The evolution of structural adjustment and stabilization policy in Jamaica

Includes bibliography

Mexico's stabilization policy

Includes bibliography

Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

Economic booms, trade deficits and economic policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by realexchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -whichhave sometimes persisted after the return to the initialexchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector.Those circumstances have typically raised the questionof the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expectedproductivity shock in an economy where the capital stockis non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances.Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfectionstend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause aninefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector.Some stabilization policies are explored.

Endogenous business cycles and stabilization policies

The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.

Determinants and effects of central bank independence reforms

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

Missão de estabilização das Nações Unidas no Haiti (2004-2011): problemas, progressos e desafios

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

Ciclo de los negocios en Colombia: el papel de la política de estabilización

Este documento mide la sincronización entre las políticas de estabilización y el ciclo de los negocios en Colombia en el periodo comprendido entre marzo de 1990 y junio de 2013. Para la construcción de los ciclos se utiliza la metodología clásica y se construye un ciclo de referencia a partir de ciclos individuales de tres índices de actividad económica real. Con el fin de medir la sincronización entre el ciclo de nego­cios y los ciclos de las políticas fiscal y monetaria se utiliza el estadístico de Harding y Pagan (2006). Se concluye que durante el periodo de estudio las políticas de estabilización tienden a ser procíclicas (por el lado fiscal) y acíclicas (por el lado monetario). En la literatura se conoce a este fenómeno como when it rains, it pours y es común que se presente en economías emergentes como la colombiana

Robustness and stabilization properties of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Based on three versions of a small macroeconomic model for Brazil, this paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of parameter uncertainty on monetary policy rules and on the robustness of optimal and simple rules over different model specifications. By comparing the optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty with the rule calculated under purely additive uncertainty, we find that parameter uncertainty should make policymakers react less aggressively to the economy's state variables, as suggested by Brainard's "conservatism principIe", although this effect seems to be relatively small. We then informally investigate each rule's robustness by analyzing the performance of policy rules derived from each model under each one of the alternative models. We find that optimal rules derived from each model perform very poorly under alternative models, whereas a simple Taylor rule is relatively robusto We also fmd that even within a specific model, the Taylor rule may perform better than the optimal rule under particularly unfavorable realizations from the policymaker' s loss distribution function.

Export Promotion through Exchange Rate Policy: Exchange Rate Depreciation or Stabilization?

Exchange rate movements affect exports in two ways -- its depreciation and its variability (risk). A depreciation raises exports, but the associated exchange rate risk could offset that positive effect. The present paper investigates the net effect for eight Asian countries using a dynamic conditional correlation bivariate GARCH-M model that simultaneously estimates time varying correlation and exchange rate risk. Depreciation encourages exports, as expected, for most countries, but its contribution to export growth is weak. Exchange rate risk contributes to export growth in Malaysia and the Philippines, leading to positive net effects. Exchange rate risk generates a negative effect for six of the countries, resulting in a negative net effect in Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and a zero net effect in Korea and Thailand. Since the negative effect of exchange rate risk may offset, or even dominate, positive contributions from depreciation, policy makers need to reduce exchange rate fluctuation along with and possibly before efforts to depreciate the currency.

Exchange Rate Stabilization and IMF High Interest Rate Policy: A Critical Reconsideration Using a Dynamic Model

This paper examines whether the IMF high interest rate policy was suitable for crisis-ridden East Asian economies. Using an "overshoot" model similar to that of Dornbusch's (1976), it shows that this sort of policy might cause an unnecessary deflationary adjusting process and have no effect on containing the real depreciation of exchange rates in the long run. The study also demonstrates that Thai economic data coincides quite well with the model presented here. Finally, it points out that the high interest policy itself might provoke high risk-premium, the existence of which, in turn, justifies the policy. This means that the policy has a self-fulfilling property. In conclusion, a "one-size-fits-all" adaptation of high interest rate policy in a currency crisis is very dangerous in general, and was inappropriate for East Asia. The desirable policy would have been to let currencies depreciate and keep interest rates stable.

Wage policy under stabilization. February, 1944.

Cover-title.

Stabilization constraints from different-average public debt levels in a Monetary Union with country-size asymmetry

In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cycle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects stabilization welfare. We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to noncooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves directly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation, higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.