Motorcycle operator licensing - issue paper.

Mode of access: Internet.

Developments in motorcycle operator licensing.

Mode of access: Internet.

Improved motorcyclist licensing and testing project. Annual report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Improved motorcyclist licensing and testing project. Executive summary. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic/Pedestrian Safety Program, Washington, D.C.

Improved motorcyclist licensing and testing project. Volume I. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic/Pedestrian Safety Program, Washington, D.C.

Improved motorcyclist licensing and testing project. Volume II. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic/Pedestrian Safety Program, Washington, D.C.

State and provincial licensing systems: comparative data.

Mode of access: Internet.

State and provincial licensing systems: comparative data.

Mode of access: Internet.

Motorcycle exhaust burns in children

Objectives: To document and describe motorbike exhaust burns on children. Design, Patients and Setting: Departmental database and case note review of all children with motorbike exhaust burns seen at the Stuart Pegg Paediatric Burns Centre, Brisbane between January 1996 and October 2001. Main outcome measures: Number and age of children burned, circumstances of the injury, burns sustained, treatment required and long-term sequelae. Results: Twenty-four children, median age 8 years, sustained thermal burns, most commonly to the right lower leg. Thirteen children required surgery, and 17 required chronic scar management. Conclusions: We have identified motorbike exhausts as a cause of burns in children. The injuries received resulted in significant morbidity to these children and warrants a campaign airned at reducing the incidence of such injuries. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. and ISBI.

Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.

Licensing in an international market

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically superior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for sufficiently large technological differences between the firms under both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

Welfare effects of entry into international markets with licensing

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically inferior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for intermediate (respectively, sufficiently large) technological differences between the firms under licensing with fixed fee (respectively, output royalty).

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results.

A comparison of environmental licensing systems in operation in the wood panel manufacturing industry in the Northern Hemisphere

The objective of this thesis is to compare and contrast environmental licensing systems, for the wood panel industry, in a number of countries in order to determine which system is the best from an environmental and economic point of view. The thesis also examines the impact which government can have on industry and the type of licensing system in operation in a country. Initially, the thesis investigates the origins of the various environmental licensing systems which are in operation in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, France, USA and Canada. It then examines the Environmental Agencies which control and supervise industry in these countries. The impact which the type of government (i.e. unitary or federal) in charge in any particular country has on industry and the Regulatory Agency in that country is then described. Most of the mills in the thesis make a product called OSB (Oriented Strand Board) and the manufacturing process is briefly described in order to understand where the various emissions are generated. The main body of the thesis examines a number of environmental parameters which have emission limit values in the licenses examined, although not all of these parameters have emission limit values in all of the licenses. All of these parameters are used as indicators of the potential impact which the mill can have on the environment. They have been set at specific levels by the Environmental Agencies in the individual countries to control the impact of the mill. Following on from this, the two main types of air pollution control equipment (WESPs and RTOs) are described in regard to their function and capabilities. The mill licenses are then presented in the form of results tables which compare air results and water results separately. This is due to the fact that the most significant emission from this type of industry is to air. A matrix system is used to compare the licenses so that the comparison can be as objective as possible. The discussion examines all of the elements previously described and from this it was concluded that the IPC licensing system is the best from an environmental and economic point of view. It is a much more expensive system to operate than the other systems examined, but it is much more comprehensive and looks at the mill as a whole rather than fragmenting it. It was also seen that the type of environmental licensing system which is in place in a country can play a role in the locating of an industry as certain systems were seen to have more stringent standards attached to them. The type of standard in place in a country is in turn influenced by the type of government which is in place in that country.