Share Repurchases, Dividends, and Executive Options

This paper reports empirical results on the determinants of the authorization decision for share repurchases and dividends in Finland. We use a data set with precise data on share repurchases as well as characteristics for the option programs. Contrary to the U.S., we use a data set where 41% of the options are dividend protected, which allows us to separate between the "option funding" and "substitution / managerial wealth" hypothesis for the choice of the distribution method. We find that foreign ownership is the main determinant for share repurchases in Finland and attribute this relationship to tax factors. We also find evidence in support of both the signaling and agency cost hypotheses for cash distributions, especially in the case of share repurchases. Finally, we find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. When options are dividend protected, the relationship between dividend distributions and the scope of the options program turns to a significantly positive one instead of the negative one documented on U.S. data. This gives some support for the substitution / managerial wealth hypothesis as a determinant for the choice of the distribution method.

The law and finance of share repurchases in Europe

This article analyses the impact of the EU market abuse law on share repurchases. We find that the Member States' previous rules differed considerably, and therefore it can be said that the Regulation on share repurchases has provided uniformity as to the availability of a safe harbour for share repurchases. The picture, however, gets more difficult to assess if we consider our findings on the actual effect of the law. Our results do not confirm a “simple law and finance story“ according to which market participants would have just reacted as expected by the new legal rules. Rather, it seems to be the case that the value of legal certainty and the positive signal of common legal rules have also had an impact on the propensity to repurchase own stock.

Stock repurchases and treasury share sales:do they stabilize price and enhance liquidity?

Can companies reduce the volatility and increase the liquidity of their stocks by trading them? In the context of the Italian stock market, where companies have far more leeway to sell as well as buy their own stocks than in the U.S., the answer is yes. We examine the effects of trading (open-market share repurchases and treasury shares sales) on liquidity (bid–ask spread) and volatility (return variance). Further, we examine the impact of shareholder approvals of repurchase programs on liquidity and volatility. We find clear evidence that trading increases liquidity and reduces volatility. These results are consistent with our analysis of the motives Italian companies give for making share repurchases.

Empirical studies on share issuance and repurchase decisions

Financial constraints influence corporate policies of firms, including both investment decisions and external financing policies. The relevance of this phenomenon has become more pronounced during and after the recent financial crisis in 2007/2008. In addition to raising costs of external financing, the effects of financial crisis limited the availability of external financing which had implications for employment, investment, sale of assets, and tech spending. This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of financial constraints on share issuance and repurchases decisions. Financial constraints comprise both internal constraints reflecting the demand for external financing and external financial constraints that relate to the supply of external financing. The study also examines both operating performance and stock market reactions associated with equity issuance methods. The first empirical chapter explores the simultaneous effects of financial constraints and market timing on share issuance decisions. Internal financing constraints limit firms’ ability to issue overvalued equity. On the other hand, financial crisis and low market liquidity (external financial constraints) restrict availability of equity financing and consequently increase the costs of external financing. Therefore, the study explores the extent to which internal and external financing constraints limit market timing of equity issues. This study finds that financial constraints play a significant role in whether firms time their equity issues when the shares are overvalued. The conclusion is that financially constrained firms issue overvalued equity when the external equity market or the general economic conditions are favourable. During recessionary periods, costs of external finance increase such that financially constrained firms are less likely to issue overvalued equity. Only unconstrained firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity even during crisis. Similarly, small firms that need cash flows to finance growth projects are less likely to access external equity financing during period of significant economic recessions. Moreover, constrained firms have low average stock returns compared to unconstrained firms, especially when they issue overvalued equity. The second chapter examines the operating performance and stock returns associated with equity issuance methods. Firms in the UK can issue equity through rights issues, open offers, and private placement. This study argues that alternative equity issuance methods are associated with a different level of operating performance and long-term stock returns. Firms using private placement are associated with poor operating performance. However, rights issues are found empirically to be associated with higher operating performance and less negative long-term stock returns after issuance in comparison to counterpart firms that issue private placements and open offers. Thus, rights issuing firms perform better than open offers and private placement because the favourable operating performance at the time of issuance generates subsequent positive long-run stock price response. Right issuing firms are of better quality and outperform firms that adopt open offers and private placement. In the third empirical chapter, the study explores the levered share repurchase of internally financially unconstrained firms. Unconstrained firms are expected to repurchase their shares using internal funds rather than through external borrowings. However, evidence shows that levered share repurchases are common among unconstrained firms. These firms display this repurchase behaviour when they have bond ratings or investment grade ratings that allow them to obtain cheap external debt financing. It is found that internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to finance their share repurchase when they invest more. Levered repurchase firms are associated with less positive abnormal returns than unlevered repurchase firms. For the levered repurchase sample, high investing firms are associated with more positive long-run abnormal stock returns than low investing firms. It appears the market underreact to the levered repurchase in the short-run regardless of the level of investments. These findings indicate that market reactions reflect both undervaluation and signaling hypotheses of positive information associated with share repurchase. As the firms undertake capital investments, they generate future cash flows, limit the effects of leverage on financial distress and ultimately reduce the risk of the equity capital.

Agency Conflicts and Corporate Payout Policies: A Global Study

We investigate the roles of finn and country level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policics. Based on a large sample of 29,610 firms in 42 countries from 2001 to 2006, we show there is a form of "pecking order" in investors' ability to extract cash (whether as dividends only or share repurchases) from firms. Although investors are able to use their legal powers to extract cash from firms in high protection countries, their ability to do so can be substantially hindered when agency costs at the firm level are high. In poor protection countries, investors seem to take whatever cash they can get, even though the amount may be small, and with scant regard for investment opportunities and firm level agency conflicts. Finally, compared to repurchases, we find dividends are more likely to be the sole method of payout in high protection countries and in non insider-dominated firms.

A Comparison of Managers’ Perception of Short-Termism in Finland, Sweden and the U.S

Increased media exposure to layoffs and corporate quarterly financial reporting have created arguable a common perception – especially favored by the media itself – that the companies have been forced to improve their financial performance from quarter to quarter. Academically the relevant question is whether companies themselves feel that they are exposed to short-term pressure to perform even if it means that they have to compromise company’s long-term future. This paper studies this issue using results from a survey conducted among the 500 largest companies in Finland. The results show that companies in general feel moderate short-term pressure, with reasonable dispersion across firms. There seems to be a link between the degree of pressure felt, and the firm’s ownership structure, i.e. we find support for the existence of short-term versus long-term owners. We also find significant ownership related differences, in line with expectations, in how such short-term pressure is reflected in actual decision variables such as the investment criteria used.

Tax Reform and Payout Policy:Do Shareholder Clienteles or Payout Policy Adjust?

Changes in taxation of corporate dividends offer excellent opportunities to study dividend clientele effects. We explore payout policies and ownership structures around a major tax reform that took place in Finland in 2004. Consistent with dividend clienteles affecting firms’ dividend policy decisions, we find that Finnish firms altered their dividend policies based on the changed tax incentives of their largest shareholders. While firms adjust their payout policies, our results also indicate that ownership structures of Finnish firms also changed around the 2004 reform, consistent with shareholder clienteles adjusting to the new tax system.

Essays on Stock Options, Incentives, and Managerial Action

Executive compensation and managerial behavior have received an increasing amount of attention in the financial economics literature since the mid 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of managerial compensation, especially how stock option compensation is linked to the actions undertaken by the management. Furthermore, managerial compensation is continuously and heatedly debated in the media and an emerging consensus from this discussion seems to be that there still exists gaps in our knowledge of optimal contracting. In Finland, the first executive stock options were introduced in the 1980s and throughout the last 15 years it has become increasingly popular for Finnish listed firms to use this type of managerial compensation. The empirical work in the thesis is conducted using data from Finland, in contrast to most previous studies that predominantly use U.S. data. Using Finnish data provides insight of how market conditions affect compensation and managerial action and provides an opportunity to explore what parts of the U.S. evidence can be generalized to other markets. The thesis consists of four essays. The first essay investigates the exercise policy of the executive stock option holders in Finland. In summary, Essay 1 contributes to our understanding of the exercise policies by examining both the determinants of the exercise decision and the markets reaction to the actual exercises. The second essay analyzes the factors driving stock option grants using data for Finnish publicly listed firms. Several agency theory based variables are found to have have explanatory power on the likelihood of a stock option grant. Essay 2 also contributes to our understanding of behavioral factors, such as prior stock return, as determinants of stock option compensation. The third essay investigates the tax and stock option motives for share repurchases and dividend distributions. We document strong support for the tax motive for share repurchases. Furthermore, we also analyze the dividend distribution decision in companies with stock options and find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. We thus document that the cutting of dividends found in previous U.S. studies can be avoided by dividend protection. In the fourth essay we approach the puzzle of negative skewness in stock returns from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. We suggest that negative skewness in stock returns is generated by management disclosure practices and find proof for this. More specifically, we find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when non-scheduled firm specific news is disclosed.

Owners' Way or the Highway: Short-term Expectations and Owner Impatience

Increased media exposure to layoffs and corporate quarterly financial reporting have created arguable a common perception – especially favored by the media itself – that the companies have been forced to improve their financial performance from quarter to quarter. Academically the relevant question is whether the companies themselves feel that they are exposed to short-term pressure to perform even if it means that they have to compromise company’s long-term future. This paper studies this issue using results from a survey conducted among the 500 largest companies in Finland. The results show that companies in general feel moderate short-term pressure, with reasonable dispersion across firms. There seems to be a link between the degree of pressure felt, and the firm’s ownership structure, i.e. we find support for the existence of short-term versus long-term owners. We also find significant ownership related differences, in line with expectations, in how such short-term pressure is reflected in actual decision variables such as the investment criteria used.

Estudo exploratório sobre os motivos que levam as empresas a recomprarem suas próprias ações

Através de estudo de evento este trabalho analisa o impacto provocado pelo anúncio de recompra de ações sobre os seus próprios preços, utilizando como referência, as empresas que anunciaram aquisição de ações de sua emissão, através de publicação de fato relevante na Comissão de Valores Mobiliário (CVM), nos exercícios de 2003 a 2009. O estudo pressupõe eficiência de mercado na sua forma semi-forte e identifica retorno anormal, estatisticamente significativo na data um do evento, ou seja, um dia após o anúncio. Os retornos acumulados de três dias são regredidos contra dados da recompra e os resultados reforçam a hipótese de sinalização, já sugerida pela análise do gráfico do retorno anormal acumulado, com os retornos indicando alta decorrente de pressão de preços. Os modelos de regressão utilizados, incluindo variáveis contábeis associadas a outras hipóteses explicativas, não encontram resultados significativos que dêem suporte a outras possíveis motivações propostas na literatura acadêmica.

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information–communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations. © The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association]. All rights reserved.

Stock repurchases and treasury share sales: Do they stabilize price and enhance liquidity?

The article studies the impact of a firm’s trading in its own shares on the volatility and market liquidity of the firm’s stock in the Italian stock market. In the study, both stock repurchases and treasury share sales executed on the open market are defined as trading in own shares. The study finds that Italian firms can reduce the volatility of their stock and boost market liquidity by trading their own shares.

How do investors respond to share buyback programs? : evidence from Brazil during 2008 crisis

This paper provides empirical evidence of how effective share repurchase programs were as instruments to signal low prices during 2008 crisis in Brazil. Although we found that stock prices did not respond to buyback programs in the period 2006 to 2012 (1.65% cumulative abnormal returns after 5 days), the average stock price reaction in 2008 (2.93%) is higher and different with statistical significance. Furthermore, we found that the share price reaction from companies with market capitalization below R$10 billion is higher than the one from larger companies. In addition, we found that the response to the buyback programs is positively correlated (i) to the company’s purchasing activity after the announcement, (ii) to the maximum amount of shares announced which can be bought and (iii) to the quantity actually bought during the program. This research is unique in providing empirical evidence on the Brazilian case by analyzing 377 programs announced during that period. The research also confirms that the stock reaction is not influenced by the company's purchasing activity in prior announcements.

Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Share

PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants.

Creative Commons : fair to share?

This article explores new the realities of the permissions culture and “all rights reserved copyright” in the networked environment and poses the question: why is lending a copy of a book sharing but emailing a PDF of it piracy? It explores new approaches to publishing and distribution of books by highlighting two books in the Aduki Independent Press catalogue. It was modeled on a presentation delivered by Elliott Bledsoe at the Changing Climates in Arts Publishing forum run by Artlink and the Copyright Agency Limited in Adelaide, Australia on 9 May 2009 and in Sydney, Australia on 27 June 2009.