Saving for Retirement and Investing for Growth. Report of the CEPS-RCMI Task Force on Long-term Investing and Retirement Savings. CEPS Task Force Report, September 2013

Europe is facing a double challenge: a significant need for long-term investments – crucial levers for economic growth – and a growing pension gap, both of which call for resolute action. Crucially, at a time when low interest rates and revised prudential standards strain the ability of life insurers and pension funds to offer guaranteed returns, Europe lacks a framework ensuring the quality and accessibility of long-term investment solutions for small retail investors and defined contribution pension plans. This report considers the potential to steer household financial wealth – accounting for over 60% of total financial wealth in Europe – towards long-term investing, which would achieve two goals at once: higher growth and higher pensions. It follows a holistic approach that considers both solution design – how to gear product structuring towards long-term investing – and market structure – how to engineer a competitive market setting that is able to deliver high-quality and cost-efficient solutions. The report also considers prudential rules for insurers and pension funds and the potential to build a single market for less-liquid funds, occupational and personal pensions, with improved investor protection. It urges policy-makers to act aggressively to deliver more inclusive, efficient and resilient retail investment markets that are better equipped and more committed to deliver value over the long-term for beneficiaries.

Financial services and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. CEPS Policy Brief No. 302, 20 November 2013

Given the size of the financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic and the symmetry in the follow-up of the G-20 standards, Karel Lannoo argues in this Policy Brief that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) provides a good opportunity to put in place a more institutionalised framework. He finds that both blocs have reacted in similar ways to the financial crisis in strengthening their regulatory and supervisory frameworks and incorporating the G-20 recommendations into federal law. He also notes that consumer protection has been reinforced, certainly in the US, with the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And on the EU side, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) will radically change banking supervision. In his view, inclusion of financial services could also be an opportunity to strengthen prudential rules and consumer protection provisions on both sides. Rather than leading to a reduction of consumer protection, as had been feared in the post-crisis environment, it could lead to an examination, exchange and recognition of best practices in regulation and enforcement. Finally, he concludes that inclusion of financial services would make it part of the permanent regulatory dialogue that will be established as a result of a successful TTIP.

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Ograniczona względami ekonomicznymi dostępność świadczeń zdrowotnych a naruszenie przez lekarza reguł ostrożności

Odpowiedzialność karną lekarza łączy się powszechnie z problematyką błędu medycznego, choć właściwie odpowiada on nie za sam błąd medyczny, jako że prawo karne nie zna przestępstwa polegającego na popełnieniu błędu medycznego, ale za ewentualne jego skutki, które mogą być kwalifikowane jako nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci, nieumyślne spowodowanie ciężkiego, średniego albo lekkiego uszczerbku na zdrowiu bądź nieumyślne narażenie na niebezpieczeństwo utraty życia albo ciężkiego uszczerbku na zdrowiu. Nie można oczywiście wykluczyć wystąpienia sytuacji, w której lekarz swoim zachowaniem zrealizowałby znamiona typu umyślnego, jednakże na potrzeby niniejszej publikacji przyjęto, że co do zasady lekarz działa w celu ratowania dóbr prawnych, jakimi są życie i zdrowie pacjenta, nie zaś z zamiarem narażenia ich na niebezpieczeństwo bądź naruszenia, a ewentualne negatywne skutki dla życia i pacjenta, powstałe w miejsce lub obok zamierzonego stanu rzeczy, nie są przez niego objęte umyślnością. Kluczowym warunkiem uznania, że czyn popełniony został nieumyślnie jest ustalenie, że sprawca naruszył reguły ostrożnego postępowania, wymagane w danych okolicznościach. W odniesieniu do zawodu lekarza na pierwszy plan wysuwa się wśród nich wymóg stosowania się do wskazań aktualnej wiedzy medycznej. Autorka przekłada ten obowiązek na grunt realiów systemu ochrony zdrowia i rozważa, jaki wpływ na jego niedopełnienie mają okoliczności ograniczonej względami ekonomicznymi dostępności świadczeń zdrowotnych oraz w jaki sposób niedostatek środków finansowych może rzutować na naruszenie przez lekarza reguł ostrożnego postępowania, o których mowa w art. 9 § 2 Kodeksu karnego.

A Viable Alternative to Basel III Prudential Capital Rules. CEPS Policy Brief No. 291, May 2013

Stefano Micossi argues in this paper that the Basel framework for bank prudential requirements is deeply flawed and that the Basel III revision has failed to correct these flaws, making the system even more complicated, opaque and open to manipulation. In practice, he finds that the present system does not offer regulators and financial markets a reliable capital standard for banks and its divergent implementation in the main jurisdictions of the European Union and the United States has broken the market into special fiefdoms governed by national regulators in response to untoward special interests. The time is ripe to stop tinkering with minor adjustment and revisions in order to rescue the system, because the system cannot be rescued. In response to the current situation, Micossi calls for abandoning reference to risk-weighted assets calculated by banks with their internal risk management models for the determination of banks’ prudential capital, together with the preoccupation with the asset side of banks in correcting for risk exposure. He suggests that the alternative may be provided by a combination of a straight capital ratio and a properly designed deposit insurance system. It is a logical, complete and much less distortive alternative; it would serve better the cause of financial stability as well as the interest of the banks in clear, transparent and level playing field.

Federal Court Rules 027 r 11 - Subpoena to give evidence

In Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Rural and General Insurance Let [2004] FCA 933, Gyles J considered what he described as "a novel question", namely, whether taking steps to prepare to give oral evidence when subpoenaed to attend for that purpose, including the obtaining of legal advice and assistance, could be recovered by the witness under O 27 r 11 of the Federal Court Rules

Capital-account and counter-cyclical prudential regulations in developing countries

Includes bibliography