Poiesis : poesía hasta donde va

UANL

Inventing (a) life: deconstruction and the praxis and poiesis of narrative

Deconstruction often sits awkwardly between the realm of literary studies and criticism, and philosophy proper. This paper explores the contribution that a deconstructive literacy might have for those engaged in writing narrative, as a practice and a product. Taking up Kristeva's reading of Arendt, and the Aristotelian categories of praxis and poiesis, it will be argued that the act of narrating life amounts to both the actual generation of the life it purports to describe, while also being a praxis in itself, one that need not produce anything, since the very act of engaging in/with it, leaves atraceless trace that itself is 'full of meaning'. Narrative, however, will not rest in either pole of Aristotle's binary structure. For Arendt, Kristeva will remind us, narrative is an activity that is very 'human', where we engender not just zoe, mere physiological life, but bios, a living that is not colonised by ends alone, and instead finding in itself a value, a fulfilment in its own process. Applied to the activity of story-making (autobiographical or otherwise), and also to pedagogical practice in the academy, this dual potential of narrative (at once to produce and to be an end unto itself) reframes the Beruf (calling) of creative writing. Deconstruction, in other words, assists us in appreciating the very ethical consequences of the labour of deciding where and when the story begins and ends, and who the protagonist is. Recalling us to the ontological implications of the thought of différance, this paper will attempt to demonstrate how the action of articulating the edges of story can be read as akin to that which turns the
featureless flux of time into bios, or human life that, according to Arendt, is what goes missing under totalitarianism.

Uncovering poiesis : the role of production in technical communication, work, and public life

This dissertation is a report on a collaborative project between the Computer Science and the Humanities Departments to develop case studies that focus on issues of communication in the workplace, and the results of their use in the classroom. My argument is that case study teaching simulates real-world experience in a meaningful way, essentially developing a teachable way of developing phronesis, the reasoned capacity to act for the good in public. In addition, it can be read as a "how-to" guide for educators who may wish to construct their own case studies. To that end, I have included a discussion of the ethnographic methodologies employed, and how it was adapted to our more pragmatic ends. Finally, I present my overarching argument for a new appraisal of the concept of techné. This reappraisal emphasizes its productive activity, poiesis, rather than focusing on its knowledge as has been the case in the past. I propose that focusing on the telos, the end outside the production, contributes to the diminishment, if not complete foreclosure, of a rich concept of techné.

Winrich Hopp, Kurzwellen von Karlheinz Stockhausen, Konzeption und musikalische Poiesis

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F09979

'A dark / Inscrutable workmanship:' Shining a ‘scientific’ light on emotion and poiesis

Max Nordau’s physiognomic study of criminality, Degeneration (1895), notably dedicated to the Italian pioneer of criminal anthropology Cesare Lombroso, labels poets and other artists—alongside criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, and lunatics—as ‘degenerates’. The Symbolist poets come under particular scrutiny in Nordau’s pseudo-scientific study. Paul Verlaine is described as ‘a repulsive degenerate subject with asymmetric skull and Mongolian face’ (1920 [1895]:128), while Stéphane Mallarmé is said to have ‘long, pointed, faun-like ears’ (131). The emotional and metaphorical intensity of their poetry, for Nordau, is another reflection of their alleged degeneracy. These poets write ‘twaddle’ (116), engaging in a ‘babbling and stammering’ (119) resonant of children and animals, which only ‘imbeciles and idiots’ profess to understand. While the Symbolists are viewed as avant-garde, Nordau is at pains to demonstrate that their irrational use of language actually exposes them as atavistic. Nordau proclaims: ‘clear speech serves the purpose of communication of the actual’ (118). By contrast, the Symbolists, ‘so far as they are honestly degenerate and imbecile, can think only in a mystical, that is, in a confused way… their emotions override their ideas.’

Identified by Nordau as one of the fin de siècle’s degenerates, Oscar Wilde evoked Nordau’s book in a petition for clemency when he was imprisoned in 1896, arguing that Nordau’s findings proved he required medical rather than punitive intervention. His plea was not successful, with Wilde later quipping: ‘I quite agree with Dr Nordau’s assertion that all men of genius are insane, but Dr Nordau forgets that all sane people are idiots’ (cited in Hitchens 2000: 18).

Kotitaloustaidon ulottuvuuksia : Analyysi kotitaloustaidosta eksistentialistis-hermeneuttisen fenomenologian valossa

DOMESTIC SKILLS AS THE ART OF EVERYDAY LIFE. An inquiry about domestic skills as a way of being-in-the-world in the light of existentialist-hermeneutics phenomenology. This study focuses on analyzing domestic skills in a phenomenological manner. The description phenomenological emerges from the interpretation process, which originates from the ontological question of domestic skills. The ontological question of how domestic skills are directs one s phenomenological gaze to the experiencing of domestic skills, rather than merely viewing their action or technical aspects. Along with the ontological question, the axiological question of what the meaning of domestic skills is drives the analysis. This study is both theoretical and philosophical. Phenomenology is the guiding philosophy, theory and methodology of the inquiry. Existentialist-hermeneutics is the emphasis which most appropriately describes the phenomenological attitude adopted within the analysis. Martin Heidegger s philosophy of being and Maurice Merleau-Ponty s philosophy of the lived body essentially form the theoretical base for the inquiry. The analysis reveals domestic skills within a core of Care and the Other. Care and the Other are anchored both in Heidegger s analysis of Dasein and in Merleau-Ponty s analysis of the reversible being-in-the-world. The social nature of being and the action-oriented intentionality of the lived body are embodied in Care and the Other. This ontological base of domestic skills enables us to see the extensions that inhabit in it. These extensions are redoing, emotional experiencing, adapting and emancipating. The analysis connects ability and action, which is why domestic skills and household activity must be seen as a united whole. This united whole is not the matter of the two components of the phenomenon, but is rather the matter of domestic skills as a way of being-in-the-world. Domestic skills are a channel for the phenomenon Home Economics to manifest in our lives. This is the gaze that presents domestic skills as to be like the poetry of everyday life. The main result of the study is the elucidation of the ontology of domestic skills and the naming of its extensions. This growth of philosophical understanding makes it possible to strengthen the science of home economics.

Arjen hallinta kotitalouden toiminnan tavoitteena : Kotitalouden toiminnan filosofista ja teoreettista tarkastalua

The aim of this philosophical and theoretical study is to outline a conceptual framework, which could be used to describe the qualitative characteristics of household activities from a holistic point of view. The philosophical part of the study deals with ontological and epistemological approaches. Ontological questions of existence are based on the holistic notion of man. The epistemological approach to household activities is based on the Aristotelian concept of knowledge, according to which actions are viewed as being praxis and poiesis in type. The concept of rationality is essential. As a result of the study, concepts describing the qualitative contents of the concept of mastery of everyday life are presented. Mastery of everyday life describes an individual's understanding of how to act in a household and promote the common good. The qualitative dimensions are the aims of actions, knowledge that guides actions and interaction. From the standpoint of these dimensions, the development of mastery of everyday life means an increase in the individual's sense of responsibility, so that s/he is gradually able to deal responsibility with the whole household, the immediate environment and the surrounding community and society. The quality of interaction develops so that the significance of communicative interaction becomes central. There are three levels in the mastery of everyday life, which differ from one other in respect to the development of reflective thought and the scope of understanding. The whole conceptual framework will contribute to the study of both household activities and the teaching of home economics. Key words: holistic notion of man, rationality, interaction.

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.

“Something isn’t right here”: American exceptionalism and the creative nonfiction of the Vietnam War

In this thesis, I argue that few attempts were as effective in correcting the exceptionalist ethos of the United States than the creative nonfiction written by the veterans and journalists of the Vietnam War. Using critical works on creative nonfiction, I identify the characteristics of the genre that allowed Paul John Eakin to call it ‘a special kind of fiction.’ I summarise a brief history of creative nonfiction to demonstrate how it became a distinctly American form despite its Old World origins. I then claim that it was the genre most suited to the kind of ideological transformation that many hoped to instigate in U.S. society in the aftermath of Vietnam. Following this, the study explores how this “new” myth-making process occurred. I use Tim O’Brien’s If I Die in a Combat Zone and Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War to illustrate how autobiography/memoir was able to demonstrate the detrimental effect that America’s exceptionalist ideology was having on its population. Utilising narrative and autobiographical theory, I contend that these accounts represented a collective voice which spoke for all Americans in the years after Vietnam. Using Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie and C.D.B. Bryan’s Friendly Fire, I illustrate how literary journalism highlighted the hubris of the American government. I contend that while poiesis is an integral attribute of creative nonfiction, by the inclusion of extraneous bibliographic material, authors of the genre could also be seen as creating a literary context predisposing the reader towards an empirical interpretation of the events documented within. Finally, I claim that oral histories were in their essence a synthesis of “everyman” experiences very much in keeping with the American zeitgeist of the early Eighties. Focussing solely on Al Santoli’s Everything We Had, I demonstrate how such polyphonic narratives personalised the history of the Vietnam War.

Para a consideração de um plano de criação poética na obra de Mário Cesariny

Trabalho de Projecto apresentado para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Filosofia, área de especialização em Estética.

La place de l’autonomie de l’apprenant en formation ouverte et à distance dans le contexte de l’enseignement supérieur ouest-africain

Les difficultés croissantes de l’enseignement supérieur en matière d’accessibilité aux formations et de disponibilité de filières de qualité, dans les pays en voie de développement de l’Afrique de l’Ouest notamment, conjuguées avec le développement vertigineux des technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC), suscitent un grand espoir de faire de la formation à distance une solution alternative crédible des formations présentielles (OCDE, 2006). Or, si la littérature s’accorde à reconnaitre aux TIC et l’interactivité qu’elles procurent des facteurs favorisant l’apprentissage (Karsenti, 2006), la réalité du terrain éducatif lui impose de reconnaitre que non seulement la révolution de la formation ouverte et à distance (FOAD) n’est pas encore d’actualité (OCDE, 2006), mais qu’elle ne le sera que si, pour faire face à la distance transactionnelle, plus accrue en formation à distance, l’apprenant ne se contente plus d’apprendre, mais d’apprendre à apprendre, ce qui exige de lui des compétences d’autonomie. Or, malgré des décennies d’intérêt et d’investissement de la recherche, le développement de l’autonomie sur le terrain reste toujours marginal, les débats philosophiques ayant pris le pas sur la quête de solutions pratiques (Albero ,2003). La question de savoir comment les éducateurs de la FOAD utilisent les solutions existantes, censées favoriser l’autonomie de l’apprenant, telles certaines formes de tutorat et de travail de groupes, n’est pas sans intérêt, puisqu’elle permet de mieux comprendre le terrain cible et sa part de responsabilité dans cet insuccès de l’autonomie. S’inscrivant en droite ligne des travaux d’Albero (2003), la présente étude organise les principes d’autonomie suivant un cadre conceptuel privilégiant l’action et le développement, selon une dimension dynamique symbolisant l’importance du soutien à accorder à l’apprenant, une dimension topologique indiquant la nécessité pour ce soutien de prendre en compte les différents aspects sur lesquels l’apprenant peut exercer son autonomie et une dimension chronologique exprimant l’importance du désétayage. De façon pratique, cette étude, démarrée en 2009 dans le contexte de la FOAD du 2IE (Institut International des Ingénieurs de l’Eau et de l’Environnement), sis à Ouagadougou au Burkina Faso, s’organise en trois articles : le premier tente de comprendre si les conditions d’efficacité de la FOAD, selon les apprenants, formulent un besoin d’apprentissage en autonomie; le second tente de comprendre, à partir des propos des tuteurs, si l’encadrement des apprenants respecte les principes d’autonomie; enfin, le troisième article s’est penché, sur la base des intentions exprimées par les concepteurs, sur le respect des principes d’autonomie par les cours. L’éloignement des apprenants et l’objectif de comprendre leurs perceptions de la FOAD, nous ont fait préférer une approche de recherche de type mixte, à la fois qualitative pour mieux comprendre leur perception (Karsenti & Savoie-Zajc, 2004) et quantitative, pour tenir compte de leur éloignement. Pour la perception des éducateurs, nous avons opté pour une approche qualitative/descriptive plus appropriée dès que l’étude vise la compréhension du phénomène social abordé (Karsenti & Savoie-Zajc, 2004). Des résultats obtenus, la perception des 62 apprenants sur les 170 initialement invités par courriel à répondre au questionnaire, semble confirmer l’autonomie de l’apprenant comme une condition de leur réussite en FOAD. La demande des apprenants pour un soutien accru, malgré l’effort actuellement consenti par l’encadrement, effort reconnu par les apprenants eux-mêmes et qu’attestent les 10 tuteurs interviewés sur une quarantaine au 2IE, devrait, toutefois, inviter à la réflexion, puisque ne s’opposant pas réellement à un apprentissage en hétéronomie. À l’analyse, il apparait que l’insatisfaction des apprenants s’expliquerait par la non-prise en compte des différents aspects susceptibles d’influencer leur apprentissage. De plus, en nous référant aux entretiens avec les 11 concepteurs de cours sur un total de 30, il apparait que, bien que conscients de la nécessité d’adapter les cours au contexte de la FOAD, ni la modularité des contenus, ni la flexibilité de la structure des cours ne semblent être prises en compte. Au final, l’étude révèle l’urgence de lutter contre les habitudes acquises en formation présentielle et la nécessité d’employer des pédagogues professionnels formés pour une pédagogie d’autonomisation. Encore faudrait-il que l’autonomie soit véritablement consacrée par la littérature comme une praxis pour signifier qu’elle n’a d’autre fin qu’elle-même, et non comme une poiesis, pour dire que l’autonomie vise une production et cesserait dès que son objectif est atteint.

Entre fines y metas : revisión de algunas cuestiones curriculares.

Resumen tomado del autor. Resumen en castellano e inglés. Notas al final

Inaccurate autobiography – the ‘true-invention’ of a life

This paper takes the Aristotelian binary of praxis and poiesis and approaches the process of autobiography via its double lens. Drawing on a reading of Hannah Arendt done by Julia Kristeva, it considers the question of whether the activity (that is: praxis) of making-narrative might constitute an activity that is particularly ‘human’. It is framed by the playful and serious challenge offered by Derridean deconstruction to think two things at once, and to practice an inhabiting of binary ultimatums. Given this, it goes on to suggest that making in an autobiographical fashion, rather than involvinganythingprimarily representative or documentary, is more paradoxically akin to the invention of what is most true about that which we are in the habit of calling ‘our life’. Indeed, it can be argued that this praxisinvents that very ‘life’ – the latter being an entity or categorythat logically does not precede thesame writing that purports to describe it, but rather arises with its activity. This self-reflexivity (a manoeuvre that at once describes and invokes the very thing described) coincides with Derrida’s explication of invention’s mechanism.