State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

Social Investment and State Capacity. CEPS Working Document No. 419/February 2016

This paper looks at the difference between the levels and nature of social policy expenditure in northern and northwest European countries and the countries of southern, central, and eastern Europe, and examines the relationship between social investment and state capacity in these country groupings. The authors show that southern and eastern countries have a much greater preference for ‘compensating’ rather than ‘capacitating’ social policy spending. Furthermore, the state capacity in these countries is lower, which generates less state revenue. Based on these observations they conclude that low state capacity and low state revenue go hand in hand with the preference for capacitating social policies, as these policies involve less delegation and discretion than social investment policies. This paper shows that high state capacity is probably a necessary precondition for effective social investment policies, although some limited alternative paths do exist.

The Mestizo State: Violence and State Formation in Peru (1980 – 2000)

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-07

Who Governs Educational Change? The Paradoxes of State Power and the Pursuit of Educational Reform in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador (2007-2015)

This study identifies and compares competing policy stories of key actors involved in the Ecuadorian education reform under President Rafael Correa from 2007-2015. By revealing these competing policy stories the study generates insights into the political and technical aspects of education reform in a context where state capacity has been eroded by decades of neoliberal policies. Since the elections in 2007, President Correa has focused much of his political effort and capital on reconstituting the state’s authority and capacity to not only formulate but also implement public policies. The concentration of power combined with a capacity building agenda allowed the Correa government to advance an ambitious comprehensive education reform with substantive results in equity and quality. At the same time the concentration of power has undermined a more inclusive and participatory approach which are essential for deepening and sustaining the reform. This study underscores both the limits and importance of state control over education; the inevitable conflicts and complexities associated with education reforms that focus on quality; and the limits and importance of participation in reform. Finally, it examines the analytical benefits of understanding governance, participation and quality as socially constructed concepts that are tied to normative and ideological interests.

Interven????o estatal, centraliza????o pol??tica e reforma burocr??tica: o significado dos departamentos administrativos no Estado Novo

O objetivo deste artigo ?? expor e explicar um momento espec??fico da evolu????o pol??tico institucional brasileira. S??o explorados os conflitos que est??o na origem da escolha e a implementa????o de uma nova ordem pol??tico-administrativa no p??s-1930. S??o examinadas as origens, a concep????o e os objetivos que guiaram a inven????o de um aparelho burocr??tico que, juntamente com o interventor federal, n??o s?? controlou as elites pol??ticas regionais, mas tamb??m contribuiu para a organiza????o do poder do Estado em bases nacionais, cooperando para viabilizar a capacidade estatal: os Departamentos Administrativos. Analiso o contexto pol??tico, os antecedentes legais e as inova????es institucionais do decreto-lei n?? 1202/39, a fim de responder a duas quest??es bem espec??ficas: por que e com que objetivo essa lei sobre a administra????o dos estados e dos munic??pios foi criada durante o Estado Novo?

Patterns of Associational Life in Western Europe, 1800-2000

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Science of the European University Institute

Strategic mass killings

Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data.

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.

States and Economic Development

Today the Washington Consensus on development lies in tatters. The recent history of the developing world has been unkind to the core claim that a nation that opens its economy and keeps government's role to a minimum invariably experiences rapid economic growth. The evidence against this claim is strong: the developing world as a whole grew faster during the era of state intervention and import substitution (1950-1980) than in the more recent era of structural adjustment (1990-2005); and the recent economic performance of both Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africaregions that truly embraced neoliberalismhas lagged well behind that of many Asian economies, which have instead pursued judicial and unorthodox combinations of state intervention and economic openness. As scholars and policy makers reconstruct alternatives to the Washington Consensus on development, it is important to underline that prudent and effective state intervention and selective integration with the global economy have been responsible for development success in the past; they are also likely to remain the recipes for upward mobility in the global economy in the future."

La décentralisation au Niger : le cas de la mobilisation des ressources financières dans la ville de Niamey

La décentralisation implantée en 2004 au Niger, a pour objectif de promouvoir le développement « par le bas » et de diffuser les principes démocratiques dans les milieux locaux, afin d’améliorer les conditions de vie des populations. Les recherches sur le sujet font état d’un écart considérable entre les objectifs et les réalisations de la décentralisation. Les facteurs avancés pour expliquer cet écart sont entre autres, le faible appui technique et financier de l’État envers les collectivités territoriales ou encore la quasi-inexistence d’une fonction publique locale qualifiée et apte à prendre en charge les projets de décentralisation. Toutefois, ces observations s’avèrent insuffisantes pour rendre compte des difficultés rencontrées par les acteurs de la décentralisation au Niger. Nous affirmons que les partis politiques jouent un rôle fondamental dans le processus de décentralisations. Ceux-ci diffusent des stratégies d’influence politique et de patronage dans les arènes locales. Les stratégies des partis politiques entravent les initiatives des acteurs locaux, notamment leur capacité de mobilisation des ressources financières.

Efectos de la reducción del nivel del Lago Chad sobre la Seguridad Regional (Nigeria, Níger, Chad y Camerún) durante el período de 2000-2010

El Lago Chad ha sido durante varias décadas, una fuente de supervivencia económica para millones de personas que habitan en cuatro Estados a saber; Nigeria, Níger, Chad y Camerún. No obstante, el cambio climático, el aumento acelerado de la población, la explotación insostenible y la mala regulación de los Estados ribereños han sido los principales factores que han dado lugar, en la última década, a la dramática reducción del nivel del Lago Chad. Teniendo en cuenta que los Estados aledaños al Lago, se encuentran inmersos en una Interdependencia Compleja, este nuevo contexto, ha tenido un impacto directo en la región, debido a que ha agravado otras variables económicas, sociales, ambientales y políticas, dejando un ambiente de inseguridad regional. De esta manera, la reducción de la Cuenca del Lago Chad representa una amenaza compartida que vincula estrechamente a Nigeria, Níger, Chad y Camerún, lo que permite vislumbrar la existencia de un Subcomplejo de Seguridad Regional.

La piratería de Nigeria como una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del Golfo de Guinea (2007-2012). Una aproximación desde el crimen organizado

Desde finales de los 70 la piratería se convirtió en un problema para Nigeria. Con el tiempo adquirió características del crimen organizado y en 2010 se transformó en un problema transnacional, afectando a Estados del golfo de Guinea. Así, a través de una base conceptual, el estudio de caso concluyó que los factores internos –como la pobreza, debilidad estatal y marginalización- y externos –siendo ellos la falta de políticas internas destinadas a las aguas y la ausencia de estrategias marítimas en la región- de la piratería, crearon una dinámica para que dicha actividad se convirtiera en una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del golfo de Guinea, tomando como referencia a Benín y Togo. Siguiendo la línea argumentativa, se demuestra que la búsqueda de una solución a la delincuencia marítima ha generado interacciones de seguridad que sugieren las primeras fases de un posible complejo de seguridad regional.

Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.

O estado necessário para a democracia possível na América latina

Uma democracia consolidada pressupõe um estado capaz, e para ambos é necessária uma nação forte e uma sociedade civil ativa. Diversas democracias na América Latina não alcançaram tais requisitos porque não completaram suas respectivas revoluções capitalistas, e o excedente econômico continua dependendo do controle direto do estado. Este fato demonstra que a qualidade das democracias varia de país para país, e prevê que as democracias possíveis nos países mais pobres serão necessariamente democracias limitadas. Desde que a democracia tornou-se uma justificativa para pressões e intervenções externas, é um erro incluir no conceito de democracia mais do que as necessidades mínimas, práticas. Por outro lado, para melhorar a democracia é necessário aumentar a capacidade do estado não apenas para assegurar o respeito às leis, mas também para promover o desenvolvimento econômico e social.