Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Do dividends signal more earnings?

Signaling models have contributed to the corporate finance literature by formalizing "the informational content of dividends" hypothesis. However, these models are under criticism of empirical literature, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predicitions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim thaht the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The models developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show thaht signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

Do dividends signal more earnings? a theoretical analysis

The signaling models have contributed to the literature of corporate finance by the formalization of "the informational content of dividends hypothesis". However, these models are under criticism of empirical works, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predictions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim that the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The mo deIs developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show that signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

The Monotonicity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation of Incentive Structures

Non-monotone incentive structures, which - according to theory - are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled laboratory conditions. Implementing some features relevant to real-world employment relationships, our paper demonstrates that, in fact, the frequency of income-maximizing decisions made by agents is higher under the monotone contract. Although this observed behavior does not change the superiority of the non-monotone contract for principals, they do not choose this contract type in a significant way. This is what we call the monotonicity puzzle. Detailed investigations of decisions provide a clue for solving the puzzle and a possible explanation for the popularity of monotone contracts.

Essais en économie avec frictions financières

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats.

Structures quantiques de certaines sous-variétés lagrangiennes non-monotones

Soit (M,ω) un variété symplectique fermée et connexe.On considère des sous-variétés lagrangiennes α : L → (M,ω). Si α est monotone, c.- à-d. s’il existe η > 0 tel que ημ = ω, Paul Biran et Octav Conea ont défini une version relative de l’homologie quantique. Dans ce contexte ils ont déformé l’opérateur de bord du complexe de Morse ainsi que le produit d’intersection à l’aide de disques pseudo-holomorphes. On note (QH(L), ∗), l’homologie quantique de L munie du produit quantique. Le principal objectif de cette dissertation est de généraliser leur construction à un classe plus large d’espaces. Plus précisément on considère soit des sous-variétés presque monotone, c.-à-d. α est C1-proche d’un plongement lagrangian monotone ; soit les fibres toriques de variétés toriques Fano. Dans ces cas non nécessairement monotones, QH(L) va dépendre de certains choix, mais cela sera irrelevant pour les applications présentées ici. Dans le cas presque monotone, on s’intéresse principalement à des questions de déplaçabilité, d’uniréglage et d’estimation d’énergie de difféomorphismes hamiltoniens. Enfin nous terminons par une application combinant les deux approches, concernant la dynamique d’un hamiltonien déplaçant toutes les fibres toriques non-monotones dans CPn.

A generalized modified Weibull distribution for lifetime modeling

A four parameter generalization of the Weibull distribution capable of modeling a bathtub-shaped hazard rate function is defined and studied. The beauty and importance of this distribution lies in its ability to model monotone as well as non-monotone failure rates, which are quite common in lifetime problems and reliability. The new distribution has a number of well-known lifetime special sub-models, such as the Weibull, extreme value, exponentiated Weibull, generalized Rayleigh and modified Weibull distributions, among others. We derive two infinite sum representations for its moments. The density of the order statistics is obtained. The method of maximum likelihood is used for estimating the model parameters. Also, the observed information matrix is obtained. Two applications are presented to illustrate the proposed distribution. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The exponentiated generalized gamma distribution with application to lifetime data

A four-parameter extension of the generalized gamma distribution capable of modelling a bathtub-shaped hazard rate function is defined and studied. The beauty and importance of this distribution lies in its ability to model monotone and non-monotone failure rate functions, which are quite common in lifetime data analysis and reliability. The new distribution has a number of well-known lifetime special sub-models, such as the exponentiated Weibull, exponentiated generalized half-normal, exponentiated gamma and generalized Rayleigh, among others. We derive two infinite sum representations for its moments. We calculate the density of the order statistics and two expansions for their moments. The method of maximum likelihood is used for estimating the model parameters and the observed information matrix is obtained. Finally, a real data set from the medical area is analysed.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation

In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them. At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non-monotone equilibria.

Etude des modèles de Whittle markoviens probabilisés

Etude des modèles de Whittle markoviens probabilisés Résumé Le modèle de Whittle markovien probabilisé est un modèle de champ spatial autorégressif simultané d'ordre 1 qui exprime simultanément chaque variable du champ comme une moyenne pondérée aléatoire des variables adjacentes du champ, amortie d'un coefficient multiplicatif ρ, et additionnée d'un terme d'erreur (qui est une variable gaussienne homoscédastique spatialement indépendante, non mesurable directement). Dans notre cas, la moyenne pondérée est une moyenne arithmétique qui est aléatoire du fait de deux conditions : (a) deux variables sont adjacentes (au sens d'un graphe) avec une probabilité 1 − p si la distance qui les sépare est inférieure à un certain seuil, (b) il n'y a pas d'adjacence pour des distances au-dessus de ce seuil. Ces conditions déterminent un modèle d'adjacence (ou modèle de connexité) du champ spatial. Un modèle de Whittle markovien probabilisé aux conditions où p = 0 donne un modèle de Whittle classique qui est plus familier en géographie, économétrie spatiale, écologie, sociologie, etc. et dont ρ est le coefficient d'autorégression. Notre modèle est donc une forme probabilisée au niveau de la connexité du champ de la forme des modèles de Whittle classiques, amenant une description innovante de l'autocorrélation spatiale. Nous commençons par décrire notre modèle spatial en montrant les effets de la complexité introduite par le modèle de connexité sur le pattern de variances et la corrélation spatiale du champ. Nous étudions ensuite la problématique de l'estimation du coefficent d'autorégression ρ pour lequel au préalable nous effectuons une analyse approfondie de son information au sens de Fisher et de Kullback-Leibler. Nous montrons qu'un estimateur non biaisé efficace de ρ possède une efficacité qui varie en fonction du paramètre p, généralement de manière non monotone, et de la structure du réseau d'adjacences. Dans le cas où la connexité du champ est non observée, nous montrons qu'une mauvaise spécification de l'estimateur de maximum de vraisemblance de ρ peut biaiser celui-ci en fonction de p. Nous proposons dans ce contexte d'autres voies pour estimer ρ. Pour finir, nous étudions la puissance des tests de significativité de ρ pour lesquels les statistiques de test sont des variantes classiques du I de Moran (test de Cliff-Ord) et du I de Moran maximal (en s'inspirant de la méthode de Kooijman). Nous observons la variation de puissance en fonction du paramètre p et du coefficient ρ, montrant par cette voie la dualité de l'autocorrélation spatiale entre intensité et connectivité dans le contexte des modèles autorégressifs

Essays in equilibrium asset pricing

Introduction This dissertation consists of three essays in equilibrium asset pricing. The first chapter studies the asset pricing implications of a general equilibrium model in which real investment is reversible at a cost. Firms face higher costs in contracting than in expanding their capital stock and decide to invest when their productive capital is scarce relative to the overall capital of the economy. Positive shocks to the capital of the firm increase the size of the firm and reduce the value of growth options. As a result, the firm is burdened with more unproductive capital and its value lowers with respect to the accumulated capital. The optimal consumption policy alters the optimal allocation of resources and affects firm's value, generating mean-reverting dynamics for the M/B ratios. The model (1) captures convergence of price-to-book ratios -negative for growth stocks and positive for value stocks - (firm migration), (2) generates deviations from the classic CAPM in line with the cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns and (3) generates a non-monotone relationship between Tobin's q and conditional volatility consistent with the empirical evidence. The second chapter proposes a standard portfolio-choice problem with transaction costs and mean reversion in expected returns. In the presence of transactions costs, no matter how small, arbitrage activity does not necessarily render equal all riskless rates of return. When two such rates follow stochastic processes, it is not optimal immediately to arbitrage out any discrepancy that arises between them. The reason is that immediate arbitrage would induce a definite expenditure of transactions costs whereas, without arbitrage intervention, there exists some, perhaps sufficient, probability that these two interest rates will come back together without any costs having been incurred. Hence, one can surmise that at equilibrium the financial market will permit the coexistence of two riskless rates that are not equal to each other. For analogous reasons, randomly fluctuating expected rates of return on risky assets will be allowed to differ even after correction for risk, leading to important violations of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The combination of randomness in expected rates of return and proportional transactions costs is a serious blow to existing frictionless pricing models. Finally, in the last chapter I propose a two-countries two-goods general equilibrium economy with uncertainty about the fundamentals' growth rates to study the joint behavior of equity volatilities and correlation at the business cycle frequency. I assume that dividend growth rates jump from one state to other, while countries' switches are possibly correlated. The model is solved in closed-form and the analytical expressions for stock prices are reported. When calibrated to the empirical data of United States and United Kingdom, the results show that, given the existing degree of synchronization across these business cycles, the model captures quite well the historical patterns of stock return volatilities. Moreover, I can explain the time behavior of the correlation, but exclusively under the assumption of a global business cycle.