Benchmarking regional planning arrangements for natural resource management 2004–05: Progress, constraints and future directions for regions

This report provides a benchmark of progress in regional planning for natural resource management in Queensland and the tropical savannas region of northern Australia during 2004. It is based on a review of regional plans and planning processes against a set of pre-defined criteria designed specifically to evaluate regional planning arrangements.

A discrete forest in a continuous landscape : investigating interactions between natural resource management and sustainable development

Summary Forests are key ecosystems of the earth and associated with a large range of functions. Many of these functions are beneficial to humans and are referred to as ecosystem services. Sustainable development requires that all relevant ecosystem services are quantified, managed and monitored equally. Natural resource management therefore targets the services associated with ecosystems. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the spatial and temporal domains of relevant services do not correspond to a discrete forest ecosystem. As a consequence, the services are not quantified, managed and monitored in an equal and sustainable manner. The thesis aims were therefore to test this hypothesis, establish an improved conceptual approach and provide spatial applications for the relevant land cover and structure variables. The study was carried out in western Switzerland and based primarily on data from a countrywide landscape inventory. This inventory is part of the third Swiss national forest inventory and assesses continuous landscape variables based on a regular sampling of true colour aerial imagery. In addition, land cover variables were derived from Landsat 5 TM passive sensor data and land structure variables from active sensor data from a small footprint laserscanning system. The results confirmed the main hypothesis, as relevant services did not scale well with the forest ecosystem. Instead, a new conceptual approach for sustainable management of natural resources was described. This concept quantifies the services as a continuous function of the landscape, rather than a discrete function of the forest ecosystem. The explanatory landscape variables are therefore called continuous fields and the forest becomes a dependent and function-driven management unit. Continuous field mapping methods were established for land cover and structure variables. In conclusion, the discrete forest ecosystem is an adequate planning and management unit. However, monitoring the state of and trends in sustainability of services requires them to be quantified as a continuous function of the landscape. Sustainable natural resource management iteratively combines the ecosystem and gradient approaches. Résumé Les forêts sont des écosystèmes-clés de la terre et on leur attribue un grand nombre de fonctions. Beaucoup de ces fonctions sont bénéfiques pour l'homme et sont nommées services écosystémiques. Le développement durable exige que ces services écosystémiques soient tous quantifiés, gérés et surveillés de façon égale. La gestion des ressources naturelles a donc pour cible les services attribués aux écosystèmes. L'hypothèse principale de cette thèse est que les domaines spatiaux et temporels des services attribués à la forêt ne correspondent pas à un écosystème discret. Par conséquent, les services ne sont pas quantifiés, aménagés et surveillés d'une manière équivalente et durable. Les buts de la thèse étaient de tester cette hypothèse, d'établir une nouvelle approche conceptuelle de la gestion des ressources naturelles et de préparer des applications spatiales pour les variables paysagères et structurelles appropriées. L'étude a été menée en Suisse occidentale principalement sur la base d'un inventaire de paysage à l'échelon national. Cet inventaire fait partie du troisième inventaire forestier national suisse et mesure de façon continue des variables paysagères sur la base d'un échantillonnage régulier sur des photos aériennes couleur. En outre, des variables de couverture ? terrestre ont été dérivées des données d'un senseur passif Landsat 5 TM, ainsi que des variables structurelles, dérivées du laserscanning, un senseur actif. Les résultats confirment l'hypothèse principale, car l'échelle des services ne correspond pas à celle de l'écosystème forestier. Au lieu de cela, une nouvelle approche a été élaborée pour la gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Ce concept représente les services comme une fonction continue du paysage, plutôt qu'une fonction discrète de l'écosystème forestier. En conséquence, les variables explicatives de paysage sont dénommées continuous fields et la forêt devient une entité dépendante, définie par la fonction principale du paysage. Des méthodes correspondantes pour la couverture terrestre et la structure ont été élaborées. En conclusion, l'écosystème forestier discret est une unité adéquate pour la planification et la gestion. En revanche, la surveillance de la durabilité de l'état et de son évolution exige que les services soient quantifiés comme fonction continue du paysage. La gestion durable des ressources naturelles joint donc l'approche écosystémique avec celle du gradient de manière itérative.

War and Natural Resource Exploitation

We build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour (i.e., fighting efforts) and for endogenous natural resource exploitation (i.e., speed, ownership, and investments). While depletion is spread in a balanced Hotelling fashion during peace, the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction, as this lowers the stakes of future contest. This voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue, especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government's weapon advantage is weak. Some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons. The shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction, as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee. Furthermore, the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation, which leads to more government turnover. Without credible commitment to future fighting efforts, private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government's non-oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful, which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe.

Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria

Some natural resources oil and minerals in particular exert a negative andnonlinear impact on growth via their deleterious impact on institutionalquality. We show this result to be very robust. The Nigerian experienceprovides telling confirmation of this aspect of natural resources. Wasteand corruption from oil rather than Dutch disease has been responsible forits poor long run economic performance. We propose a solution for addressingthis resource curse which involves directly distributing the oil revenuesto the public. Even with all the difficulties of corruption and inefficiencythat will no doubt plague its actual implementation, our proposal will, atthe least, be vastly superior to the status quo. At best, however, it couldfundamentally improve the quality of public institutions and, as a result,transform economics and politics in Nigeria.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Natural Resource, FY2004

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.