A puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a kórházi szektorban = The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector

A kutatások eddig főképpen azt vizsgálták, hogyan jelenik meg a puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a vállalati szférában és a hitelrendszerben. A jelen cikk a kórházi szektorra összpontosítja a figyelmet. Leírja az események öt főszereplőjének, a betegnek, az orvosnak, a kórházigazgatónak, a politikusnak és a kórház tulajdonosának motivációit és magatartásuk ellentmondásos jellegét. A motivációk magyarázzák, miért olyan erőteljes a túlköltési hajlam és a költségvetési korlát felpuhulásának tendenciája. A döntési és finanszírozási folyamatok minden szintjén felfelé hárítják a túlköltés és eladósodás terheit. A cikk kitér a különböző tulajdonformák (állami, nonprofit és forprofit nem állami tulajdonformák) és a puha költségvetési korlát szindrómájának kapcsolatára. Végül normatív szempontból vizsgálja a jelenséget: melyek a költségvetési korlát megkeményítésének kedvező és kedvezőtlen következményei, és hogyan tükröződnek a normatív dilemmák az események résztvevőinek tudatában. ___________ Researches so far have examined mainly how the soft budget constraint syndrome appears in the corporate sphere and the credit system. This article concentrates on the hospital sector. It describes the motivations and the contradictory behaviour of the five main types of participant in the events: patients, doctors, hospital managers, politicians, and hospital owners. The motivations explain why the propensity to overspend and the tendency to soften the budget constraint are so strong. The burdens of overspending and indebtedness are pushed upwards at every level of the decision-making and funding processes. The article considers the connection between the soft budget constraint syn-drome and the various forms of ownership (state ownership and the non-profit and for-profit forms of non-state ownership). Finally, the phenomenon is examined from the normative point of view: what are the favourable and unfavourable consequences of hardening the budget constraint and how these are reflected in the consciousness of the participants in the normative dilemmas and events.

The Soft Budget Constraint. An introductory study to volume IV of the Life’s Work series

The author’s ideas on the soft budget constraint (SBC) were first expressed in 1976. Much progress has been made in understanding the problem over the ensuing four decades. The study takes issue with those who confine the concept to the process of bailing out loss-making socialist firms. It shows how the syndrome can appear in various organizations and forms in many spheres of the economy and points to the various means available for financial rescue. Single bailouts do not as such generate the SBC syndrome. It develops where the SBC becomes built into expectations. Special heed is paid to features generated by the syndrome in rescuer and rescuee organizations. The study reports on the spread of the syndrome in various periods of the socialist and the capitalist system, in various sectors. The author expresses his views on normative questions and on therapies against the harmful effects. He deals first with actual practice, then places the theory of the SBC in the sphere of ideas and models, showing how it relates to other theoretical trends, including institutional and behavioural economics and theories of moral hazard and inconsistency in time. He shows how far the intellectual apparatus of the SBC has spread in theoretical literature and where it has reached in the process of “canonization” by the economics profession. Finally, he reviews the main research tasks ahead.

Introduction of soft budget constraint as an analyzing tool into public management. The case of the Hungarian public administration reform

Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the public administration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe the Hungarian public administration reforms implemented by the Orbán government from 2010 onward and analyze its reforms, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian public administration system. In the literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the given system. By using the concept of SBC, I also hope to shed some light on the rationale behind the Hungarian government’s introduction of such a contradictory reform package. Previously, the concept of SBC was utilized narrowly in public management studies, mostly in the field of fiscal federalism. My goal is to apply the concept to a broader area of public management studies. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public management studies by deepening our knowledge on the reasons behind the success and failure of public administration reforms.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban = Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése nem egyforma mértékben ment végbe minden posztszocialista gazdaságban. Egyes országokban messzire jutottak ebben a tekintetben, másokban viszont alig változott az indulóállapot. A tanulmány áttekinti a költségvetési korlát puhaságának különböző megnyilvánulásait: az állami támogatásokat, a puha adózást, a nem teljesítő bankkölcsönöket, a vállalatközi tartozások felgyülemlését és a kifizetetlen béreket. A jelenséget sokféle tényező okozza, amelyek többnyire együttesen jelentkeznek. Az állami tulajdon fenntartása kedvez a puha költségvetési szindróma megrögződésének, a privatizálás elősegíti a keményítést, de nem elégséges feltétele a kemény korlát érvényesítésének. Ehhez megfelelő politikai, jogi és gazdasági környezetet kell céltudatosan kialakítani. A posztszocialista átmenet kezdetén sokan azt hitték, hogy a hatékony piacgazdaság létrehozásához elegendő lesz megvalósítani a liberalizáció, privatizáció és stabilizáció "szentháromságát". Mára már kiderült, hogy a költségvetési korlát megkeményítése az említett három feladattal egyenrangúan fontos. Ahol ez nem valósul meg (például Oroszország), ott a privatizáció nem hozza meg a várt eredményt. ___________________ The budget constraint has not hardened to equal degrees in the various post-socialist countries. In some of them, a great deal has been done in this respect, while in others there has been hardly any change from the initial state. This study surveys the typical manifestations of softness of the budget constraint, such as state subsidies, soft taxation, non-performing loans, the accumulation of trade arrears between firms, and the build-up of wage arrears. Softness of the budget constraint is caused by several factors that tend to act in combination. Thus retention of state ownership helps to preserve the soft budget-constraint syndrome, while privatization encourages the budget constraint to harden, although it does not form a sufficient condition for it to happen. Purposeful development of the requisite political, legal and economic conditions is also required. It was widely maintained at the outset of the post-socialist transition that the 'Holy Trinity' of liberalization, privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market economy. Since then, it has become clear that hardening the budget constraint needs to be given equal priority with these. Otherwise, the effects of privatization will fall short of expectations, as they have in Russia, for example.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

Soft Budget Constraints and Regional Industrial Policy: Reinterpreting the Rise and fall of De Lorean

The rise and fall of De Lorean Motor Cars Limited (DMCL) has been traditionally interpreted as either the result either of John De Lorean’s psychological flaws or as confirming the supposed limitations of activist industrial policy. However, when the episode is examined in greater historical detail, neither of these interpretations are compelling. The reinterpretation outlined here draws on institutional analysis as well as a range of archival sources, much of it previously unreleased. The inefficiencies within the original contractual agreement are highlighted. The lack of credibility associated with this agreement was in turn traceable to the institutional environment (with its associated risk-reward implications) under which industrial policy operated. This environment had a political element - it had been distorted by the Troubles and the resulting fears policymakers had of a cumulative causation relationship between violence and unemployment. Officials in Belfast, against Treasury opposition, advocated state-led entrepreneurship as a policy response.

Political intervention in economic activity

This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.

Competição tributária regional, externalidades fiscais e federalismo no Brasil : uma abordagem de equilíbrio geral computável

Este trabalho analisa os efeitos econômicos da competição tributária regional a partir de uma metodologia de equilíbrio geral computável. O objetivo é investigar se a competição tributária regional pode ser consistente com um equilíbrio welfare-improving quando as externalidades fiscais, subjacentes às mudanças estratégicas na política tributária dos governos regionais e às regras do federalismo fiscal vigente no Brasil, são plenamente assimiladas nos payoffs dos agentes econômicos. Para tanto, foi elaborado um modelo inter-regional de equilíbrio geral computável que divide a economia brasileira em duas regiões integradas, o Rio Grande do Sul e o Restante do Brasil. Este modelo foi utilizado para implementar dois experimentos de simulação sobre políticas contra-factuais de competição fiscal. O primeiro experimento avalia os efeitos de uma política regional de incentivo realizada pelo governo estadual gaúcho, baseada na renúncia tributária do ICMS, visando a atração de novos investimentos. Este experimento considera que os novos investimentos são exógenos à região e ao país como um todo e não se assume resposta estratégica do governo do Restante do Brasil. Os resultados mostram que a política é welfare-improving para as duas regiões e gera um retorno tributário líquido positivo para o governo do Rio Grande do Sul. Contudo, o efeito sobre as finanças do governo do Restante do Brasil é negativo, resultado que pode ser visto como um fator de incentivo para uma resposta política de competição fiscal. O segundo experimento avalia os efeitos de políticas de competição tributária regional entre os governos estaduais, assumindo-se que as alíquotas do ICMS são utilizadas como instrumentos estratégicos num jogo não cooperativo para atração de fatores produtivos. O experimento foi implementado para três fechamentos fiscais distintos com a finalidade de avaliar a sensibilidade dos resultados. O primeiro fechamento assume um regime fiscal do tipo soft budget constraint pelo qual o déficit orçamentário é a principal variável endógena para acomodar os custos da competição; o segundo fechamento assume um regime fiscal do tipo hard budget constraint pelo qual o consumo dos governos regionais (provisão de bens públicos) é a principal variável endógena; o terceiro fechamento considera o governo federal como um terceiro player no jogo de competição tributária regional e assume que a alíquota do imposto sobre a renda é a principal variável endógena de ajuste fiscal para capturar o papel das ligações verticais via mecanismos de transferências. Independente do fechamento fiscal, constata-se que a competição tributária gera um equilíbrio welfare-improving, mas o nível dos efeitos de bem-estar é bastante diferenciado entre os fechamentos. Constata-se ainda que o equilíbrio de Nash é do tipo race-to-the-bottom para as alíquotas de ICMS nos dois primeiros fechamentos, mas é race-to-the-top no terceiro porque a estratégia ótima do governo federal força os governos regionais a um equilíbrio com alíquotas de ICMS mais elevadas. As externalidades fiscais têm um papel crucial nos resultados encontrados, particularmente no segundo experimento, pois aliviam a necessidade de ajuste na provisão de bens públicos provocada pelo equilíbrio race-to-the-bottom e, assim, permitem que os ganhos de bem-estar do consumo privado superem as perdas decorrentes da redução na provisão de bens públicos.

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.

Myanmar's two decades of partial transition to a market economy : a negative legacy for the new government

Despite more than two decades of transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, Myanmar’s economic transition is still only partly complete. The government’s initial strategy for dealing with the swelling deficits of the state economic enterprises (SEEs) was to put them under direct control in order to scrutinize their expenditures. This policy change postponed restructuring and exacerbated the soft budget constraint problem of the SEEs. While the installation of a new government in March 2011 has increased prospects for economic development, sustainable growth still requires full-scale structural reform of the SEEs and institutional infrastructure building. Myanmar can learn from the gradual approaches to economic transition in China and Vietnam, where partial reforms weakened further impetus for reforms.

Market reform and fiscal laxity in Communist and post-Communist Hungary: A path-dependent approach

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework in order to analyse and understand the twin developments of successful microeconomic reform on the one hand and failed macroeconomic stabilisation attempts on the other hand in Hungary. The case study also attempts to explore the reasons why Hungarian policymakers were willing to initiate reforms in the micro sphere, but were reluctant to initiate major changes in public finances both before and after the regime change of 1989/1990. Design/methodology/approach – The paper applies a path-dependent approach by carefully analysing Hungary's Communist and post-Communist economic development. The study restricts itself to a positive analysis but normative statements can also be drawn accordingly. Findings – The study demonstrates that the recent deteriorating economic performance of Hungary is not a recent phenomenon. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues that both Communist and post-Communist governments used the general budget as a buffer to compensate the losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The gradualist success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in the general government. Practical implications – Hungary has been one of the worst-hit countries of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, not just in Central and Eastern Europe but in the whole world. The capacity and opportunity for strengthening international investors' confidence is, however, not without doubts. The current deterioration is deeply rooted in failed past macroeconomic management. The dissolution of fiscal laxity and state paternalism in a broader context requires, therefore, an all-encompassing reform of the general government, which may trigger serious challenges to the political regime as well. Originality/value – The study aims to show that a relatively high ratio of redistribution, a high and persistent public deficit and an accelerated indebtedness are not recent phenomena in Hungary. In fact, these trends characterised the country well before the transformation of 1989/1990, and have continued in the post-socialist years, too. To explain such a phenomenon, the study argues that in the last couple of decades the hardening of the budget constraint of firms have come at the cost of maintaining the soft budget constraint of the state.

A hiány újratermelése (The reproduction of shortage)

Sporadic lack of consumer articles, the housing shortage, disturbances of material supply, and shortages of investment goods and of labour may be traced back to a common main cause. Shortage is constantly reproduced by specific features of the economic mechanism. The first part of the article consists of micro-analysis, mainly of the productive enterprise. Efforts to increase production may run up against ceilings of three kinds: constraints on physical resources, constraints on demand, and the budget constraint on enterprises. It is an important feature of a system which of these constraints takes effect. Resource-constrained systems can be distinguished from demand-constrained ones here. In the former, production is limited by production bottlenecks, in the latter by buyer demand. The socialist economy in its "classical" form belongs to the former type. It is related to whether the budget constraint on the enterprise is "hard" or "soft". If hard, enterprise spending is limited by its financial scope, if soft (its losses offset almost automatically) its demand becomes almost insatiable. The second part performs a macro-analysis, showing the mechanism of "suction" with the aid of a hydraulic analogy. The enterprise sector "pumps away" reserves and surpluses of the system, mainly due to the "investment hunger" that appears in the wake of expansionist efforts. Finally the article discusses briefly the interrelations between shortage and inflation.

Optimal control of information epidemics modeled as Maki Thompson rumors

We model the spread of information in a homogeneously mixed population using the Maki Thompson rumor model. We formulate an optimal control problem, from the perspective of single campaigner, to maximize the spread of information when the campaign budget is fixed. Control signals, such as advertising in the mass media, attempt to convert ignorants and stiflers into spreaders. We show the existence of a solution to the optimal control problem when the campaigning incurs non-linear costs under the isoperimetric budget constraint. The solution employs Pontryagin's Minimum Principle and a modified version of forward backward sweep technique for numerical computation to accommodate the isoperimetric budget constraint. The techniques developed in this paper are general and can be applied to similar optimal control problems in other areas. We have allowed the spreading rate of the information epidemic to vary over the campaign duration to model practical situations when the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign changes with time. The shape of the optimal control signal is studied for different model parameters and spreading rate profiles. We have also studied the variation of the optimal campaigning costs with respect to various model parameters. Results indicate that, for some model parameters, significant improvements can be achieved by the optimal strategy compared to the static control strategy. The static strategy respects the same budget constraint as the optimal strategy and has a constant value throughout the campaign horizon. This work finds application in election and social awareness campaigns, product advertising, movie promotion and crowdfunding campaigns. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.