Armed conflict and paramilitary groups in Chiapas

The armed conflict in Chiapas began in 1994 after the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Until now the Mexican government do not recognize the existence of an armed conflict there, for what they call inter-ethnic violence that happens in different municipalities in Chiapas. This study aims at demonstrating that, first, the Mexican state of Chiapas has an armed conflict since the mid-nineties, which has intensified and transformed over sixteen years. It is in this transformation that have emerged paramilitary groups seeking to destabilize the state, generating dynamics of appropriation and control of territory through different practices such as forced displacements, selective assassinations and terror spread within populations who are the targets of their attacks (mainly community support of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation). This work studied the "Peace and Justice" paramilitary group operating in different parts of the state of Chiapas, mainly in the Northern Zone. This case-study will look at the changes it has undergone Mexican democracy, which will be analyzed at two points: first, the failure of federal and Chiapas state to allow or endorse the creation of paramilitary groups and not to punish their actions; on the other, the consequences of the actions of such actors in democratic institutions, and democracy itself. Will seek to demonstrate that indeed both the permissiveness of the Mexican state and its complicity has weakened democracy in Mexico, since they are not able to manage conflict so that they do not degenerate into violence.

The Proliferation of Paramilitary Groups in Southern Mexico: State Strategy or Struggle between Local Political Elites?

This study traces the origins of Mexican paramilitary groups and argues that, contrary to what most of the literature on the subject implies, they do not represent a state strategy to thwart leftist groups seeking social change. Rather, they represent battles between groups of national and local-level elites with different visions of democracy and of what constitutes good governance. The polarization inherent in this type of conflict leads local actors to have to side with one faction of elites or the other. The presence of radical leftist groups in recently colonized indigenous areas with scant state presence gives rise to a process of radicalization among local elites. There are multiple factors that explain the emergence of paramilitary groups. Aside from the post Cold War international context, there were national factors like a shift in its focus away from security matters between 1989 and 1993, and presidential policies between 1968 and 1993, that planted the seeds of leftist radicalism in a context of id modernization

So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent? How Interplay, not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process

The precise rationale for, and timing of, the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s and beyond, which developed after more than two decades of conflict, has yet to be fully explained. It has been a common assumption that it arose from a stalemate involving the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 'regular' pro-state forces of the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary and the 'irregular/ultra' pro-state loyalist paramilitary groups of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Under this interpretation, military/paramilitary deadlock led to ripeness for peace, amid reappraisals by all parties to the conflict of the utility of violence accompanied by reinterpretations of earlier political orthodoxies. The IRA could not remove the British sovereign claim to Northern Ireland; British forces could not militarily defeat the IRA and loyalists and republicans were engaged in a futile inter-communal sectarian war. This stalemate thesis has obvious attraction in explaining why a seemingly intractable war finally subsided, but is less convincing when subject to empirical testing among republican and loyalist participants in the conflict. This article moves away from 'top-down' generalist narratives of the onset of peace, which tend to argue the stalemate thesis, to assess 'bottom-up' interpretations from the actual combatants as to why they ceased fighting. It suggests an asymmetry, rather than mutuality, of perception that there was 'military' cessation by the armed non-state groups, with neither republican nor loyalist interpretations grounded in notions of stalemate. The article concludes by urging a wider consideration of the important and persistent interplay of the military and political in conflicts such as Northern Ireland.

Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarianism in Northern Ireland since 1994

This article considers in detail loyalist paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland since the paramilitary cease-fires of 1994. The continuing nature of contemporary loyalist violence is documented with reference to sectarian attacks against members of the “Other”/Catholic community and associated symbols of that community, violence directed at other loyalists, and the potential for future violence given constitutional uncertainty regarding Northern Ireland's position within the United Kingdom. The article also challenges assumptions within the broader literature of an inability within loyalist paramilitary groups to move beyond violence in the post-cease-fire period with particular reference to their conflict transformation efforts.

De combattants à ex-combattants : interprétations des ex-combattants des groupes paramilitaires colombiens sur leur participation au conflit armé

Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux récits des ex-combattants des groupes paramilitaires Autodéfenses unies de Colombie sur leur participation au conflit armé. Ces narrations, construites dans un contexte de réintégration à la société, permettent de réfléchir à la construction de la vérité par les ex-combattants dans les contextes post-conflit. Nous avons analysé les histoires de vie de 18 ex-combattants qui participaient au Programme de réintégration à la vie civile à Bogota. Nos interviewés ont adopté une position de victimes, en élaborant des discours justificateurs visant à se déresponsabiliser. Ces discours montrent une normalisation de la violence qui revient à la notion de « banalité du mal » d’Hannah Arendt. Nos interviewés ont employé plusieurs rhétoriques des groupes paramilitaires afin de justifier la violence. Ces rhétoriques font partie de la construction psychologique de l’ennemi par les groupes et elles invitent à analyser le rôle du langage dans la construction d’une culture paramilitaire. Néanmoins, certains interviewés ont condamné la violence exercée par leur groupe. Nous avons observé qu’il existe plusieurs interprétations de la manière dont nos interviewés disaient avoir réagi aux contextes de violence de masse, ce qui nous a amenés à réfléchir aux notions de culpabilité morale et juridique.

Posibilidades de un proceso de paz en Colombia de conformidad con los principios de verdad, justicia y reparación : el caso de las AUC

Los países que salen de conflictos armados internos deben afrontar el reto de lograr el equilibrio entre los acuerdos para establecer la paz de un lado y la búsqueda de la justicia y la reconciliación de otro. En realidad, los procesos de justicia y reconciliación están bajo la influencia de numerosos factores entre los cuales se cuentan el impacto del conflicto, los recursos disponibles, el grado de voluntad política, la capacidad institucional, las normas legales, entre otros. En este contexto, la justicia transicional, la reparación, las reformas institucionales, la cooperación con la comunidad internacional y la búsqueda de una paz sostenible son temas importantes. Esta monografía se centra en el dilema entre el derecho de las víctimas a la justicia y el derecho a vivir en paz en un régimen democrático con base en el proceso que adelanta el Gobierno con grupos paramilitares.

El paramilitarismo y el poder local en el Magdalena Medio: las negociaciones de paz entre el gobierno de Andrés Pastrana Arango y el grupo guerrillero ELN. Periodo 1998- 2002

La presente monografía trata desde la perspectiva del Autoritarismo Subnacional las lógicas que se dieron entre la élite local y el paramilitarismo, como estrategia para impedir los diálogos entre el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) y el Gobierno de Andrés Pastrana Arango en el periodo de 1998-2002. De igual modo trata el espacio regional del Magdalena Medio, como escenario activo y geoestratégico que determinó las dinámicas de legitimidad y autoridad en disputa por los diversos actores.

Los grupos paramilitares en Bogotá y Cundinamarca, 1997-2005

Este artículo considera el período comprendido entre la segunda mitad de los 90, cuando aparecieron “grupos paramilitares” en Cundinamarca y Bogotá, y mediados de la primera década de este siglo, cuando fueron desmanteladas algunas de estas estructuras por parte de las autoridades, hubo entrega de armas por otras y surgieron organizaciones paramilitares “sustitutas” que permanecen activas en el ámbito territorial referido en este estudio. Destaca la actividad “antiinsurgente” desarrollada por los paramilitares en zonas coincidentes con aquellas donde las Fuerzas Militares adelantaron operaciones contrainsurgentes. Además, documenta el proceso de transformación y desintegración que sufrieron en el centro del país algunas estructuras paramilitares que acogieron el proceso de diálogo con el gobierno Uribe como parte de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia –AUC–a la vez que enfrentaban una “guerra interna” con otros grupos paramilitares recalcitrantes a participar del acuerdo. Finalmente presenta una apreciación sobre la evolución futura de los “ejércitos privados” que perviven luego de culminado el desarme de las AUC.-----This article surveys the period that covers the second half of the 1990’s, when “paramilitary groups” became visible in Cundinamarca and Bogotá, and the first half of the present decade, when a number of these structures were diminished as a result of law enforcement operations, a few others engaged in disarmament and new “substitute” paramilitary outfits emerged in the area referred by this study. It highlights the “anti-insurgent” activity of the paramilitary in areas that overlap with those where regular military forces carried out counterinsurgent operations. It also references the process of transformation and disintegration of paramilitary units in central Colombia that joined peace talks with the Uribe administration as part of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia –AUC–, as they simultaneously engaged in an “internal war” with other paramilitary groups reluctant to the agreement. It concludes with an appreciation about the future evolution of those “private armies” which endure after the AUC disarmament.

Orden en tiempos paramilitares: Violencia, política y lucro en un barrio del caribe colombiano

Como muchos otros barrios de Colombia, el barrio Nelson Mandela conformó un orden social en medio del vacío estatal, con unas regulaciones y normatividad creadas y sancionadas por grupos ilegales. Desde el barrio Nelson Mandela, este artículo rastrea actores, agentes y pobladores que explican unas redes y una fenomenología que abarca todo el departamento de Bolívar. La función que cumplió el paramilitarismo en esta región y la génesis de sus actores y apoyos se entienden desde distintas emociones y nociones que se expresan en esta investigación en la relación con las bases: venganza, lealtad, éxito y orden. La ausencia de justicia y sus ciclos de violencia y paranoia junto al referente de éxito, en medio de un empobrecimiento cultural, han mostrado en esta investigación que son un factor central que habilita el recurso humano para las mafias. Sin embargo, más importante aún ha sido observar que, en medio de una atormentada idea de orden, desde abajo, existe una capacidad de reproducir estructuras clientelista que instrumentalizan al actor armado para los asuntos comunitarios.

The Demobilization Process of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Between Politics and Justice

The phenomenon of paramilitarism in Colombia has received an ambiguous treatment, balancing between political and criminal issues; an oscillation that has been intimately linked to the evolution of the Colombian internal conflict. This contribution analyzes the recent negotiations held with paramilitary groups by the administration of Alvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010). After a brief account of the dependency path that has determined this historical episode, I propose an assessment of the use of judicial categories by the various actors of the negotiations. The main argument is that those categories –war criminal, political criminal, drug smuggler, etc.– do not depend on the intrinsic nature of an armed actor, but are socially constructed by a conflictive process of material and symbolic struggles. The capacity to categorize private violence, as legitimate or illegitimate, political or criminal, appears as one of the basic manifestations of the state’s action, as well as one of the main conflicts presiding at the rocess of state formation.

Los grupos paramilitares en Colombia: el incierto tránsito de la guerra a la paz

Esta investigación aborda las condiciones bajo las que se llevó a cabo en Colombia, en el primer gobierno del presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2006), la negociación entre el Estado y los grupos paramilitares. Se establecen las características de ese proceso de paz, su correspondencia con modelos tradicionales de negociación y sus alcances sobre el proceso de Desmovilización, Desarme y Reinserción (DDR) de las organizaciones paramilitares.

Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies

Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidates increases their coercion effort to offset the negative popularity shock. This may result in the tainted politicians actually increasing their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia, the ‘parapolitics’ scandal featuring politicians colluding with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes. We show that colluding candidates not only get more votes than their clean competitors, but also concentrate them in areas where coercion is more likely (namely, areas with more paramilitary presence, less state presence, and more judicial inefficiency). Harder to reconcile with other explanations and as a direct test of the effects of media exposure, we compare tainted candidates exposed before elections to those exposed after. We find that those exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed once elected, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated in places where coercion is more likely. Our re

Congress composition and electoral advantage

In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.

Señor presidente no creo en vos; señor policía no temo de voz. Represión estatal y paramilitar y prácticas juveniles en los barrios Alameda, Brisas, Anita y Almendros

El estudio sobre la juventud y su relación con prácticas realizadas en los espacios públicos, especialmente la calle, ha tenido un renovado interés durante las últimas décadas. Estos debates se han vuelto relevantes en cuanto que los jóvenes parecen ocupar un lugar primordial en las escenas cotidianas de violencia, en particular los jóvenes de sectores populares. A través de un proceso etnográfico de carácter sistemático y sostenido en el tiempo identifico y explico las distintas interacciones de los jóvenes en los espacios públicos de cuatro barrios populares, centrando el análisis en las distintas formas de negociación con los actores armados, especialmente con la policía y el paramilitarismo. Lo que argumento es que hacer presencia en los espacios públicos, especialmente en la calle, termina por constituir en una opción de vida a través de los cuales fomentan una beligerancia social y política de resistencia pero ante todo como método que les permite proponer alternativas de existencia, por demás no violentas, frente a la violencia generalizada de la policía y el paramilitarismo. El problema radica en que muchas de las expresiones de algunos jóvenes terminan por reproducir los mecanismos de violencia del que son víctimas, aspecto que es identificado, por quienes acuden a la violencia, como una forma de reclamar un lugar en la comunidad, a permitirse ser reconocidos y escuchados y a sobrevivir en medio de una simultaneidad de violencias que cotidianamente los atropella y les vulnera los derechos. La violencia de estos jóvenes es una forma de no permitir que las esperanzas se diluyan, aunque paradójicamente también les puede quitar la vida

Internacionalização pelo Envolvimento de Atores Externos no Conflito Colombiano: Atuação da OEA na Desmobilização de Grupos Paramilitares na Colômbia

Internationalization of the Colombian Conflict by the Involvement of External Actors: Action by the OAS in Demobilizing Paramilitary Groups in Colombia This paper discusses the effects of the internationalization of the Colombian armed conflict, understood as the participation of foreign actors in programs regarding the resolution of the conflict. Through an analysis of the involvement of multilateral and state actors, the authors argue that this process involved the dilemma between unilateralism and multilateralism. The empirical analysis is centered on the intervention of conflict mediation mechanisms from the Organization of American States (OAS), specifically the Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP/OAS), whose scope is aimed at demobilizing paramilitary groups in Colombia.