Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Public Procurement in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations. Paper No. 2 in the CEPS-CTR project "TTIP in the Balance" and CEPS Special Report No. 100/February 2015

For more than 20 years, the United States and the European Union have engaged in often-contentious negotiations over access to government procurement. The EU is dissatisfied with the level of procurement that the US has opened under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and, as a consequence, it does not give the US its most comprehensive coverage. The US has been constrained in responding to the EU’s requests for greater access, especially to state procurement, by both its federal structure of government and by domestic purchasing requirements. At the current time, neither party has proposed a way to break the impasse. This paper reviews the current state of affairs between the US and the EU on government procurement, examining the procurement that they open to one another and the procurement that they withhold. It then proposes a strategy for the two sides to use the TTIP negotiations to move forward. This strategy includes both steps to expand their current commitments in the TTIP, as well as to develop a longer-term approach by making the TTIP a ‘living agreement’. This strategy suggests that the EU and the US could find a way to expand their access to government procurement contracts and at least partially defuse the issue.

As PPP e os processos tradicionais de contratação pura: vantagens e desvantagens

Mestrado em Engenharia Civil – ramo Tecnologia e Gestão das Construções

Puolustusteollisuusalan yrityksen strategisen verkoston hallinta ja tuloksellisuus vastakauppatoiminnan näkökulmasta

Valtiot soveltavat yleisesti puolustusvälinehankintojensa yhteydessä vastakauppamenettelyä, jota kutsutaan offsetiksi. Tämän laadullisen tapaustutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää minkälaista verkottumista suora offset edellyttää myyjäyritykseltä ja mitä vaikutuksia verkottumisella on myyjäyritykseen. Offsetvaatimusten ja paikallisyhteistyön vuoksi tapahtuvalla verkottumisella on monia vaikutuksia myyjäyritykseen, joista pääosan voidaan sanoa olevan liiketaloudellisessa mielessä negatiivisia. Huomioitavaa kuitenkin on, että ilman offsetia ei voida voittaa hankkeita ja näin generoida liiketoimintaa. Suoran offsetin verkostoituminen perustuu ratkaisuliiketoiminnan eli arvopajan kautta tuotettuun lisäarvoon loppuasiakkaalle. Tällaista verkostotoimintaa harjoittavaa yritystä voidaan kutsua asiakaskeskeisen verkoston ansaitsijaksi joka kasvattaa ansaintaansa tuottamansa korkeamman lisäarvon kautta. Offsetin luonteesta johtuen erilaisten mittausjärjestelmien rakentaminen voi nousta haasteeksi.

Mecanismos de solución de controversias en la contratación derivada de contratos financiados con recursos del Banco Mundial

Esta tesis se ocupa de analizar la eficacia de la cláusula de solución de controversias contractuales dispuesta en la contratación estatal que es financiada con recursos del Banco Mundial –regla de excepción a la aplicación del Estatuto General de Contratación Pública– pues en las normas de contratación de dicho organismo, se ha previsto que ante un conflicto contractual corresponde a un conciliador (versión 2008 de las normas Banco Mundial) o a un mediador (versión 2013) “tomar una decisión” para resolver la controversia con fuerza vinculante para las partes. La reflexión aborda el papel del “conciliador” o “mediador” según las facultades que le atribuyen las normas del Banco Mundial y su distinción respecto al concepto legal que prevé el ordenamiento nacional, donde el conciliador o mediador no toman decisiones y en consecuencia no es clara la forma de acudir a estas figuras. El reto nos lleva a considerar dos alternativas de aplicación de la cláusula para hacerla eficaz: el primero, considerar a la mediación como una figura autónoma regulada en el contrato por autorización de nuestro Estatuto de Contratación Estatal y de los Convenios suscritos con organismos internacionales, a partir de la cual se reconozca la producción de los efectos indicados por el Banco Mundial en cabeza del mediador; en segundo lugar y para desatar el efecto útil de la cláusula, considerar a la mediación como figura análoga a la amigable composición, y tramitar la solución de controversias bajo esta figura.

Parcerias público-privadas na presença de seleção adversa: uma análise numérica

Esta dissertação propõe-se a analisar a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas (PPP) em um ambiente de seleção adversa. Mais especi calmente, analiso se as tarefas de construir e operar uma infraestrutura para serviços públicos deve ser realizada por um consórcio ou se devem ser realizadas por fi rmas contratadas separadamente. Para tal, diferentemente da literatura existente para o problema, focadas nos problemas de contratos incompletos e moral hazard, construo um modelo de seleção adversa multidimensional, onde as firrmas possuem informação privada e podem exercer um esforço não observável em cada atividade, com a existência de externalidade entre as tarefas, em uma extensão do modelo de La¤ont e Tirole (1986). Após defi nir algumas condições sob as quais PPP domina os meios usuais de contratação, utilizo de uma análise numérica para melhor compreender a solução do modelo, que se mostra altamente dependente da correlação entre os parâmetros de informação privada das firmas.

Catalog of federal domestic assistance.

Identifies and describes specific government assistance opportunities such as loans, grants, counseling, and procurement contracts available under many agencies and programs.

Funzionalizzazione e unitarietà della vicenda contrattuale negli appalti pubblici

La tesi intende analizzare l’unitarietà della vicenda contrattuale dell’appalto pubblico nell’ottica del superamento della tradizionale visione dicotomica tra la fase della scelta del contraente e quella esecutiva. Sullo sfondo della funzionalizzazione del contratto alla realizzazione dell’interesse pubblico in concreto, oggi più che mai comprensivo dei fini ambientali, sociali e occupazionali, l’attenzione sarà posta in particolare sulla compresenza in entrambe le fasi di “momenti” (e quindi di regimi) pubblicistici e privatistici. A tal fine, l’attenzione sarà principalmente riservata, da un lato, all’estensione del regime delle trattative precontrattuali anche al momento che precede quello dell’aggiudicazione e, dall’altro lato, all’applicazione dello statuto pubblicistico all’esecuzione del contratto, specialmente in relazione all’esercizio del recesso, in ciò esprimendosi con maggior forza il senso dell’unitarietà fra le due fasi. Rilevata infine la frammentazione delle giurisdizioni, valorizzata l’esigenza di un giudice specializzato sulla materia e preso atto di alcune trasformazioni (potenziali e attuali) sul fronte più generale del riparto, si cercherà di fornire una lettura atta ad estendere, a Costituzione invariata, la giurisdizione esclusiva del giudice amministrativo su tutta l’unitaria vicenda contrattuale.

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Optimization of water procurement decisions in an irrigation district: the role of option contracts

Water supply instability is one of the main risks faced by irrigation districts and farmers. Water procurement decision optimisation is essential in order to increase supply reliability and reduce costs. Water markets, such as spot purchases or water supply option contracts, can make this decision process more flexible. We analyse the potential interest in an option contract for an irrigation district that has access to several water sources. We apply a stochastic recursive mathematical programming model to simulate the water procurement decisions of an irrigation district?s board operating in a context of water supply uncertainty in south-eastern Spain. We analyse what role different option contracts could play in securing its water supply. Results suggest that the irrigation district would be willing to accept the proposed option contract in most cases subject to realistic values of the option contract financial terms. Of nine different water sources, desalination and the option contract are the main substitutes, where the use of either depends on the contract parameters. The contract premium and optioned volume are the variables that have a greater impact on the irrigation district?s decisions. Key words: Segura Basin, stochastic recursive programming, water markets, water supply option contract, water supply risk.