowing for such endogeneity when evaluating the productivity effects of ownership change.

Ownership, corporate governance and IPO post-listing liquidity

This thesis investigates how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to the post-listing liquidity of IPO firms. Using a sample of 1,049 Chinese IPOs from 2001 to 2010, the results show firms with a broader shareholder base and higher ownership concentration have greater post-listing liquidity. So do firms with higher state ownership and lower institution ownership. Corporate governance is also important; post-listing liquidity is higher for firms with CEO duality, a larger and more independent board, and more frequent board meetings. The 2005 Split Share Structure Reform, which increased the proportion of tradable shares, has a positive impact on liquidity.

Does control-ownership divergence impair market liquidity in an emerging market? Evidence from China

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.

The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this study also shows that the share split reform and the improvement of institutional environment both weaken the negative relationship and strengthen the positive relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and non-SOEs to some extent. This paper documents how the financing behaviour of SOEs is more influenced by government intervention, while the financing behaviour of non-SOEs is more market oriented.

State advances and private retreats? Evidence from the decomposition of the Chinese manufacturing aggregate productivity decomposition in China

This paper is motivated by the recent debate on the existence and scale of China's 'Guo Jin Min Tui' phenomenon, which is often translated as 'the state sector advances and the private sector retreats'. We argue that the profound implication of an advancing state sector is not the size expansion of the state ownership in the economy per se, but the likely retardation of the development of the already financially constrained private sector and the issues around the sustainability of the already weakening Chinese economy growth. Drawing on recent methodological advances, we provide a critical analysis of the contributions of the state and non-state sectors in the aggregate Total Factor Productivity and its growth over the period of 1998-2007 to verify the existence of GJMT and its possible impacts on Chinese economic growth. Overall, we find strong and consistent evidence of a systematic and worsening resource misallocation within the state sector and/or between the state sectors and private sectors over time. This suggests that non-market forces allow resources to be driven away from their competitive market allocation and towards the inefficient state sector. Crown Copyright © 2014.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

The compatibility of leasehold and freehold tenure arrangements with environmental offset and trading initiatives

Environmental offsets and environmental trading initiatives are being rapidly introduced into environmental regulatory regimes. These relatively new legal mechanisms are attempting to fill in the gaps left by command and control regulation. The introduction of environmental offset and trading policy in Queensland will need to be compatible with existing land tenure regulation. Who owns and who uses natural resources are controlled by a range of legislative reservations and restrictions. Reservations give the State ownership of certain natural resources such as minerals, quarry material and, in some circumstances, forest products. Where there is a reservation in operation, the land holders rights are weakened. Restrictions in relation to uses prevent land holders from carrying out certain activities on the land. An example of a restriction of use is the operation of the Vegetation Management Act 1999(Qld), which prescribes the manner in which vegetation is to be dealt with. This article explores the nature of freehold and leasehold land tenure in Queensland and examines the effect of reservations and restrictions upon the operation of environmental offset and trading initiatives. Presently Queensland legislation does not directly address the relationship between land tenure and environmental offset and trading initiatives. The stability of tenure required for the creation of environmental offsets can be at odds with the flexibility allowed for under leasehold arrangements. This flexibility may act to undermine the permanency requirement of environmental offset creation (i.e. the guarantee that the offset is created for the long term).

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector

Is there evidence that market forces effectively discipline risk management behaviour within Chinese financial institutions? This study analyses information from a comprehensive sample of Chinese banks over the 1998-2008 period. Market discipline is captured through the impact of four sets of factors namely, market concentration, interbank deposits, information disclosure, and ownership structure. We find some evidence of a market disciplining effect in that: (i) higher (lower) levels of market concentration lead banks to operate with a lower (higher) capital buffer; (ii) joint-equity banks that disclose more information to the public maintain larger capital ratios; (iii) full state ownership reduces the sensitivity of changes in a bank's capital buffer to its level of risk;(iv) banks that release more transparent financial information hold more capital against their non-performing loans. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Law, technology and water conflicts in developing societies: a case study of tank systems in Tamil Nadu

The study examines the relationship between law, technology and water conflicts from colonial days to the present in traditional (water) tank systems in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Tanks are man-made water systems developed for irrigation and many other purposes in semi-arid areas. The thesis adopts a historical approach to study the development of law, particularly property rights, and takes an empirical approach to investigate the tank conflicts. Archival documents on irrigation development, Case laws, Focus Group Discussions, Open ended Interviews and Field visits to selected tank chains are used as source material for the discussion. Case studies of conflicts are described and analyzed at three levels - Vaigai river basin for a macro level, Kothai Anicut system in Cauvery basin for a meso level, and twenty other interconnected tanks for a micro-level. The thesis deviates from the conventional understanding that tanks as traditional systems as simple and local technologies but considers them to be complex. It argues that the use of commonly held systems such as tanks within the colonial and post colonial laws as state ownership has been the source of many conflicts. In particular, it finds most tank conflicts are a product of progressive and absolute state control over water and the systems established using colonial land revenue administrative law. The law continues to treat tanks as pieces of landed property held by state and the individuals rather than as technology systems that presupposed the regime of property rights introduced after the colonial times. The modern interventions in water including the reservoir building, and altering the hydraulics of rivers and streams aggravate tank conflicts and lead to their further detriment. The study brings the focus to ground realities, and offers new perspectives on understanding tank systems in dynamic ways.