The sources of moral motivation : studies on empathy, guilt, shame and values

The goals of this study were to analyze the forms of emotional tendencies that are likely to motivate moral behaviors, and to find correlates for these tendencies. In study 1, students narratives of their own guilt or shame experiences were analyzed. The results showed that pure shame was more likely to motivate avoidance than reparation, whereas guilt and combination of guilt and shame were likely to motivate reparation. However, all types of emotion could lead to chronic rumination if the person was not clearly responsible for the situation. In study 2, the relations of empathy with two measures of guilt were examined in a sample of 13- to 16-year-olds (N=113). Empathy was measured using Davis s IRI and guilt by Tangney s TOSCA and Hoffman s semi-projective story completion method that includes two different scenarios, guilt over cheating and guilt over inaction. Empathy correlated more strongly with both measures of guilt than the two measures correlated with each other. Hoffman s guilt over inaction was more strongly associated with empathy measures in girls than in boys, whereas for guilt over cheating the pattern was the opposite. Girls and boys who describe themselves as empathetic may emphasize different aspect of morality and feel guilty in different contexts. In study 3, cultural and gender differences in guilt and shame (TOSCA) and value priorities (the Schwartz Value Survey) were studied in samples of Finnish (N=156) and Peruvian (N=159) adolescents. Gender differences were found to be larger and more stereotypical among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish girls were more prone to guilt and shame than boys were, whereas among the Peruvians there was no gender difference in guilt, and boys were more shame-prone than girls. The results support the view that psychological gender differences are largest individualistic societies. In study 4, the relations of value priorities to guilt, shame and empathy were examined in two samples, one of 15 19-year-old high school students (N = 207), and the other of military conscripts (N = 503). Guilt was, in both samples, positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to valuing power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathy were similar, but the relation to the openness conservation value dimension was weaker. Shame and personal distress were weakly related to values. In sum, shame without guilt and the TOSCA shame scale are tendencies that are unlikely to motivate moral behavior in Finnish cultural context. Guilt is likely to be connected to positive social behaviors, but excessive guilt can cause psychological problems. Moral emotional tendencies are related to culture, cultural conceptions of gender and to individual value priorities.

Adam Smith, Moral Motivation and Business Ethics

This paper shows how Adam Smith’s concept of moral motivation applies to business ethics and ethical consumption. Moral motivation for Smith is embedded in his moral psychology and his theory of virtue, particularly in terms of socialization and our social interactions and in his view that people always seek approval for their conduct, either though actual or ideal spectators. It follows that right conduct depends on the spectator’s awareness of one’s conduct. Thus concerning business ethics, transparency and accountability are essential, as opposed to anonymity which is detrimental. Applying Smith’s theory of motivation to consumption entails two further points: One, information concerning business conduct without consumers seeking it and acting accordingly will only have a limited effect. Two, people’s concern for the propriety of their action can and should include consumption, such that purchasing behavior becomes a moral issue rather than a mere economic one.

À procura da identidade de Heinz : um modelo de compreensão da motivação moral

RESUMO: As teorias psicológicas da moralidade dividem-se na conceptualização da motivação moral, o tema desta dissertação. Os modelos construtivistas, apoiados na epistemologia genética, privilegiam a cognição como factor determinante mas, as teorias que enfatizam o funcionamento individual admitem que as emoções e a identidade interferem na tendência de cada pessoa agir moralmente. Particularmente apoiados na segunda perspectiva, testámos um modelo preditor da motivação moral com três variáveis, identidade, identidade moral e integridade, todas avaliadas por medidas psicométricas, em duas amostras. A primeira era composta por 320 estudantes do 12º ano de uma escola do concelho de Lisboa, com idades compreendidas entre 18 e 20 anos (M=18,22; Dp=0,49), 108 masculinos e 194 femininos e a segunda era composta por 174 sujeitos, estudantes finalistas de cursos profissionais de uma escola do concelho de Lisboa frequentada por alunos provenientes de ambientes sociais caracterizados pelo stresse sócio-económico e familiar, e até, em bastantes casos, que já tinham participado em actos ilegais relacionados com furto, vandalismo, tráfico de drogas, e agressões, com idades compreendidas entre 18 e 22 anos (M=18,98; Dp=1,075), 104 masculinos e 70 femininos. A primeira amostra foi considerada normativa e a segunda de risco psicossocial. Para avaliar a motivação moral foi construída uma medida que incluiu dois aspectos: a consciência moral, relativa à avaliação objectiva e subjectiva que os indivíduos fazem das situações morais que através de processos de análise de conteúdo foi distinguida em três categorias exclusivas: não transgressão, transgressão relativizada e transgressão; e a autoatribuição de emoções que indica a probabilidade objectiva dos indivíduos cometerem acções morais. Foi verificada a existência de diferenças individuais em ambas as medidas da motivação moral e, também, a existência de diferenças na atribuição de emoções em função da consciência moral: os sujeitos da categoria transgressão apresentaram atribuições mais negativas do que os sujeitos de transgressão relativizada e estes, por sua vez, apresentaram atribuições mais negativas que os sujeitos da categoria não transgressão. Estes resultados confirmam o papel da identidade na motivação moral. A análise da predição confirmou que a integridade, a identidade e a identidade moral, em ordem decrescente de capacidade explicativa, constituem factores preditores tanto da consciência moral como da auto-atribuição de emoções. ABSTRACT: Moral motivation, the subject of this thesis, is differently viewed by several psychological perspectives. Constructivist models supported by genetic epistemology define cognition as the determinant factor while theories that emphasize individual functioning admit that emotions and identity have a central role in the way that persons could morally act. Particularly supported in this second approach we tested a predictive model of moral motivation with three variables, identity, moral identity and integrity, all evaluated by psychometric scales, in two samples. The first sample had 320 graduate high school students with age between 18 and 20 (M=18,22; SD=0,49), 108 male and 194 female and the second sample had 174 graduate students of vocational courses in high school of a risk social and familiar environment, many of them had already done illegal acts such as stealing, vandalism, drug traffic and aggressions; they had ages between 18 and 22 (M=18,98; SD=1,08), 104 male and 70 female. The first sample was considered normative and the second one was classified as psychosocial risk. To evaluate moral motivation we developed a measure that assesses two aspects: moral conscience, who includes both objective and subjective evaluation of moral situations that was distinguished in three exclusive categories by procedures of content analysis: non-transgression, justifiable transgression and transgression; and self-attribution of emotion that indicates the likelihood of committing moral actions. We observed individual differences in both measurements of moral motivation and also verified differences in emotional attribution on the basis of moral conscience: the individuals of transgression category presented more negative attributions than those of justifiable transgression and in turn the latter presented more negative attributions than individuals of non-transgression category. These results confirm the role of identity in moral motivation. The predictor analysis confirmed integrity, identity and moral identity, in descending order of explanatory power, as predictive variables of moral consciousness and self-attribution of emotions.

A identidade moral e a integridade são preditoras da motivação moral?

Com o objetivo de analisar os componentes que induzem o comportamento moral, apoiámo-nos nas teorias psicológicas que admitem a importância do papel das emoções e da identidade na motivação para a ação moral, contrariamente ao que era defendido pelas teorias construtivistas, que apenas referiam a cognição como motor do funcionamento moral. Deste modo elegemos a identidade moral e a integridade como variáveis que podem estar associadas à motivação moral. Participaram 91 adultos emergentes, com idades compreendidas entre os 18 e os 25 anos (M = 20,63; Dp = 2,33), 14 do género masculino e 77 do género feminino. Para avaliar a motivação moral, a identidade moral e a integridade utilizámos respetivamente a PMAM, EIM e EI. Os objetivos foram verificar se existem diferenças individuais na consciência moral e nas emoções atribuídas a atos de transgressão, se a intensidade das emoções auto-atribuídas varia em função da consciência moral, e se a identidade moral e a integridade estão associadas à motivação moral. Os resultados mostram que existem diferenças individuais tanto na consciência moral como na atribuição de emoções. Os sujeitos avaliaram as transgressões de cuidado, não cuidar de parente e infidelidade, com emoções mais negativas e com maior utilização de consciência moral de transgressão, do que as transgressões anti-sociais, fraude e mentira. Verificámos também que a intensidade emocional varia em função da consciência moral. As categorias de Transgressão Identitária e Transgressão estão associadas com emoções mais negativas e as de Transgressão Relativizada e Não Transgressão estão relacionadas com emoções menos negativas. Foi ainda encontrada associação entre a identidade moral e integridade com a motivação moral, mas apenas para as transgressões anti-sociais.

The formation of conscience : pedagogy of the sacred

This qualitative study explores Thomas Green's (1999) treatise, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience; for the purpose of reconstruing the transformative usefulness of conscience in moral education. Conscience is "reflexive judgment about things that matter" (Green, 1999, p. 21). Paul Lehmann (1963) suggested that we must "do the conscience over or do the conscience in" (p. 327). Thomas Green "does the conscience over", arguing that a philosophy of moral education, and not a moral philosophy, provides the only framework from which governance of moral behaviour can be understood. Narratives from four one-to-one interviews and a focus group are analysed and interpreted in search of: (a) awareness and understanding of conscience, (b) voices of conscience, (c) normation, (d) reflexive emotions, and (e) the idea of the sacred. Participants in this study (ages 16-21) demonstrated an active awareness of their conscience and a willingness to engage in a reflective process of their moral behaviour. They understood their conscience to be a process of self-judgment about what is right and wrong, and that its authority comes from within themselves. Narrative accounts from childhood indicated that conscience is there "from the beginning" with evidence of selfcorrecting behaviour. A maturing conscience is accompanied by an increased cognitive capacity, more complicated life experiences, and individualization. Moral motivation was grounded in " a desire to connect with things that are most important." A model for conscience formation is proposed, which visualizes a critical path of reflexive emotions. It is argued that schools, striving to shape good citizens, can promote conscience formation through a "curriculum of moral skills"; a curriculum that embraces complexity, diversity, social criticism, and selfhood.

Imagining Others

It is often argued that the ability to imagine what others think and feel is central to moral functioning. In this paper, I consider to what extent this is true. I argue that neither the ability to think of others as having representational mental states, nor the ability to imagine being in their position, is necessary for moral understanding or moral motivation. I go on to argue that the area in which thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings appears to play the largest role is that of supererogatory actions. Being able to get on well with others seems to be importantly predicated on our ability to think about their thoughts and feelings and being able to take up their perspective. However, when it comes to grosser moral norms and restrictions, such as harm norms, there is little reason to think that thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings plays a central role in understanding such norms or being motivated by them.

Émotions et identité : le rôle des émotions dans la formation de l'identité narrative

Cette thèse met en place un modèle permettant d'éclairer les relations entre certaines émotions et la conception que l'individu a de lui-même. En accord avec plusieurs auteurs contemporains, il est ici défendu que la conception que nous avons de nous-mêmes prend la forme d'une identité narrative, c'est-à-dire d'un récit à l'intérieur duquel nous tentons de structurer une image cohérente de nous-mêmes. Dans cette perspective, il est proposé qu'un certain groupe d'émotions, comme la honte, la fierté et la culpabilité, occupe une place cruciale dans la formation et le maintien de cette image de soi. Ces émotions, que nous pouvons qualifier d'auto-évaluatives, conditionnent l'évaluation que nous avons de nous-mêmes et participent ainsi à l'élaboration de la représentation de soi. De plus, cette identité narrative, à travers un certain aspect normatif et motivant, vient à son tour influencer la manifestation et l'interprétation de ces mêmes émotions. Ainsi, la relation entre les émotions auto-évaluatives et l'identité narrative serait une relation complexe d'influences réciproques. L’analyse proposée devrait permettre de clarifier de nombreux aspects de l’économie mentale de l’individu et plus particulièrement de sa motivation morale.

Caring at a distance: Gift Theory, aid chains and social movements

This paper takes as its starting point recent work on caring for distant others which is one expression of renewed interest in moral geographies. It examines relationships in aid chains connecting donors/carers in the First World or North and recipients/cared for in the Third World or South. Assuming predominance of relationships between strangers and of universalism as a basis for moral motivation I draw upon Gift Theory in order to characterize two basic forms of gift relationship. The first is purely altruistic, the other fully reciprocal and obligatory within the framework of institutions, values and social forces within specific relationships of politics and power. This conception problematizes donor-recipient relationships in the context of two modernist models of aid chains-the Resource Transfer and the Beyond Aid Paradigms. In the first, donor domination means low levels of reciprocity despite rhetoric about partnership and participation. The second identifies potential for greater reciprocity on the basis of combination between social movements and non-governmental organizations at both national and trans-national levels, although at the risk of marginalizing competencies of states. Finally, I evaluate post-structural critiques which also problematize aid chain relationships. They do so both in terms of bases-such as universals and difference-upon which it might be constructed and the means-such as forms of positionality and mutuality-by which it might be achieved.

Piękny czy dobry? Moralny wymiar upiększania ciała

The main purpose of the article is to point outsome relations between beauty and good in contemporary reality. The main question that arises here is as follows: is the relationship of beauty and moral good still relevant? The concept presented in the thesis refers to the ancient idea of kalokagathia. It stated that beauty is inseparable from moral good. As far as this ancient perspective is concerned, it can be treated as the background for contemporary considerations about the main issue of beauty and good. The article refers to the concept of aestheticization by Wolfgang Welsch. He defines aesthetics as the primary guiding value, where as experience and entertainment have become the guidelines for contemporary culture. Moreover, the thesis mentions the concept of the consumer society and new ethics of the relation to the body as it is described by Jean Budrillard. Then the narration of the article focuses on the following problem: in what sense can we talk nowadays about moral motivation for beauty treatments of body? One assumption leads to the case of looking after one’s body. Another point of view mentions the need of harmony which manifests itself in beautiful body. Eventually, the central question emerges whether contemporary practice of beautifying the body can be a part of the concept of the good life or not.

L'éthique et sa place dans la nature

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.

L'éthique et sa place dans la nature

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

El razonamiento moral como elemento constitutivo de la competencia ética: dilemas reales e hipotéticos en profesores de educación secundaria en México

El objetivo del presente texto es la indagación del razonamiento moral en los profesores de secundaria como un elemento de la competencia ética. Se realizó con dilemas morales hipotéticos (analizados y probados previamente para su validación y cuya fiabilidad se obtuvo a través del alfa de Cronbach) y con dilemas reales. Se aplicó a 264 profesores, miembros de la comunidad académica de la Escuela Normal Superior de Michoacán, México. Se analizó a través del programa estadístico Aquad 6. Entre los descubrimientos se encuentra una presencia mayoritaria de conflictos entre las normas éticas interpersonales con las normas de conformidad social y con las normas institucionales particulares. También que la justicia y la protección contra daños a los alumnos son valores presentes en los dilemas reales y una prevalencia en el razonamiento convencional de los profesores