A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks

Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Linear quadratic game and non-cooperative predictive methods for potential application to modelling driver-AFS interactive steering control

This paper is concerned with the modelling of strategic interactions between the human driver and the vehicle active front steering (AFS) controller in a path-following task where the two controllers hold different target paths. The work is aimed at extending the use of mathematical models in representing driver steering behaviour in complicated driving situations. Two game theoretic approaches, namely linear quadratic game and non-cooperative model predictive control (non-cooperative MPC), are used for developing the driver-AFS interactive steering control model. For each approach, the open-loop Nash steering control solution is derived; the influences of the path-following weights, preview and control horizons, driver time delay and arm neuromuscular system (NMS) dynamics are investigated, and the CPU time consumed is recorded. It is found that the two approaches give identical time histories as well as control gains, while the non-cooperative MPC method uses much less CPU time. Specifically, it is observed that the introduction of weight on the integral of vehicle lateral displacement error helps to eliminate the steady-state path-following error; the increase in preview horizon and NMS natural frequency and the decline in time delay and NMS damping ratio improve the path-following accuracy. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

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A spatial collision avoidance strategy for UAVs in a non-cooperative environment

This paper presents a feasible spatial collision avoidance approach for fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proposed strategy aims to achieve the desired relative bearing in the horizontal plane and relative elevation in the vertical plane so that the host aircraft is able to avoid collision with the intruder aircraft in 3D. The host aircraft will follow a desired trajectory in the collision avoidance course and resume the pre-arranged trajectory after collision is avoided. The approaching stopping condition is determined for the host aircraft to trigger an evasion maneuver to avoid collision in terms of measured heading. A switching controller is designed to achieve the spatial collision avoidance strategy. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively avoid spatial collision, making it suitable for integration into flight control systems of UAVs.

A 3D collision avoidance strategy for UAVs in a non-cooperative environment

This paper presents a feasible 3D collision avoidance approach for fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proposed strategy aims to achieve the desired relative bearing in the horizontal plane and relative elevation in the vertical plane so that the host aircraft is able to avoid collision with the intruder aircraft in 3D. The host aircraft will follow a desired trajectory in the collision avoidance course and resume the pre-arranged trajectory after collision is avoided. The approaching stopping condition is determined for the host aircraft to trigger an evasion maneuver to avoid collision in terms of measured heading. A switching controller is designed to achieve the spatial collision avoidance strategy. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively avoid spatial collision, making it suitable for integration into flight control systems of UAVs.

Comparing cooperative and non-cooperative crash risk assessment

Cooperative Systems provide, through the multiplication of information sources over the road, a lot of potential to improve the assessment of the road risk describing a particular driving situation. In this paper, we compare the performance of a cooperative risk assessment approach against a non-cooperative approach; we used an advanced simulation framework, allowing for accurate and detailed, close-to-reality simulations. Risk is estimated, in both cases, with combinations of indicators based on the TTC. For the non-cooperative approach, vehicles are equipped only with an AAC-like forward-facing ranging sensor. On the other hand, for the cooperative approach, vehicles share information through 802.11p IVC and create an augmented map representing their environment; risk indicators are then extracted from this map. Our system shows that the cooperative risk assessment provides a systematic increase of forward warning to most of the vehicles involved in a freeway emergency braking scenario, compared to a non-cooperative system.

Learning Optimal Discriminant Functions through a Cooperative Game of Automata

The problem of learning correct decision rules to minimize the probability of misclassification is a long-standing problem of supervised learning in pattern recognition. The problem of learning such optimal discriminant functions is considered for the class of problems where the statistical properties of the pattern classes are completely unknown. The problem is posed as a game with common payoff played by a team of mutually cooperating learning automata. This essentially results in a probabilistic search through the space of classifiers. The approach is inherently capable of learning discriminant functions that are nonlinear in their parameters also. A learning algorithm is presented for the team and convergence is established. It is proved that the team can obtain the optimal classifier to an arbitrary approximation. Simulation results with a few examples are presented where the team learns the optimal classifier.

A cooperative game of a pair of learning automata

A cooperative game played in a sequential manner by a pair of learning automata is investigated in this paper. The automata operate in an unknown random environment which gives a common pay-off to the automata. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the functions in the reinforcement scheme are given for absolute monotonicity which enables the expected pay-off to be monotonically increasing in any arbitrary environment. As each participating automaton operates with no information regarding the other partner, the results of the paper are relevant to decentralized control.

Cooperative game play with avatars and agents: Differences in brain activity and the experience of play

The current study sought to identify the impact of whether teammates in a cooperative videogame were controlled by other humans (avatars) or by the game (agents). The impact on player experience was explored through both subjective questionnaire measures and brain wave activity measurement (electroencephalography). Play with human teammates was associated with a greater sense of relatedness, but less competence and flow than play with other computer-controlled teammates. In terms of brain activity, play with human teammates was associated with greater activity in the alpha, theta and beta power bands than play with computer-controlled teammates. Overall, the results suggest that play with human teammates involves greater cognitive activity in terms of 'mentalising' than play with computer-controlled teammates. Additionally, the associations between subjective measures of player experience and brain activity are described. Limitations of the current study are identified and key directions for future research are discussed.

A cooperative game theoretic approach to prototype selection

In this paper we consider the task of prototype selection whose primary goal is to reduce the storage and computational requirements of the Nearest Neighbor classifier while achieving better classification accuracies. We propose a solution to the prototype selection problem using techniques from cooperative game theory and show its efficacy experimentally.

Pattern clustering using cooperative game theory

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. With extensive experimentation on standard data sets, we compare the performance of DRAC with that of well known algorithms. We show an interesting result that four prominent solution concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Gately point and \tau-value coincide for the defined characteristic form game. This vindicates the choice of the characteristic function of the clustering game and also provides strong intuitive foundation for our approach.