786 resultados para non state armed groups
Resumo:
Reparations have been often used victim-centred measures to redress both private harm and gross violations of human rights. However, with the increasing occurrence of internal armed conflict and political violence, identities of victims and perpetrators in protracted conflicts can become blurred for some individuals. In countries like Peru and Northern Ireland that have suffered protracted violence, victimhood has been contested around which individuals are seen as innocent and deserving to exclude any members of non-state armed groups from claiming reparations. This article explores the issue of a proposed bill on a pension for injured victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It identifies that there is no consistent state practice or human rights jurisprudence in this area, but instead offers a more complex approach through four models that can grapple with the seeming diametrically opposed victimhood and responsibility, by including victimised-perpetrators in reparations programmes such as that proposed for a pension of seriously injured victims in Northern Ireland.
Resumo:
Avec l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention des droits de l’enfant (CDE) en 1990, la communauté internationale a formellement matérialisé sa volonté de faire des droits de l’enfant, des droits à protéger en tout temps. La CDE vient compléter le dispositif juridique mis en place par le droit international humanitaire (DIH) pour protéger lesdits droits en période de conflit et inspirera la Charte africaine des droits et bien-être de l’enfant. Les Etats s’engagent ainsi à en faire une réalité, quelles que soient les circonstances. Mais l’engagement juridique est confronté aux conflits armés internes qui remettent en cause les droits fondamentaux clairement énoncés, notamment le droit à la santé et à l’éducation et qui favorisent la violation de ces droits. Dans ce mémoire, nous nous sommes interrogés sur les éventuelles causes qui peuvent expliquer que les engagements juridiques ne soient pas politiquement traduits en réalité concrète. Il s’agit de vérifier si le dispositif juridique de protection ne porte pas en lui-même les germes de cette violation. Une autre hypothèse serait que l’absence de reconnaissance formelle de la responsabilité des groupes armés non étatiques impliqués dans ces conflits, en ce qui concerne le respect des droits pourrait être un élément qui favorise les violations. Ainsi, dans la première partie, après avoir retracé l’évolution historique et juridique de la reconnaissance des droits de l’enfant, nous nous sommes inscrits dans le contexte du conflit en Côte d’Ivoire entre 2002 et 2011, pour montrer les impacts des conflits armés internes sur la jouissance des droits de l’enfant, notamment à la santé et à l’éducation. La deuxième partie nous permet de relever d’une part, les insuffisances du dispositif de protection, les lacunes relatives à la non prise en compte formelle des entités armées non étatiques, et de faire des réflexions en termes de perspectives pour une meilleure effectivité du respect des droits de l’enfant en période de conflit armé non international, d’autre part.
Resumo:
Este es un estudio sobre las dinámicas de seguridad en Malí durante el periodo de 2009 a 2013. La investigación busca explicar de qué manera se ha dado un proceso de securitización de los grupos insurgentes frente a la amenaza generada por la proliferación de grupos armados no estatales en el territorio comprendido entre Malí y Níger. Se toma a Níger con el ánimo de ver la existencia de un subcomplejo regional de seguridad entre este país y Malí. De esta manera se afirma que el aumento de las actividades insurgentes y terroristas en la zona compuesta por Malí y Níger se da por la proliferación de actores armados no estatales, entre los cuales se encuentran los grupos seculares e insurgentes Tuareg, las agrupaciones islamistas fundamentalistas y los grupos que se componen entre rebeldes Tuareg, criminales e islamistas, éstos actores han afectado la percepción que tiene Malí sobre su seguridad.
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Este es un estudio sobre la estrategia de guerra estadounidense en Medio Oriente basada en el uso sistemático de drones durante el periodo comprendido entre 2009 y 2013. Se busca explicar de qué manera puede considerarse el uso de este tipo de armamento como una práctica basada en la proyección de poder sin mayor vulnerabilidad. Los casos de Pakistán y Yemen son abordados, ya que evidencian las características de las operaciones selectivas por las que ha abogado el Presidente Obama. El estudio se inscribe dentro del realismo ofensivo, haciendo también referencia a sus limitaciones explicativas. Empero, se afirma que las dinámicas y consecuencias de la utilización de drones son intrínsecas a la necesidad estadounidense de combatir actores no estatales mediante prácticas que garanticen su seguridad y pretensiones hegemónicas a pesar de las implicaciones políticas , legales y sociales en las que puede incurrir.
Resumo:
Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.
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Despite a rich body of research on the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland, the ‘disappearances’ carried out by Republican armed groups have so far escaped scrutiny. In this article I examine how the Republican movement has framed the rationale behind ‘disappearing’ as a rational response to informing and as an example of historical continuity. In doing so, Republicans appear to attempt to confer legitimacy on their choice of target and normalize the use of the practice within a Republican framework. However, these rationales incorporate techniques of neutralization and attempts to contextualize the ‘disappearances’ in such a way as to distance the Irish Republican Army from agency. Such distancing speaks to a third, overarching rationale for ‘disappearing’: the avoidance of an embarrassment that has continued into the postconflict period. I consider why Republicans persist in claiming the ‘disappeared’ were legitimate targets, killed by a method for which there is historical precedent, when such framing left them open to criticism at a time when they were seeking to demonstrate that they had left violence behind. I conclude that Republican attempts to satisfy two audiences resulted in a gulf between their engagement in the process of recovering remains and their rhetoric surrounding this issue. In so doing, light is shed on some of the challenges the Republican movement faced in their transition away from violence. More broadly, the value of unpicking the framing of key actors in transitional processes is illuminated.
Resumo:
El interés de esta investigación es realizar un estudio relativo a la estrategia de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Sendero Luminoso, y el Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo. Se analiza y explica estos actores armados no estatales perfilan una estrategia que vincula a la guerra irregular como medio militar para alcanzar sus objetivos políticos. Este trabajo efectuará un análisis de alcance explicativo mediante la tipología de monografía, en el cual se establezca la estrategia y su vinculación con los aspectos políticos y los medios militares de los tres actores objeto de este estudio. Por consiguiente, se realizará un uso de elementos teóricos y conceptuales que permitan dar alcance a la relación entre las variables de este trabajo.
Resumo:
This chapter explores the responsibility of armed non-state actors for reparations to victims. Traditionally international law has focused on the responsibility of the state, and more recently the responsibility of convicted individuals before the International Criminal Court, to provide reparations for international crimes. Yet despite the prevalence of internal armed conflict over the past few decades, there responsibility of armed groups for reparations has been neglected in international law. Although there is a tentative emerging basis for armed groups to provide reparations under international law, such developments have not yet crystallized into hard law. However, when considering the more substantive practice of states in Northern Ireland, Colombia and Uganda, a greater effort can be discerned in ensuring that such organizations are responsible for reparations. This paper finds that not only can armed non-state actors be held collectively responsible for reparations, but due to the growing number of internal armed conflict they can play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of reparations in remedying victims’ harm. Yet, finding armed groups responsible for reparations is no panacea for accountability, due to the nature of armed conflicts, responsibility may not be distinct, but overlapping and joint, and such groups may face difficulties in meeting their obligations, thus requiring a holistic approach and subsidiary role for the state.
Resumo:
Armed violence in Paraguay is not a recent phenomenon. During the second half of the XX Century, Paraguay saw the rise of a larger number of underground, revolutionary movements that sought the overthrow of the Alfredo Stroessner’s (1954-1989) government. From among those movements emerged the Partido Patria Libre (or, Free Fatherland, also known for its acronym PPL), made up of a two branches: one legal and the other one, operational. The latter was based on people’s power, as represented by “Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo” (or, the Paraguayan People’s Army, with acronym EPP). After EPP broke with PPL in March 2008, this Marxist-oriented revolutionary project, which was apparently oriented to put an end to the social, political and economic inequalities in Paraguay, began to carry out markedly criminal activities, which included bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks and armed confrontations. Its strategies and modus operandi utilized by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepciόn, San Pedro, Canindeyú y Caazapá, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as “campanas” (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking. Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger. In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriόtico Manuel Rodríguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all.
Resumo:
In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.
Resumo:
The thesis is first and foremost the examination of the notion and consequences of ‘state failure’ in international law. The disputes surrounding criteria for creation and recognition of states pertain to efforts to analyse legal and factual issues unravelling throughout the continuing existence of states, as best evidenced by the ‘state failure’ phenomenon. It is argued that although the ‘statehood’ of failed states remains uncontested, their sovereignty is increasingly considered to be dependent on the existence of effective governments. The second part of this thesis focuses on the examinations of the legal consequences of the continuing existence of failed states in the context of jus ad bellum. Since the creation of the United Nations the ability of states to resort to armed force without violating what might be considered as the single most important norm of international law, has been considerably limited. State failure and increasing importance of non-state actors has become a greatly topical issue within recent years in both scholarship and the popular imagination. There have been important legal developments within international law, which have provoked much academic, and in particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis contributes to this commentary. Despite the fact that the international community continues to perpetuate a notion of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric system of international law to exist, when dealing with practical and political realities of state failure, international law may no longer consider external sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement to statehood. Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is whether the implicit and explicit invocation of the state failure provides sufficient legal basis for the intervention in self-defence against non-state actors in located in failed states. It has been argued that state failure has a profound impact, the extent of which is yet to be fully explored, on the modern landscape of peace and security.
Resumo:
This presentation discussed the growing recognition of sustainable diets at international governance levels and how this reflects the challenges and win-win opportunities of living within our ecological limits. I assert that sustainable diets provide an example of how living within our ecological limits would actually make us better off even apart from environmental benefits. After determining whether Australians’ generally have a sustainable diet, I outlined how Australian regulators are attempting to address sustainable diets. I argued that the personal responsibility approach coupled with the focus on preventing or reducing overweight and obesity levels are proving incapable of bringing about long-term sustainable diets that will contribute to the health and well-being of Australian people.
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A general derivation of the coupling constant relations which result on embedding a non-simple group like SU L (2) @ U(1) in a larger simple group (or graded Lie group) is given. It is shown that such relations depend only on the requirement (i) that the multiplet of vector fields form an irreducible representation of the unifying algebra and (ii) the transformation properties of the fermions under SU L (2). This point is illustrated in two ways, one by constructing two different unification groups containing the same fermions and therefore have same Weinberg angle; the other by putting different SU L (2) structures on the same fermions and consequently have different Weinberg angles. In particular the value sin~0=3/8 is characteristic of the sequential doublet models or models which invoke a large number of additional leptons like E 6, while addition of extra charged fermion singlets can reduce the value of sin ~ 0 to 1/4. We point out that at the present time the models of grand unification are far from unique.
Resumo:
The capacity to conduct international disease outbreak surveillance and share information about outbreaks quickly has empowered both State and Non-State Actors to take an active role in stopping the spread of disease by generating new technical means to identify potential pandemics through the creation of shared reporting platforms. Despite all the rhetoric about the importance of infectious disease surveillance, the concept itself has received relatively little critical attention from academics, practitioners, and policymakers. This book asks leading contributors in the field to engage with five key issues attached to international disease outbreak surveillance - transparency, local engagement, practical needs, integration, and appeal - to illuminate the political effect of these technologies on those who use surveillance, those who respond to surveillance, and those being monitored.