CEO overconfidence and leverage ratio: Evidence from the founder members of Mila

The study investigates the impact of the managerial overconfidence bias on the capital structure of a sample of 78 firms from Chile, Peru and Colombia, during the years 1996-2014. We infer that there is a positive relation between the leverage ratio and a) the overconfidence; b) the experience and c) the male gender of the executive. Overconfidence is measured according to the status of the CEO (entrepreneur or not-entrepreneur) and the hypotheses are tested through dynamic panel data model. The empirical results show a highly significant positive correlation between overconfidence and leverage ratio and between gender and leverage ratio while, in contrast, the relation between experience and leverage ratio is negative.

Self-Confidence, Overconfidence and Prenatal Testosterone Exposure: Evidence from the Lab

This paper examines whether the degree of confidence and overconfidence in one's ability is determined biologically. In articular, we study whether foetal testosterone exposure correlates with an incentive-compatible measure of confidence within an experimental setting. We find that men (rather than women) who were exposed to high testosterone levels in their mother's womb are less likely to overestimate their actual performance, which in turn helps them to gain higher monetary rewards. Men exposed to low prenatal testosterone levels, instead, set unrealistically high expectations which results in self-defeating behaviour. These results from the lab are able to reconcile hitherto disconnected evidence from the field, by providing a link between traders'overconfidence bias, long-term financial returns and prenatal testosterone exposure.

Entrepreneur's Overconfidence, Private Benefits and the Market Performance of the Firm

Many firms around the world are managed and partially owned by entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs hold under diversified portfolios and, therefore, bear idiosyncratic risk in addition to systematic risk. To compensate the additional risk borne, they extract private benefits. In this paper, we analyse how an entrepreneur's overconfidence affects the market performance of the firm, through the channel of private benefits. We show that two dimensions of overconfidence, namely overestimation of future cash-flows and underestimation of idiosyncratic risk (called miscalibration), have opposite effects on the private benefits extracted by the entrepreneur. As a consequence, firms managed and partially owned by overconfident entrepreneurs can deliver overperformance or underperformance, depending on the prevalence of overestimation or miscalibration of the beliefs of the entrepreneur.

Skill, Luck, Overconfidence, and Risk Taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making luck more important induces greater optimism for the former, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance.

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.

Risk aversion, overconfidence and private information as determinants of majority thresholds

We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between the voter's risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter's preferred majority threshold negatively relates to the voter's confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behaviour, the confidence-related motivation of behaviour loses ground to the signal's strength.

CEO overconfidence and the impact on M&A activity

What drives mergers and acquisitions decisions? Can an overconfidence bias affect decisions within the management team? This study complements recent work developed within the behavioral finance analyses of Mergers & Acquisitions and proposes the use of new variable to measure overconfidence. Using a sample of 8,895 takeover transactions completed by 993 CEOs in the United States – between 1992 and 2008 – it can be noticed that overconfident CEOs have 22% higher odds of engaging in corporate takeovers than rational CEOs.

Overconfidence and confirmation bias: are future managers vulnerable?

Decision makers often use ‘rules of thumb’, or heuristics, to help them handling decision situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979b). Those cognitive shortcuts are taken by the brain to cope with complexity and time limitation of decisions, by reducing the burden of information processing (Hodgkinson et al, 1999; Newell and Simon, 1972). Although crucial for decision-making, heuristics come at the cost of occasionally sending us off course, that is, make us fall into judgment traps (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Over fifty years of psychological research has shown that heuristics can lead to systematic errors, or biases, in decision-making. This study focuses on two particularly impactful biases to decision-making – the overconfidence and confirmation biases. A specific group – top management school students and recent graduates - were subject to classic experiments to measure their level of susceptibility to those biases. This population is bound to take decision positions at companies, and eventually make decisions that will impact not only their companies but society at large. The results show that this population is strongly biased by overconfidence, but less so to the confirmation bias. No significant relationship between the level of susceptibility to the overconfidence and to the confirmation bias was found.

What are the metacognitive costs of young children's overconfidence?

Children typically hold very optimistic views of their own skills but so far, only a few studies have investigated possible correlates of the ability to predict performance accurately. Therefore, this study examined the role of individual differences in performance estimation accuracy as a global metacognitive index for different monitoring and control skills (item-level judgments of learning [JOLs] and confidence judgments [CJs]), metacognitive control processes (allocation of study time and control of answers), and executive functions (cognitive flexibility, inhibition, working memory) in 6-year-olds (N=93). The three groups of under estimators, realists and over estimators differed significantly in their monitoring and control abilities: the under estimators outperformed the over estimators by showing a higher discrimination in CJs between correct and incorrect recognition. Also, the under estimators scored higher on the adequate control of incorrectly recognized items. Regarding the interplay of monitoring and control processes, under estimators spent more time studying items with low JOLs, and relied more systematically on their monitoring when controlling their recognition compared to over estimators. At the same time, the three groups did not differ significantly from each other in their executive functions. Overall, results indicate that differences in performance estimation accuracy are systematically related to other global and item-level metacognitive monitoring and control abilities in children as young as six years of age, while no meaningful association between performance estimation accuracy and executive functions was found.

Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory Environment: Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners

In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.

Entrepreneurial decision-making using the knightian uncertainty approach

The article discusses the behavioral aspects that affect the entrepreneurs' decision making under the Knightian uncertainty approach. Since the profit arising from entrepreneurial activity represents the reward of an immeasurable and subjective risk, it has been hypothesized that innovative entrepreneurs have excessive optimism and confidence, which leads them to invest in high-risk activities. A behavioral model of decision making under uncertainty is used to test the hypothesis of overconfidence. This model is based on Bayesian inference, which allows us to model the assumption that these entrepreneurs are overconfident. We conclude that, under the hypothesis of overconfidence, these entrepreneurs decide to invest, despite the fact that the expected utility model indicates the contrary. This theoretical finding could explain why there are a large number of business failures in the first years of activity.

Excess Entry, Ambiguity Seeking, and Competence: An Experimental Investigation

Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.

Recognition judgments and the performance of the recognition heuristic depend on the size of the reference class

In a series of three experiments, participants made inferences about which one of a pair of two objects scored higher on a criterion. The first experiment was designed to contrast the prediction of Probabilistic Mental Model theory (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) concerning sampling procedure with the hard-easy effect. The experiment failed to support the theory's prediction that a particular pair of randomly sampled item sets would differ in percentage correct; but the observation that German participants performed practically as well on comparisons between U.S. cities (many of which they did not even recognize) than on comparisons between German cities (about which they knew much more) ultimately led to the formulation of the recognition heuristic. Experiment 2 was a second, this time successful, attempt to unconfound item difficulty and sampling procedure. In Experiment 3, participants' knowledge and recognition of each city was elicited, and how often this could be used to make an inference was manipulated. Choices were consistent with the recognition heuristic in about 80% of the cases when it discriminated and people had no additional knowledge about the recognized city (and in about 90% when they had such knowledge). The frequency with which the heuristic could be used affected the percentage correct, mean confidence, and overconfidence as predicted. The size of the reference class, which was also manipulated, modified these effects in meaningful and theoretically important ways.

Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgement

Excess entry or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions is often attributed tooverconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entryis an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does notimply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone isunderconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarilyoverconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and amongsuccessful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that entrepreneurs areoverconfident and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility inproducing economic outcomes.