The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment

We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game inthe presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effortchoices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in thesecond round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher efforts. This isnot true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choiceof a sanction is a signal of low effort levels causes players who chose high effort in the firstround to be less optimistic.

Análise biomecânica instrumental da técnica de judô Morote Seoi Nage, através de uma metodologia de treinamento

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Can we learn more from fewer seeds?

The vital role that 'design of experiment' (DOE) plays when investigating dormancy, germination and potentially influential factors is discussed. The Taguchi analysis, developed by Dr. Genichi Taguchi, is a special application and analysis of the fractional factorial aimed at achieving maximum information from minimum effort and resources.

Demo: Shield UI JavaScript Chart - A Flexible HTML5 Data Visualization Component

Shield UI’s advanced framework for creating rich charts and graphs is the first of a line of data visualization components, giving web developers the power for embedding rich graphics in their web projects with minimum effort. Built with HTML, CSS3 and packaged as a jQuery plugin, the library has full support for legacy and modern desktop web browsers, as well as the latest mobile devices.

Gait Regulation for Bipedal Locomotion

This work explores regulation of forward speed, step length, and slope walking for the passive-dynamic class of bipedal robots. Previously, an energy-shaping control for regulating forward speed has appeared in the literature; here we show that control to be a special case of a more general time-scaling control that allows for speed transitions in arbitrary time. As prior work has focused on potential energy shaping for fully actuated bipeds, we study in detail the shaping of kinetic energy for bipedal robots, giving special treatment to issues of underactuation. Drawing inspiration from features of human walking, an underactuated kinetic-shaping control is presented that provides efficient regulation of walking speed while adjusting step length. Previous results on energetic symmetries of bipedal walking are also extended, resulting in a control that allows regulation of speed and step length while walking on any slope. Finally we formalize the optimal gait regulation problem and propose a dynamic programming solution seeded with passive-dynamic limit cycles. Observations of the optimal solutions generated by this method reveal further similarities between passive dynamic walking and human locomotion and give insight into the structure of minimum-effort controls for walking.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Relationship Between Aerobic And Anaerobic Parameters From 3-minute All-out Tethered Swimming And 400-m Maximal Front Crawl Effort.

The main aim of this investigation was to verify the relationship of the variables measured during a 3-minute all-out test with aerobic (i.e., peak oxygen uptake [(Equation is included in full-text article.)] and intensity corresponding to the lactate minimum [LMI]) and anaerobic parameters (i.e., anaerobic work) measured during a 400-m maximal performance. To measure force continually and to avoid the possible influences caused by turns, the 3-minute all-out effort was performed in tethered swimming. Thirty swimmers performed the following tests: (a) a 3-minute all-out tethered swimming test to determine the final force (equivalent to critical force: CF3-MIN) and the work performed above CF3-MIN (W'3-MIN), (b) a LMI protocol to determine the LMI during front crawl swimming, and (c) a 400-m maximal test to determine the (Equation is included in full-text article.)and total anaerobic contribution (WANA). Correlations between the variables were tested using the Pearson's correlation test (p ≤ 0.05). CF3-MIN (73.9 ± 13.2 N) presented a high correlation with the LMI (1.33 ± 0.08 m·s; p = 0.01) and (Equation is included in full-text article.)(4.5 ± 1.2 L·min; p = 0.01). However, the W'3-MIN (1,943.2 ± 719.2 N·s) was only moderately correlated with LMI (p = 0.02) and (Equation is included in full-text article.)(p = 0.01). In summary, CF3-MIN determined during the 3-minute all-out effort is associated with oxidative metabolism and can be used to estimate the aerobic capacity of swimmers. In contrast, the anaerobic component of this model (W'3-MIN) is not correlated with WANA.

Análise dos esforços de alta intensidade de jogadores de futebol profissional

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Efficiency of sampling methods and effort to assess arthropod diversity in Azorean native forests

The BALA project (Biodiversity of Arthropods of Laurisilva of the Azores) is a research initiative to quantify the spatial distribution of arthropod biodiversity in native forests of the Azores archipelago. Arthropods were collected using a combination of two techniques, targeting epigean (ground dwelling) and canopy (arboreal) arthropods: pitfall traps (with Turquin and Ethylene solutions) and beating samples (using the three most dominant plant species). A total of 109 transects distributed amongst 18 forest fragments in seven of the nine Azorean islands were used in this study. The performance of alternative sampling methods and effort were tested. No significant differences were found in the accumulated number of species captured whether an alternative method was used or whether another transect with similar effort was established in another location within the same fragment. A combination of Ethylene and Turquin traps captured more species per individual, Turquin and beating captured more species per sample, and Turquin captured more species per unit time. An optimization exercise was performed and we found that the protocol applied during recent years is very close to optimal, allowing its future replication with confidence. The minimum combinations of sampling effort and methods, in order to monitor or to inventory diversity, taking into account different proportions of sample completeness are discussed.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.