Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing and Signalling

The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships remains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of others. Another idea is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. The paper shows that these two arguments are stronger when combined in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly. Further, once such an equilibrium is established, altruists will not be supplanted by mutants who have similar mentalizing abilities but who lack altruism.

Shared neural circuits for mentalizing about the self and others

Although many examples exist for shared neural representations of self and other, it is unknown how such shared representations interact with the rest of the brain. Furthermore, do high-level inference-based shared mentalizing representations interact with lower level embodied/simulation-based shared representations? We used functional neuroimaging (fMRI) and a functional connectivity approach to assess these questions during high-level inference-based mentalizing. Shared mentalizing representations in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus, and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) all exhibited identical functional connectivity patterns during mentalizing of both self and other. Connectivity patterns were distributed across low-level embodied neural systems such as the frontal operculum/ventral premotor cortex, the anterior insula, the primary sensorimotor cortex, and the presupplementary motor area. These results demonstrate that identical neural circuits are implementing processes involved in mentalizing of both self and other and that the nature of such processes may be the integration of low-level embodied processes within higher level inference-based mentalizing.

What neuroimaging and perceptions of self-other similarity can tell us about the mechanism underlying mentalizing

Carruthers' "mindreading is prior" model postulates one unitary mindreading mechanism working identically for self and other. While we agree about shared mindreading mechanisms, there is also evidence from neuroimaging and mentalizing about dissimilar others that suggest factors that differentially affect self-versus-other mentalizing. Such dissociations suggest greater complexity than the mindreading is prior model allows.

Specialization of right temporo-parietal junction for mentalizing and its relation to social impairments in autism

Over the last 25years, "mindblindness" (deficits in representing mental states) has been one of the primary explanations behind the hallmark social-communication difficulties in autism spectrum conditions (ASC). However, highlighting neural systems responsible for mindblindness and their relation to variation in social impairments has remained elusive. In this study we show that one of the neural systems responsible for mindblindness in ASC and its relation to social impairments is the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Twenty-nine adult males with ASC and 33 age and IQ-matched Controls were scanned with fMRI while making reflective mentalizing or physical judgments about themselves or another person. Regions of interest within mentalizing circuitry were examined for between-group differences in activation during mentalizing about self and other and correlations with social symptom severity. RTPJ was the only mentalizing region that responded atypically in ASC. In Controls, RTPJ was selectively more responsive to mentalizing than physical judgments. This selectivity for mentalizing was not apparent in ASC and generalized across both self and other. Selectivity of RTPJ for mentalizing was also associated with the degree of reciprocal social impairment in ASC. These results lend support to the idea that RTPJ is one important neural system behind mindblindness in ASC. Understanding the contribution of RTPJ in conjunction with other neural systems responsible for other component processes involved in social cognition will be illuminating in fully explaining the hallmark social-communication difficulties of autism.

The mentalizing network orchestrates the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement.

Parochial altruism - a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members and mistrust or hostility towards outgroup members--is a pervasive feature in human society and strongly shapes the enforcement of social norms. Since the uniqueness of human society critically depends on the enforcement of norms, the understanding of the neural circuitry of the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement is key, but unexplored. To fill this gap, we measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects had the opportunity to punish ingroup members and outgroup members for violating social norms. Findings revealed that subjects' strong punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity in a functionally connected network involved in sanction-related decisions (right orbitofrontal gyrus, right lateral prefrontal cortex, right dorsal caudatus). Moreover, the stronger the connectivity in this network, the more outgroup members are punished. In contrast, the much weaker punishment of ingroup members who committed the very same norm violation is associated with increased activity and connectivity in the mentalizing-network (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-parietal junction), as if subjects tried to understand or justify ingroup members' behavior. Finally, connectivity analyses between the two networks suggest that the mentalizing-network modulates punishment by affecting the activity in the right orbitofrontal gyrus and right lateral prefrontal cortex, notably in the same areas showing enhanced activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punished defecting outgroup members.

Conversational interaction in the scanner:mentalizing during language processing as revealed by MEG

Humans are especially good at taking another's perspective-representing what others might be thinking or experiencing. This "mentalizing" capacity is apparent in everyday human interactions and conversations. We investigated its neural basis using magnetoencephalography. We focused on whether mentalizing was engaged spontaneously and routinely to understand an utterance's meaning or largely on-demand, to restore "common ground" when expectations were violated. Participants conversed with 1 of 2 confederate speakers and established tacit agreements about objects' names. In a subsequent "test" phase, some of these agreements were violated by either the same or a different speaker. Our analysis of the neural processing of test phase utterances revealed recruitment of neural circuits associated with language (temporal cortex), episodic memory (e.g., medial temporal lobe), and mentalizing (temporo-parietal junction and ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Theta oscillations (3-7 Hz) were modulated most prominently, and we observed phase coupling between functionally distinct neural circuits. The episodic memory and language circuits were recruited in anticipation of upcoming referring expressions, suggesting that context-sensitive predictions were spontaneously generated. In contrast, the mentalizing areas were recruited on-demand, as a means for detecting and resolving perceived pragmatic anomalies, with little evidence they were activated to make partner-specific predictions about upcoming linguistic utterances.

Simulation-based mentalizing generates a ‘proxy’ self-reference effect in memory

Peer reviewed

Simulation-based mentalizing generates a ‘proxy’ self-reference effect in memory

The self-reference effect (SRE) in memory is thought to depend on specialized mechanisms that enhance memory for self-relevant information. We investigated whether these mechanisms can be engaged “by proxy” when we simulate other people, by asking participants to interact with two virtual partners: one similar and one dissimilar to self. Participants viewed pairs of objects and picked one for themselves, for their similar partner, or their dissimilar partner. A surprise memory test followed that required participants to identify which object of each pair was chosen, and for whom. Finally, participants were shown both partners’ object pairs again, and asked to indicate their personal preference. Four key findings were observed. Overlap between participants’ own choice and those made for their partner was significantly higher for the similar than the dissimilar partner, revealing participants’ use of their own preferences to simulate the similar partner. Recollection of chosen objects was significantly higher for self than for both partners and, critically, was significantly higher for similar than dissimilar partners. Source confusion between self and the similar partner was also higher. These findings suggest that self-reference by proxy enhances memory for non-self-relevant material, and we consider the theoretical implications for functional interpretation of the SRE.

Social Cognition is not Reducible to Theory of Mind. When Children use Deontic Rules to Predict Others' Behaviors

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deonticreasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point tothe existence of such non-mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviourof others. In Study 1, young children (3- and 4-year-olds) were told different versionsof classic false-belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a ruleor a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, theperformance of 3-year-olds, who fail traditional false-belief tasks, significantly improved.In Study 2, 3-year-olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and touse it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified versionof the false-belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the socialcognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involvemind reading.

Habileté de mentalisation chez les mères présentant un trouble de personnalité limite : orientation mentale maternelle lors d’interactions mère-bébé.

Contexte : Les personnes atteintes de trouble de personnalité limite (TPL) présenteraient un déficit de mentalisation, soit la capacité de percevoir et interpréter les états mentaux chez soi et chez l’autre. Dans le cadre de la relation mère-bébé, un tel déficit est susceptible d’entraîner des perturbations relationnelles ayant des conséquences néfastes sur le développement de l’enfant. L’orientation mentale se mesure par le biais des verbalisations du parent au sujet des états mentaux de son enfant et constitue donc un reflet de la mentalisation du parent durant cette interaction. Toutefois, aucune étude n’a encore investigué l’orientation mentale chez des mères avec TPL durant l’interaction avec leur bébé. Objectif : Le but de cette étude était d’évaluer l’orientation mentale de 38 mères en interaction avec leur enfant âgé de 12 mois, incluant 10 mères atteintes de TPL et 28 sans diagnostic psychiatrique. Méthode: L’orientation mentale maternelle fut évaluée à partir de vidéos d’interaction mère-enfant dans un contexte de jeu libre. Le TPL a été identifié à l’aide du Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R Personality Disorders (SCID-II). Résultats: Les mères atteintes de TPL ne se sont pas distingué concernant la fréquence de commentaires faisant référence aux états mentaux de leur bébé. Toutefois, les commentaires mentaux des mères souffrant de TPL se sont avérés être 4.7 fois plus fréquemment jugés non-appropriés à l’état mental de l’enfant comparés à ceux des mères sans diagnostic psychiatrique. Conclusions : Les commentaires mentaux des mères atteintes de TPL semblent plus fréquemment empreints d’erreurs d’interprétation des états mentaux de leur enfant, ce qui pourrait poser un risque pour le développement de l’enfant.

Atypical neural self-representation in autism

The 'self' is a complex multidimensional construct deeply embedded and in many ways defined by our relations with the social world. Individuals with autism are impaired in both self-referential and other-referential social cognitive processing. Atypical neural representation of the self may be a key to understanding the nature of such impairments. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging we scanned adult males with an autism spectrum condition and age and IQ-matched neurotypical males while they made reflective mentalizing or physical judgements about themselves or the British Queen. Neurotypical individuals preferentially recruit the middle cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in response to self compared with other-referential processing. In autism, ventromedial prefrontal cortex responded equally to self and other, while middle cingulate cortex responded more to other-mentalizing than self-mentalizing. These atypical responses occur only in areas where self-information is preferentially processed and does not affect areas that preferentially respond to other-referential information. In autism, atypical neural self-representation was also apparent via reduced functional connectivity between ventromedial prefrontal cortex and areas associated with lower level embodied representations, such as ventral premotor and somatosensory cortex. Furthermore, the magnitude of neural self-other distinction in ventromedial prefrontal cortex was strongly related to the magnitude of early childhood social impairments in autism. Individuals whose ventromedial prefrontal cortex made the largest distinction between mentalizing about self and other were least socially impaired in early childhood, while those whose ventromedial prefrontal cortex made little to no distinction between mentalizing about self and other were the most socially impaired in early childhood. These observations reveal that the atypical organization of neural circuitry preferentially coding for self-information is a key mechanism at the heart of both self-referential and social impairments in autism.

Theory of mind in children with traumatic brain injury

Objective: This study was designed to examine the existence of deficits in mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM) in children with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Research design: ToM functioning was assessed in 12 children aged 6-12 years with TBI and documented frontal lobe damage and compared to 12 controls matched for age, sex and verbal ability. Brief measures of attention and memory were also included. Main outcome and results: The TBI group was significantly impaired relative to controls on the advanced ToM measure and a measure of basic emotion recognition. No difference was found in a basic measure of ToM. Conclusion: Traumatic brain damage in childhood may disrupt the developmental acquisition of emotion recognition and advanced ToM skills. The clinical and theoretical importance of these findings is discussed and the implications for the assessment and treatment of children who have experienced TBI are outlined.

A behavioral comparison of male and female adults with high functioning autism spectrum conditions

Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) affect more males than females in the general population. However, within ASC it is unclear if there are phenotypic sex differences. Testing for similarities and differences between the sexes is important not only for clinical assessment but also has implications for theories of typical sex differences and of autism. Using cognitive and behavioral measures, we investigated similarities and differences between the sexes in age- and IQ-matched adults with ASC (high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome). Of the 83 (45 males and 38 females) participants, 62 (33 males and 29 females) met Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) cut-off criteria for autism in childhood and were included in all subsequent analyses. The severity of childhood core autism symptoms did not differ between the sexes. Males and females also did not differ in self-reported empathy, systemizing, anxiety, depression, and obsessive-compulsive traits/symptoms or mentalizing performance. However, adult females with ASC showed more lifetime sensory symptoms (p = 0.036), fewer current socio-communication difficulties (p = 0.001), and more self-reported autistic traits (p = 0.012) than males. In addition, females with ASC who also had developmental language delay had lower current performance IQ than those without developmental language delay (p<0.001), a pattern not seen in males. The absence of typical sex differences in empathizing-systemizing profiles within the autism spectrum confirms a prediction from the extreme male brain theory. Behavioral sex differences within ASC may also reflect different developmental mechanisms between males and females with ASC. We discuss the importance of the superficially better socio-communication ability in adult females with ASC in terms of why females with ASC may more often go under-recognized, and receive their diagnosis later, than males.

Cognition in males and females with autism: similarities and differences

The male bias in autism spectrum conditions (ASC) has led to females with ASC being under-researched. This lack of attention to females could hide variability due to sex that may explain some of the heterogeneity within ASC. In this study we investigate four key cognitive domains (mentalizing and emotion perception, executive function, perceptual attention to detail, and motor function) in ASC, to test for similarities and differences between males and females with and without ASC (n = 128 adults; n = 32 per group). In the mentalizing and facial emotion perception domain, males and females with ASC showed similar deficits compared to neurotypical controls. However, in attention to detail and dexterity involving executive function, although males with ASC showed poorer performance relative to neurotypical males, females with ASC performed comparably to neurotypical females. We conclude that performance in the social-cognitive domain is equally impaired in male and female adults with ASC. However, in specific non-social cognitive domains, performance within ASC depends on sex. This suggests that in specific domains, cognitive profiles in ASC are modulated by sex.

Perception of causality in schizophrenia spectrum disorder

Patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders often maintain deviating views on cause-effect relationships, especially when positive and disorganization symptoms are manifest. Altered perceived causality is prominent in delusional ideation, in ideas of reference, and in the mentalizing ability (theory of mind [ToM]) of patients. Perceiving causal relationships may be understood either as higher order cognitive reasoning or as low-level information processing. In the present study, perception of causality was investigated as a low-level, preattentional capability similar to gestalt-like perceptual organization. Thirty-one patients (24 men and 7 women with mean age 27.7 years) and the same number of healthy control subjects matched to patients with respect to age and sex were tested. A visual paradigm was used in which 2 identical discs move, from opposite sides of a monitor, steadily toward and then past one another. Their coincidence generates an ambiguous, bistable percept (discs either "stream through" or "bounce off" one another). The bouncing perception, ie, perceived causality, is enhanced when auditory stimuli are presented at the time of coincidence. Psychopathology was measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. It was found that positive symptoms were strongly associated with increased perceived causality and disorganization with attenuated perceived causality. Patients in general were not significantly different from controls, but symptom subgroups showed specifically altered perceived causality. Perceived causality as a basic preattentional process may contribute to higher order cognitive alterations and ToM deficiencies. It is suggested that cognitive remediation therapy should address both increased and reduced perception of causality.