State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

The effects of state ownership in the internationalization of emerging multinationals

Esta tese é um compendio de três trabalhos de pesquisa que visam analisar o efeito da participação do estado na estrutura de propriedade das Multinacionais de Países Emergentes (EMNEs). A participação do estado como acionista é um fenómeno que pode trazer novas contribuições no âmbito da governança corporativa, administração da empresa e a tomada de decisões estratégicas. Os estudos aqui inclusos permitem identificar, a partir de momentos, diferentes, até que ponto o estado, na posição de proprietário da EMNE, pode impactar a mesma. Os trabalhos vão desde os mecanismos de escolha de firmas nas quais investir ate o impacto no ritmo de internacionalização das empresas, explicando também os mecanismos que o estado usa para ganhar aceso à tomada de decisões por meio de mudanças na governança corporativa

Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.

Privatisation, state ownership and productivity:evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between the transfer of ownership between the public and private sectors of Chinese industry, and its impacts on performance. We link ownership changes to productivity growth, and demonstrate that privatisation contributes significantly. We offer an extension that is generally ignored in the literature, in looking at firms that are taken back into state ownership, and evaluating the productivity growth effects of this. Further, we highlight the well-understood simultaneity problems, and demonstrate the hazard of ignoring the issue by comparing various estimators, including the modified control function approach. In general, the results stress the importance of allowing for such endogeneity when evaluating the productivity effects of ownership change.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES THROUGH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

ABSTRACT State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are created to focus on domestic needs, and yet recent evidence points to increasing outward foreign direct investment by SOEs. Existing International Business (IB) theories focus on efficiency-based motives for internationalization; therefore, they do not fully capture SOEs' internalization dynamics, which are driven largely by political factors and social welfare considerations. We integrate public management and IB theories to develop propositions that combine these questions: why SOEs internationalize; what are their motivations; and what are the main managerial outcomes of SOEs' internationalization. Our findings suggest that SOEs display little hesitancy in entering international markets, and that SOE international expansion is not contradictory with the goals of state-ownership if the purpose is to adjust the company to changing institutional environments both in the domestic and international markets. Our propositions about SOE internationalization are based on an in-depth case study of the outward foreign direct investment conducted by Brazil's Petrobras over the past three decades.

State advances and private retreats? Evidence from the decomposition of the Chinese manufacturing aggregate productivity decomposition in China

This paper is motivated by the recent debate on the existence and scale of China's 'Guo Jin Min Tui' phenomenon, which is often translated as 'the state sector advances and the private sector retreats'. We argue that the profound implication of an advancing state sector is not the size expansion of the state ownership in the economy per se, but the likely retardation of the development of the already financially constrained private sector and the issues around the sustainability of the already weakening Chinese economy growth. Drawing on recent methodological advances, we provide a critical analysis of the contributions of the state and non-state sectors in the aggregate Total Factor Productivity and its growth over the period of 1998-2007 to verify the existence of GJMT and its possible impacts on Chinese economic growth. Overall, we find strong and consistent evidence of a systematic and worsening resource misallocation within the state sector and/or between the state sectors and private sectors over time. This suggests that non-market forces allow resources to be driven away from their competitive market allocation and towards the inefficient state sector. Crown Copyright © 2014.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

1003-001 Williamson Pond Final Report

Williamson Pond is a 26-acre publicly owned lake located about 2 miles east of the town of Williamson, in Lucas County. It has a watershed area of 1,499 acres. It has been managed since 1976 by the Lucas County Conservation Board (while still under state ownership) for fishing, boating, hunting, picnicking and other passive uses. Designated uses are Class AI, primary contact, and Class B (LW) aquatic life. Williamson Pond is on the 2004 EPA 303(d) List of Impaired Waters. A Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for turbidity and nutrients at Williamson Pond was prepared by IDNR in 2005 and approved by EPA in 2006. The TMDL set reduction targets for both suspended sediment and phosphorus. The Williamson Pond Watershed Management Plan has provided the local work group and partners with information to develop and implement strategies to improve and protect water quality. These strategies are based on a three phase approach that will ultimately lead the removal of Williamson Pond from the Impaired Waters List. The goals identified in this proposal (Phase I) will reduce sediment and phosphorus delivery by 453 tons and 589 pounds annually. The Lucas County SWCD has and will continue to provide leadership on the Williamson Pond Project and has secured the partnerships necessary to address water quality problems and hired a part-time project coordinator to manage, implement, and oversee all activities pertaining to this proposal.

Osakeyhtiölain mukaiset edellytykset valtio-omistajan tahdon toteuttamiseen yhtiön johdossa

Tutkielman tavoitteena on kuvata valtio-omistajan vaikutusmahdollisuudet ja vaikuttamiskeinot valtioenemmistöisen osakeyhtiön hallintoon voimassa olevan osakeyhtiölain mukaisesti. Tutkielmassa paneudutaan osakeyhtiön johdon tehtävien ja velvollisuuksien lisäksi valtion rooliin ja asemaan yhtiön omistajana sekä selvitetään valtion omistajavallan jakautumista valtiollisten toimijoiden välillä. Tutkimusmetodina on käytetty oikeusdogmatiikkaa. Tutkielman pääasiallisena lähdeaineistona on voimassa oleva lainsäädäntö valmisteluaineistoineen. Lisäksi lähteinä on käytetty kotimaista oikeuskirjallisuutta, viranomaisten ohjeistuksia ja kannanottoja sekä ajankohtaisia asiantuntija-artikkeleita. Osakeyhtiö on nykyisin tyypillisin yritysmuoto liiketoiminnan harjoittamiseen myös valtion omistamana. Valtio omistaa merkittävästi osakkeita hyvin erityyppisissä yhtiöissä ja hyvin erisuuruisin osuuksin. Enemmistöosakkeenomistajuus tuo käytännössä valtiolle päätösvallan yhtiökokouksessa yhtiön merkittävistä ja laajakantoisista asioista strategisista linjauksista ja hallituksen jäsenten valinnasta päätettäessä. Jo yhtiötä perustettaessa valtio enemmistöosakkaana voi määrätä yhtiöjärjestyksessä melko vapaasti yhtiön tarkoituksesta ja hallinnon järjestämisestä. Hallitus ja toimitusjohtaja toimivat omistajan tahdon ja yhtiön tarkoituksen mukaisesti, mutta kuitenkin itsenäisesti yhtiön edun parhaaksi. Valtio-omistajuus ei tarkoita osakeyhtiön hallinnon ja toiminnan erilaisuutta muihin yhtiöihin nähden, vaan yhtiö toimii hyvän hallintotavan mukaisesti liiketoimintaperiaattein, johon myös valtion omistajaohjauksella pyritään.

Omistajuuden vaikutus yrittäjämäiseen orientaatioon, kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen

Tämän tutkielman aiheena tutkia miten omistajuus vaikuttaa yrittäjämäiseen orientaatioon, kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen suomalaisissa osakeyhtiöissä. Omistajuuden muotoina ovat mukana valtionomistus, ulkomaalaisomistus ja julkinen/yksityinen osakeyhtiö. Tutkielmassa käytetään line-aarista regressiota tutkimaan miten nämä kolme vaikuttavat yrittäjämäiseen orientaatioon, kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen, mutta myös miten yrittäjämäinen orientaatio vaikuttaa kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen. Tutkielma osoittaa, että valitut omistajuuden muodot eivät suoraan vaikuta yrityksen kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen eikä yrittäjämäisen orientaation ta-soon suomalaisessa osakeyhtiössä.

Urban economic openness and IPO underpricing

We examine the empirical impact of trade openness on the short-run underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) using city-level real estate data. This paper represents a first attempt to employ a macroeconomic approach to explain IPO performance. We investigate an openness effect in which urban economic openness (UEO) has a significant impact on the productivity and on the prices of both direct and indirect real estate due to productivity gains of companies in more open areas. This in turn positively affects the firm’s profitability, enhancing the confidence in the local real estate market and the future company performance and decreasing the uncertainty of the IPO valuation. And as a result, we find that issuers have less incentive to underprice the IPO shares. China provides a suitable experimental ground to study the immense underpricing in developing markets, which cannot solely be accounted for by firm specific effects. First, Chinese real estate companies show strong geographic patterns focusing their businesses locally – usually at a city level. Second, we observe a degree of openness which is significantly heterogeneous across Chinese cities. Controlling for company-specific variables, location and state ownership, we find the evidence that companies whose businesses are in economically more open areas experience less IPO underpricing. Our results show high explanatory power and are robust to diverse specifications.

After the demise of neoliberalism but not of conservatism, a third developmentalism?

Neoliberalism and developmentalism are the two alternative forms of economic and political organization of capitalism. Since the 2008 global financial crisis we see the demise of neoliberalism in rich countries, as state intervention and regulation increased, opening room for a third historical developmentalism (the first was mercantilism, the second, Fordism). Not only because of major market failures, not only because the market is definitely unable to assure financial stability and full employment, an active macroeconomic policy is being required. Modern economies are divided into a competitive and a non-competitive sector; for the coordination of the competitive sector the market is irreplaceable and regulation as well as strategic industrial policy will be pragmatically adopted following the subsidiarity principle, whereas for the non-competitive sector, state coordination and some state ownership are usually more efficient. Besides, the fact that capitalist economies are increasingly diversified and complex is an argument against the two extremes – against statism as well as neoliberalism – in so far that they require market coordination combined with increased regulation. But the third developmentalism probably will not be progressive as was the second, because the social-democratic political parties are disoriented. They won the battle for the welfare state, which neoliberalism was unable to dismantle, but the competition of low wage developing countries and immigration continue to offer arguments to conservative political parties that defend the reduction of the cost of labor contracts or the or precarization of labor.