Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Análisis de algunas alternativas de control en los acuerdos de cooperación bilateral, regional y multilateral en materia ambiental. Estudio de caso: La regulación del acceso a los recursos genéticos frente a la amenaza de la biopiratería en el Convenio de Diversidad Biológica, La Comunidad Andina y el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos

Esta monografía avanza en la revisión conceptual que permita establecer posibles alternativas de control en los acuerdos de cooperación bilateral, regional y multilateral, que contribuyan a mitigar el efecto de la biopiratería en Colombia debido al acceso de los recursos genéticos. Parte de un análisis comparado de los aspectos básicos de control propuestos para las negociaciones en materia ambiental que se llevaron a cabo en tres ámbitos distintos: el bilateral, el multilateral y el regional, tomando como referencia el tema de la protección de los recursos genéticos de acuerdo con lo establecido en la Convención de Diversidad Biológica, la Decisión 391 de 1996 de la Comunidad Andina y el texto del TLC entre Colombia y Estados Unidos, con énfasis en la negociación de los temas ambientales. Lo anterior con base en información secundaria, referida específicamente a publicaciones oficiales de gobierno, tratados, textos y revistas académicas especializadas, páginas oficiales y publicaciones de institutos de investigación, las cuales permitieron un acercamiento más profundo a los puntos de observación.

O regime global da propriedade intelectual e a questão do desenvolvimento: o poder dos países em desenvolvimento no campo multilateral

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Mining trading partners’ preferences for efficient multi-issue bargaining in E‑business

Classical negotiation models are weak in supporting real-world business negotiations because these models often assume that the preference information of each negotiator is made public. Although parametric learning methods have been proposed for acquiring the preference information of negotiation opponents, these methods suffer from the strong assumptions about the specific utility function and negotiation mechanism employed by the opponents. Consequently, it is difficult to apply these learning methods to the heterogeneous negotiation agents participating in e‑marketplaces. This paper illustrates the design, development, and evaluation of a nonparametric negotiation knowledge discovery method which is underpinned by the well-known Bayesian learning paradigm. According to our empirical testing, the novel knowledge discovery method can speed up the negotiation processes while maintaining negotiation effectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first nonparametric negotiation knowledge discovery method developed and evaluated in the context of multi-issue bargaining over e‑marketplaces.

Unfair terms in residential land contracts : will the Australian consumer law improve a buyer’s bargaining position?

The prohibition on unfair contract terms in standard form consumer contracts has the potential to significantly impact on the terms of contracts for the sale of land. The definition of ‘consumer contract’ includes contracts for the sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual wholly or predominantly for personal or domestic use. Therefore, a contract for the purchase of a residence for personal occupation by the buyer, as opposed to a purchase for investment purposes, will be a consumer contract potentially attracting the application of the unfair terms provisions. Significant consumer protection mechanisms already exist in most state jurisdictions requiring disclosure of relevant matters to the buyer and providing remedies for the provision of misleading conduct. Minimal evidence of unfair terms in land contract was presented to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Australian Consumer Policy Framework raising the question as to whether there is an identified problem of unfair terms in real estate contracts and if so, whether the same economic and ethical rationales justify regulatory intervention. This article examines what effect if any the introduction of the unfair contract provisions will have on the enforcement of residential land contracts and the viability of previously accepted conditions if challenged as being “unfair terms”. The article concludes that despite the existence of several potentially unfair terms in some land contracts, the intervention of the rules of equity to overcome perceived hardship or unfairness to buyers from strict enforcement of terms means the unfair terms provisions are only likely to operate on terms untouched by those principles. In the authors’ view the scope for operation of the unfair terms provisions will be limited to terms untouched by the principles of equity and consumer protection legislation making it unlikely that there will be any significant realignment of the contractual obligations and rights of buyers and sellers of land.

Heart beats and economic decisions : Observing mental stress in the ultimatum bargaining game

One aim of experimental economics is to try to better understand human economic decision making. Early research of the ultimatum bargaining game (Gueth et al., 1982) revealed that other motives than pure monetary reward play a role. Neuroeconomic research has introduced the recording of physiological observations as signals of emotional responses. In this study, we apply heart rate variability (HRV) measuring technology to explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of proposers and responders in the ultimatum bargaining game. Since this technology is small and non-intrusive, we are able to run the experiment in a standard experimental economic setup. We show that low o�ers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder, as both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.

Analysis of multilateral service conversations in global business networks

The rapid growth of services available on the Internet and exploited through ever globalizing business networks poses new challenges for service interoperability. New services, from consumer “apps”, enterprise suites, platform and infrastructure resources, are vying for demand with quickly evolving and overlapping capabilities, and shorter cycles of extending service access from user interfaces to software interfaces. Services, drawn from a wider global setting, are subject to greater change and heterogeneity, demanding new requirements for structural and behavioral interface adaptation. In this paper, we analyze service interoperability scenarios in global business networks, and propose new patterns for service interactions, above those proposed over the last 10 years through the development of Web service standards and process choreography languages. By contrast, we reduce assumptions of design-time knowledge required to adapt services, giving way to run-time mismatch resolutions, extend the focus from bilateral to multilateral messaging interactions, and propose declarative ways in which services and interactions take part in long-running conversations via the explicit use of state.

Long-term care and family bargaining

We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long-term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision-making assumptions we make.