Taming SIFIs

We model a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) that is too big(or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision,the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessiverisk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance againstsystemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solutioninvolves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and moreimportantly establishing a Systemic Risk Authority endowed with special resolutionpowers, including the control of bankers' compensation packages during crisisperiods.

On the Uniform Convergence of Partial Dunkl Integrals in Besov-Dunkl Spaces

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 44A15, 44A35, 46E30

Commutants of the Dunkl Operators in C(R)

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 44A35; 42A75; 47A16, 47L10, 47L80

Herz-Type Hardy Spaces for the Dunkl Operator on the Real Line

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 46F12, Secondary 44A15, 44A35