Testing the single-peakedness of other-regarding preferences

We test an implication that is common to all prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences: the ordinal preference ranking of an agent over a finite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payoffs to oneself and some other agent must be single-peaked or single-plateaued. An incentive compatible mechanism is used to elicit strict preference rankings of subjects over a finite set of alternatives in decision tasks based on dictator and trust games. Violations of single-peakedness range from a low of 19% to a high of 46% across the six main treatments. Other-regarding subjects violate single-peakedness significantly more often than self-regarding subjects. The presence of equal-split in the set of alternatives increases the number of violations. We argue that the violations cannot be explained by appealing to the relative ease of reporting certain rankings or as errors from the theoretical benchmark.

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.

How distributional preferences shape incentives on (experimental) markets for credence goods

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness of institutional design with respect to heterogeneity in distributional preferences as a possible cause and design new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers’ distributional types. Our results indicate that less than a fourth of the subjects behave according to standard theory’s assumption, the rest behaving either in line with non-standard selfish or in accordance with non-trivial other-regarding preferences. We discuss consequences of our findings for institutional design and agent selection.

Learning other agents' preferences in multi-agent negotiation using the bayesian classifier

In multi-agent systems, most of the time, an agent does not have complete information about the preferences and decision making processes of other agents. This prevents even the cooperative agents from making coordinated choices, purely due to their ignorance of what others want. To overcome this problem, traditional coordination methods rely heavily on inter-agent communication, and thus become very inefficient when communication is costly or simply not desirable (e.g. to preserve privacy). In this paper, we propose the use of learning to complement communication in acquiring knowledge about other agents. We augment the communication-intensive negotiating agent architecture with a learning module, implemented as a Bayesian classifier. This allows our agents to incrementally update models of other agents' preferences from past negotiations with them. Based on these models, the agents can make sound predictions about others' preferences, thus reducing the need for communication in their future interactions.

Learning other agents' preferences in multiagent negotiation

In multiagent systems, an agent does not usually have complete information about the preferences and decision making processes of other agents. This might prevent the agents from making coordinated choices, purely due to their ignorance of what others want. This paper describes the integration of a learning module into a communication-intensive negotiating agent architecture. The learning module gives the agents the ability to learn about other agents' preferences via past interactions. Over time, the agents can incrementally update their models of other agents' preferences and use them to make better coordinated decisions. Combining both communication and learning, as two complement knowledge acquisition methods, helps to reduce the amount of communication needed on average, and is justified in situations where communication is computationally costly or simply not desirable (e.g. to preserve the individual privacy).

Image-encounters with the techno-mediated other: Regarding post-election Iran on Youtube

In June 2009 large-scale public demonstrations on the streets of Tehran followed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial claiming of victory in the Republic’s most recent election. As the scale of the unrest rapidly escalated, foreign journalists were expelled from the country and unprecedented numbers of Iranian journalists were imprisoned (Sreberny and Khiabany 176). Observers outside of Iran learned of the events as Iranians on the streets embraced image production and distribution as a central component of their protest. Evading the attempts of the regime to control media coverage of the post-election violence, Iranians uploaded rough footage, still images, and blog entries, seeking to make real their experiences for the international community. A stream of citizen-produced footage of mass demonstrations, beatings and deaths was relayed to the world at large via Internet-based social networking channels and mobile phones. This paper takes a series of images from the mediated turmoil in Iran as a prism through which to consider the problem of what it is that such images make real for distant observers.

Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda

Despite 10 years of research on behavior in hypothetical referenda, conflict remains in the literature on whether or not the mechanism generates biased responses compared to real referenda, and the nature and source of any such bias. Almost all previous inquiry in respect of this issue has concentrated on bias at the aggregate level. This paper reports a series of three experiments which focuses on bias at the individual level and how this can translate to bias at the aggregate level. The authors argue that only an individual approach to hypothetical bias is consistent with the concept of incentive compatibility. The results of these experiments reflect these previous conflicting findings but go on to show that individual hypothetical bias is a robust result driven by the differing influence of pure self-interest and other-regarding preferences in real and hypothetical situations, rather than by a single behavioral theory such as free riding. In a hypothetical situation these preferences cause yea-saying and non-demand revealing voting. This suggests that investigation of individual respondents in other hypothetical one-shot binary choices may also provide us with insights into aggregate behavior in these situations.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Individual Decision-Making and Inflation Persistence

The traditional task of a central bank is to preserve price stability and, in doing so, not to impair the real economy more than necessary. To meet this challenge, it is of great relevance whether inflation is only driven by inflation expectations and the current output gap or whether it is, in addition, influenced by past inflation. In the former case, as described by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the central bank can immediately and simultaneously achieve price stability and equilibrium output, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Galí 2007). In the latter case, the achievement of price stability is costly in terms of output and will be pursued over several periods. Similarly, it is important to distinguish this latter case, which describes ‘intrinsic’ inflation persistence, from that of ‘extrinsic’ inflation persistence, where the sluggishness of inflation is not a ‘structural’ feature of the economy but merely ‘inherited’ from the sluggishness of the other driving forces, inflation expectations and output. ‘Extrinsic’ inflation persistence is usually considered to be the less challenging case, as policy-makers are supposed to fight against the persistence in the driving forces, especially to reduce the stickiness of inflation expectations by a credible monetary policy, in order to reestablish the ‘divine coincidence’. The scope of this dissertation is to contribute to the vast literature and ongoing discussion on inflation persistence: Chapter 1 describes the policy consequences of inflation persistence and summarizes the empirical and theoretical literature. Chapter 2 compares two models of staggered price setting, one with a fixed two-period duration and the other with a stochastic duration of prices. I show that in an economy with a timeless optimizing central bank the model with the two-period alternating price-setting (for most parameter values) leads to more persistent inflation than the model with stochastic price duration. This result amends earlier work by Kiley (2002) who found that the model with stochastic price duration generates more persistent inflation in response to an exogenous monetary shock. Chapter 3 extends the two-period alternating price-setting model to the case of 3- and 4-period price durations. This results in a more complex Phillips curve with a negative impact of past inflation on current inflation. As simulations show, this multi-period Phillips curve generates a too low degree of autocorrelation and too early turnings points of inflation and is outperformed by a simple Hybrid Phillips curve. Chapter 4 starts from the critique of Driscoll and Holden (2003) on the relative real-wage model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). While taking the critique seriously that Fuhrer and Moore’s model will collapse to a much simpler one without intrinsic inflation persistence if one takes their arguments literally, I extend the model by a term for inequality aversion. This model extension is not only in line with experimental evidence but results in a Hybrid Phillips curve with inflation persistence that is observably equivalent to that presented by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). In chapter 5, I present a model that especially allows to study the relationship between fairness attitudes and time preference (impatience). In the model, two individuals take decisions in two subsequent periods. In period 1, both individuals are endowed with resources and are able to donate a share of their resources to the other individual. In period 2, the two individuals might join in a common production after having bargained on the split of its output. The size of the production output depends on the relative share of resources at the end of period 1 as the human capital of the individuals, which is built by means of their resources, cannot fully be substituted one against each other. Therefore, it might be rational for a well-endowed individual in period 1 to act in a seemingly ‘fair’ manner and to donate own resources to its poorer counterpart. This decision also depends on the individuals’ impatience which is induced by the small but positive probability that production is not possible in period 2. As a general result, the individuals in the model economy are more likely to behave in a ‘fair’ manner, i.e., to donate resources to the other individual, the lower their own impatience and the higher the productivity of the other individual. As the (seemingly) ‘fair’ behavior is modelled as an endogenous outcome and as it is related to the aspect of time preference, the presented framework might help to further integrate behavioral economics and macroeconomics.

How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.

Prosocial behavior and gender

This study revisits different experimental data sets that explore social behavior in economic games and uncovers that many treatment effects may be gender-specific. In general, men and women do not differ in "neutral" baselines. However, we find that social framing tends to reinforce prosocial behavior in women but not men, whereas encouraging reflection decreases the prosociality of males but not females. The treatment effects are sometimes statistically different across genders and sometimes not but never go in the opposite direction. These findings suggest that (i) the social behavior of both sexes is malleable but each gender responds to different aspects of the social context; and (ii) gender differences observed in some studies might be the result of particular features of the experimental design. Our results contribute to the literature on prosocial behavior and may improve our understanding of the origins of human prosociality. We discuss the possible link between the observed differential treatment effects across genders and the differing male and female brain network connectivity, documented in recent neural studies.

Limits of the Southern Ocean

The knowledge about processes concerning perception and understanding is of paramount importance for designing means of communication like maps and charts. This is especially the case, if one does not want to lose sight of the map-user and if map-design is to be orientated along the map-users needs and preferences in order to improve the cartographic product's usability. A scientific approach to visualization can help to achieve useable results. The insights achieved by such an approach can lead to modes of visualization that are superior to those, which have seemingly proved their value in praxis - so-called "bestpractices" -, concerning their utility and efficiency. This thesis shows this by using the example of visualizing the limits of bodies of waters in the Southern Ocean. After making some introductorily remarks on the chosen mode of problem-solution in chapter one, which simultaneously illustrate the flow of work while working on the problem, in chapter two the relevant information concerning the drawing of limits in the Southern Ocean is outlined. Chapter 3 builds the theoretical framework, which is a multidisciplinary approach to representation. This theoretical framework is based on "How Maps Work" by the American Cartographer MacEachren (1995/2004). His "scientific approach to visualization" is amended and adjusted by the knowledge gained from recent findings of the social sciences where necessary. So, the approach suggested in this thesis represents a synergy of psychology, sociology, semiotics, linguistics, communication theory and cartography. It follows the tradition of interdisciplinary research getting over the boundaries of a single scientific subject. The achieved holistic approach can help to improve the usability of cartographic products. It illustrates on the one hand those processes taking place while perceiving and recognizing cartographic information - so-called bottom-up-processes. On the other hand it illuminates the processes which happen during understanding this information in so-called top-down-processes. Bottom-up- and top-down-processes are interdependent and inseparably interrelated and therefore cannot be understood without each other. Regarding aspects of usability the approach suggested in this thesis strongly focuses on the map-user. This is the reason why the phenomenon of communication gains more weight than in MacEachren's map-centered approach. Because of this, in chapter 4 a holistic approach to communication is developed. This approach makes clear that only the map-user can evaluate the usability of a cartographic product. Only if he can extract the information relevant for him from the cartographical product, it is really useable. The concept of communication is well suited to conceive that. In case of the visualization of limits of bodies of water in the Southern Ocean, which is not complex enough to illustrate all results of the theoretical considerations, it is suggested to visualize the limits with red lines. This suggestion deviates from the commonly used mode of visualization. So, this thesis shows how theory is able to ameliorate praxis. Chapter 5 leads back to the task of fixing limits of the bodies of water in the area of concern. A convention by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) states that those limits should be drawn by using meridians, parallels, rhumb lines and bathymetric data. Based on the available bathymetric data both a representation and a process model are calculated, which should support the drawing of the limits. The quality of both models, which depends on the quality of the bathymetric data at hand, leads to the decision that the representation model is better suited to support the drawing of limits.

Minimum important difference between patients with rheumatoid arthritis : the patient's perspective

OBJECTIVE: To determine the point at which differences in clinical assessment scores on physical ability, pain and overall condition are sufficiently large to correspond to a subjective perception of a meaningful difference from the perspective of the patient. METHODS: Forty patients with a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis participated in an evening of clinical assessment and one-on-one conversations with each other regarding their arthritic condition. The assessments included tender and swollen joint counts, clinician and patient global assessments, participant assessment of pain and the Health Assessment Questionnaire (HAQ) on physical ability. After each conversation, participants rated themselves relative to their conversational partner on physical ability, pain and overall condition. These subjective comparative ratings were compared to the differences of the individual clinical assessments. RESULTS: In total there were 120 conversations. Generally participants judged themselves as less disabled than others. They rated themselves as "somewhat better" than their conversation partner when they had a (mean) 7% better score on the HAQ, 6% less pain, and 9% better global assessment. In contrast, they rated themselves as "somewhat worse" when they had a (mean) 16% worse score on the HAQ, 16% more pain, and 29% worse global assessment. CONCLUSIONS: Patients view clinically important differences in an asymmetric manner. These results can provide guidance in interpreting results and planning clinical trials.

Fatigue behaviour of corrugated roofing under cycling wind loading

Low cycle fatigue cracking of light gauge metal roofing was investigated by testing a number of two-span corrugated roofing assemblies with different spans and fastening systems under cyclic uplift wind loading. Fatigue results correlated quite well with the corresponding static results reported earlier, and revealed the dependence of fatigue behaviour on the fastening system used. A comparison was made of one fastening system with the other regarding fatigue performance .