Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective

Institutions, and more speci cally private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic development. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the production of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

Property rights and the rural land market in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Property rights of landholders in non-captive wildlife and prospects for conservation

In order to reduce the rate of human-induced biodiversity loss of wild species, it has become increasingly important to stem this loss on private and tribal lands and to find effective policies to do this. Some writers believe that granting landholders commercial property rights in wildlife might be effective in dealing with this matter and result in the sustainable use of wildlife. This paper explores this view using economic theory. In doing so, it takes into account the total economic valuation concept. While granting of commercial property rights is found to be effective for conserving some species, it is predicted to be a complete failure as a means of conserving other species. In addition, particular attention is given to the economics of the utilisation and conservation of non-captive fugitive (or mobile) wildlife. The economic theory involved is contrasted and compared with that for the exploitation of open-access resources.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

India’s disappearing common lands: fuzzy boundaries, encroachment, and evolving property rights

Opportunistic land encroachment occurs in many low-income countries, gradually yet pervasively, until discrete areas of common land disappear. This paper, motivated by field observations in Karnataka, India, demonstrates that such an evolution of property rights from common to private may be efficient when the boundaries between common and private land are poorly defined, or ‘‘fuzzy.’’ Using a multi-period optimization model, and introducing the concept of stock and flow enforcement, I show how effectiveness of enforcement effort, whether encroachment is reversible, and punitive fines, influence whether an area of common land is fully defined and protected or gradually or rapidly encroached.

GERMANY: Creating New Property Rights on the Basis of General Legal Concepts - Without Limits?

In two cases recently decided by two different senates of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), the following issue was raised: To what extent can the filming of sports events organized by someone else, on the one hand, and the photographing of someone else’s physical property, on the other hand, be legally controlled by the organizer of the sports event and the owner of the property respectively? In its “Hartplatzhelden.de” decision, the first senate of the Federal Supreme Court concluded that the act of filming sports events does not constitute an act of unfair competition as such, and hence is allowed even without the consent of the organizer of the sports event in question. However, the fifth senate, in its “Prussian gardens and parks” decision, held that photographing someone else’s property is subject to the consent of the owner of the grounds, provided the photographs are taken from a spot situated on the owner’s property. In spite of their different outcomes, the two cases do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, read together, they may well lead to an unwanted – and unjustified – extension of exclusive protection, thus creating a new “organizer’s” IP right.

Nuclear and chemical safety, Y2K issues : hearing before the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, first session, February 24, 1999.

Shipping list no.: 99-0276-P.

A treatise on the police of the metropolis : containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and private property and security are, at present, injured and endangered : and suggesting remedies for their prevention /

Mode of access: Internet.

A treatise on the police of the metropolis; containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and private property and security are, at present, injured and endangered: and suggesting remedies for their prevention.

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 17105.

Economies : an account of the relations between private property and public welfare.

Mode of access: Internet.

Clean Air Act : ozone and particulate matter standards : hearings before the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, first session.

Shipping list no.: 98-0052-P (pt. 1), 98-0155-P (pt. 2).

A treatise on the police of the metropolis; containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and private property and security are, at present, injured and endangered: and suggesting remedies for their prevention.

Mode of access: Internet.