954 resultados para principles of justice
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Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.
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This article is an excellent example of applied ethics in public health policy development.
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The growing epidemic of allergy and allergy-induced asthma poses a significant challenge to population health. This article, written for a target audience of policy-makers in public health, aims to contribute to the development of policies to counter allergy morbidities by demonstrating how principles of social justice can guide public health initiatives in reducing allergy and asthma triggers. Following a discussion of why theories of social justice have utility in analyzing allergy, a step-wise policy assessment protocol formulated on Rawlsian principles of social justice is presented. This protocol can serve as a tool to aid in prioritizing public health initiatives and identifying ethically problematic policies that necessitate reform. Criteria for policy assessment include: 1) whether a tentative public health intervention would provide equal health benefit to a range of allergy and asthma sufferers, 2) whether targeting initiatives towards particu- lar societal groups is merited based on the notion of ‘worst-off status’ of certain population segments, and 3) whether targeted policies have the potential for stigmatization. The article concludes by analyzing three examples of policies used in reducing allergy and asthma triggers in order to convey the general thought process underlying the use of the assessment protocol, which public health officials could replicate as a guide in actual, region-specific policy development.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Formation of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) policy within the international climate regime has raised a number of discussions about ‘justice’. REDD+ aims to provide an incentive for developing countries to preserve or increase the amount of carbon stored in their forested areas. Governance of REDD+ is multi-layered: at the international level, a guiding framework must be determined; at the national level, strong legal frameworks are a pre-requisite to ensure both public and private investor confidence and at the sub-national level, forest-dependent peoples need to agree to participate as stewards of forest carbon project areas. At the international level the overall objective of REDD+ is yet to be determined, with competing mitigation, biological and justice agendas. Existing international law pertaining to the environment (international environmental principles and law, IEL) and human rights (international human rights law, IHRL) should inform the development of international and national REDD+ policy especially in relation to ensuring the environmental integrity of projects and participation and benefit-sharing rights for forest dependent communities. National laws applicable to REDD+ must accommodate the needs of all stakeholders and articulate boundaries which define their interactions, paying particular attention to ensuring that vulnerable groups are protected. This paper i) examines justice theories and IEL and IHRL to inform our understanding of what ‘justice’ means in the context of REDD+, and ii) applies international law to create a reference tool for policy-makers dealing with the complex sub-debates within this emerging climate policy. We achieve this by: 1) Briefly outlining theories of justice (for example – perspectives offered by anthropogenic and ecocentric approaches, and views from ‘green economics’). 2) Commenting on what ‘climate justice’ means in the context of REDD+. 3) Outlining a selection of IEL and IHRL principles and laws to inform our understanding of ‘justice’ in this policy realm (for example – common but differentiated responsibilities, the precautionary principle, sovereignty and prevention drawn from the principles of IEL, the UNFCCC and CBD as relevant conventions of international environmental law; and UNDRIP and the Declaration on the Right to Development as applicable international human rights instruments) 4) Noting how this informs what ‘justice’ is for different REDD+ stakeholders 5) Considering how current law-making (at both the international and national levels) reflects these principles and rules drawn from international law 6) Presenting how international law can inform policy-making by providing a reference tool of applicable international law and how it could be applied to different issues linked to REDD+. As such, this paper will help scholars and policy-makers to understand how international law can assist us to both conceptualise and embody ‘justice’ within frameworks for REDD+ at both the international and national levels.
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[EN] On 17 February 2008 Kosovo approved its declaration of independence from Serbia. The declaration was raised as a unilateral secession, a category which to date is widely debated by the international community, but supported in that case by a respectable number of the United Nation member states. A great many legal issues have been raised by the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. This opinion was eagerly awaited by legal scholars due to both its possible effects and the scope of its principles outside the context of decolonization in what it could constitute of new approach to the international scenario for the twenty-first century. The ICJ stated that the declaration of independence was in accordance with international law if it was not prohibited. The answer turned on whether or not international law prohibited the declaration of independence, without ever examining whether an entity seeking secession is entitled with a positive right to secede and if so, under which circumstances. The basic issue can be summarised as whether or not we are facing a new course in the interpretation of certain classical categories of international law: the principle of territorial integrity, statehood, sovereignty, recognition, the right to external self-determination, etc. In this study we shall analyse some of the aspects arising from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo focusing on the territorial issue. Firstly we shall analyse the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and how it operates ; secondly, we shall focus on the scope of that principle in relation to the interior of the State, and ask ourselves how international law operates in relation to declarations of independence. Lastly, we shall deal with the principle of respect for territorial integrity in the specific case of Serbia with respect to Kosovo, and then end with a series of general conclusions. This study aims, definitely, to contribute to the theoretical debate on the challenges to the traditional certainties of international law in this area.
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It is unclear how the principles of meaningful consequences, fair and proportionate accountability, and rehabilitation and reintegration under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003) are understood and experienced by youth participating in diversion from youth court. Interviews with 20 youth revealed that, from their understanding, extrajudicial sanctions were viewed as accomplishing the goals of meaningful consequences and fair and proportionate accountability relatively well, but less emphasis was placed on rehabilitation and reintegration. The findings suggest that there may be a need an examination of the spectrum of responses available to youth under the umbrella of Extrajudicial Sanctions and their ability to achieve the key principles of the legislation. Implications for both youth and policy are addressed.
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Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci.
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Il est mondialement reconnu que les institutions judiciaires jouent un rôle central dans le processus de prise de décisions politiques, à la fois au niveau national et international. C’est d’ailleurs le cas à la Haute Cour de justice d’Israël. L’étendue de son succès (ou de son échec) dans la tentative de trouver une solution aux violations des droits humains dans les territoires occupés est un problème qui continue de faire l’objet de bien des débats et de recherches académiques. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que, malgré l’absence de constitution écrite et l’existence d’un état d’urgence prolongé en Israël, la Haute Cour de justice a réussi à adopter une approche « judiciairement active » quant à la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homme de manière générale, y compris ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur le processus d’examen judiciaire de la Haute Cour de Justice tient pour acquise la notion qu’Israël est une démocratie. Ainsi, cet article cherche à examiner cette hypothèse. Premièrement, en adoptant la position que le processus de révision judiciaire est compatible avec la démocratie et la règle de loi. Deuxièmement, il examine l’approche « judiciairement active » de la Cour et soumet un bref aperçu du processus, des outils et des principes légaux que la Cour adopte pour examiner les actions des autorités israéliennes, y compris l’armée, et imposer une loi commune de protection des droits de la personne, donc ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. L’article argumente également que le contrôle prolongé des territoires occupés par Israël a eu des conséquences significatives, car tout effort fourni par la Cour pour garantir le respect des droits humains de la population civile palestinienne doit se faire sans compromettre la sécurité du pouvoir israélien. La conclusion à laquelle on arrive ici dépend de la façon dont on qualifie ce contrôle: une occupation à long terme ou une annexion (ce qui n’est pas réglementaire par rapport à loi internationale), ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur le rôle que la Haute Cour de justice peut effectivement jouer pour faire respecter les droits de la personne dans les territoires occupés.
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The focus of the present study is on issues related to Legal—Economics. The economic approach to legal issues is based on the belief held by both legal professionals and economists that law and economics are complementary disciplines and that collaboration is highly beneficial.The principles of economic analysis can help our understanding of the law. Economic approach has important effects on the costs and benefits that prospective litigants may expect from litigation and their decisions to litigate or to settle out of court. Economic consideration is also helpful to understand I 1 the significance of litigation costs, the practical problems of legal administration and the provision of legal servicesz. The economic approach to law is mainly based on the belief held by some economists that the core of economics, the theory of choice is in principle- applicable to all human and institutional behaviour.
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A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed.
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Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.