Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

The Uneasy History of Lotteries

While the Present Popularity of Lotteries and the Ferocious Attacks They Are the Object of Would Induce One to Think They Are a Novelty, Lotteries Already Existed At the Dawn of History. in This Paper, We Will Give a Brief Historical Survey of Games of Chance, with Special Emphasis on Lotteries. This Survey Serves As a Background for Forthcoming Studies Where We Examine Why They Were Frequently Popular And, At the Same Time, the Object of the Scorn of a Number of Would-Be Reformers.

Expenditures on Lotteries: What Do People Say and Wht They Do? a Econometric Analysis.

Underdeclarations Are Typical When Alcohol, Tobacco and Gambling Consumptions Are Questioned in Surveys. Recent Surveys on Expenditures on Lotteries Have Similar Problems: the Declared Expenditures Equal Between 60 to 65 Percent of the Revenues of the Various State-Run Lottery Entreprises. by Using the Relatively Accurate Data on the Revenue Side of This Industry One Can Deal with the Problem of Underdeclarations of Consumption Patterns in Suveys and Obtain Better Income Elasticity Estimates. the Statistical Analysis Permits to Test Specific Hypotheses on a Lottery Model Developed by Brenner, and Suggests Broader Implications Both for Future Econometric Analysis and the Confidence One Gives to Elasticity Estimates Derived From Aggregate Sectorial Data for All Consumption Expenditures.

A lecture before the Boston Young men's society, on the subject of lotteries. Delivered March 12, 1833.

Mode of access: Internet.

The feasibility of regulating gambling on the internet

Internet gambling presents substantial new challenges to governments and regulatory agencies. Existing approaches to betting, lotteries and gaming are limited by the nature of Internet technology, and the international nature of the activity. Particular aspects of Internet gambling are considered, and the conclusion is reached that prohibition is an ineffectual alternative, and that licensing of gambling services providers is the appropriate approach. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Money Cycles

Operating overheads are widespread and lead to concentrated bursts of activity. To transfer resources between active and idle spells, agents demand financial assets. Futures contracts and lotteries are unsuitable, as they have substantial overheads of their own.We show that money – under efficient monetary policy – is a liquid asset that leads to efficient allocations. Under all other policies, agents follow inefficient “money cycle” patterns of saving, activity, and inactivity. Agents spend their money too quickly – a “hot potato effect of inflation”. We show that inflation can stimulate inefficiently high aggregate output.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Risk aversion and embedding bias

In Selten (1967) ?Strategy Method,? the second mover in the game submits a complete strategy. This basic idea has been exported to nonstrategic experiments, where a participant reports a complete list of contingent decisions, one for each situation or state in a given sequence, out of which one and only one state, randomly selected, will be implemented.In general, the method raises the following concern. If S0 and S1 are two differentsequences of states, and state s is in both S0 and S1, would the participant make the same decision in state s when confronted with S0 as when confronted with S1? If not, the experimental results are suspect of suffering from an ?embedding bias.?We check for embedding biases in elicitation methods of Charles Holt and Susan Laury(Laury and Holt, 2000, and Holt and Laury, 2002), and of the present authors (Bosch-Dom?nech and Silvestre, 1999, 2002, 2006a, b) by appropriately chosen replications of the original experiments. We find no evidence of embedding bias in our work. But in Holt and Laury?s method participants tend to switch earlier to the riskier option when later pairs of lotteries are eliminated from the sequence, suggesting the presence of some embedding bias.

Three essays in behavioral and experimental economics

The present PhD dissertation consists of three papers, organized in chapters, in the field of behavioral economics. This discipline studies economic behavior of individuals subject to limitations, such as bounded self-interest and bounded willpower. The behavior studied in the present thesis ranges from the complex decision to register as an organ donor, decision¬making in the presence of uncertainty and the decision to give money to a charitable organization. The first chapter aims at testing the effectiveness of an active-decision (AD) mechanism on the decision to become an organ donor in Switzerland, using field experiments. We found that stimulating participants' reflection on the topic of organ donation had a negative effect on the decision to become an organ donor. Moreover, a non-binding commitment nudge reduces putting off the decision, but does not lead to donation rates higher than in the control group. The results suggest that AD may be far more limited than previously thought and raise doubts about the efficacy of engaging potential donors to reflect on the topic of organ donation. Beyond carrying for others, behavioral economics also recognizes that individuals do not evaluate outcomes in absolute terms but rather by comparing them to some reference levels, called reference points. Above the reference points, economic outcomes are perceived as gains, while below these levels the same outcomes are felt as losses. The last two chapters analyze the importance of reference points in the evaluation of economic outcomes. Using a laboratory experiment where subjects played two consecutive lotteries, Chapter 2 studies the speed of adjustment of the reference point. We find that varying the probability of winning the first lottery has no effect on subjects' risk behavior regarding the second lottery. This result indicates a very fast adjustment of the reference point to the latest information. Chapter 3 investigates whether reference points are relevant for charitable preferences. Using actual donation decisions of participants in a laboratory experiment, the results suggest that reference points are not crucial for shaping charitable giving. -- Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en trois articles, organisés en chapitres, dans le domaine de l'économie comportementale. Cette discipline étudie le comportement d'agents économiques sujets à des limitations, telles qu'un égoïsme limité et une volonté limitée. Le comportement étudié dans cette thèse va de la décision complexe de devenir donneur d'organes, la prise de décision en présence d'incertitude à la décision de donner de l'argent à une oeuvre caritative. Le premier chapitre vise à tester l'efficacité d'un mécanisme de « décision active » (active decision, AD) sur la décision de devenir donneur d'organes en Suisse, et ce en recourant à deux expériences hors-laboratoire. Les résultats montrent que stimuler la réflexion des participants sur le don d'organes a un effet négatif sur la décision de devenir donneur. De plus, un mécanisme qui encourage les participants à prendre une décision sur le champ réduit la tendance à procrastiner, mais ne mène pas à un taux de donneurs plus élevé par rapport à un groupe de contrôle. Les résultats suggèrent que le mécanisme AD est bien plus limité que ce qui a été supposé jusqu'à maintenant. De plus, ils suscitent le doute quant à l'efficacité de stimuler la réflexion de potentiels donneurs sur le sujet du don d'organes. En plus de se soucier des autres, l'économie comportementale admet également que les individus n'évaluent pas les résultats de façon absolue, mais en comparant ceux-ci à des niveaux de références, souvent appelés points de référence. Au-dessus de ces points de référence, les résultats sont perçus en tant que gains, tandis qu'en-dessous ces mêmes résultats sont considérés comme des pertes. Les deux derniers chapitres analysent l'importance des points de référence dans diverses situations. A l'aide d'une expérience en laboratoire dans laquelle les participants participent à deux loteries consécutives, le chapitre 2 étudie la vitesse d'ajustement du point de référence. Le résultat montre que varier la probabilité de gagner la première loterie n'a aucun effet sur le comportement en matière de risques concernant la deuxième loterie. Cela indique un ajustement très rapide du point de référence. Le chapitre 3 vise à déterminer si les points de référence ont un rôle majeur concernant les préférences caritatives. Les données relatives aux décisions de don des participants d'une expérience en laboratoire montrent que les points de référence n'influencent pas significativement le don caritatif.

Arpajaislain uudistamisprosessi ja uudistusten vaikutukset rahapelien markkinointiin

Tutkielma kuvaa Suomen arpajaislain muutosprosessia ja sen taustalla olevia tekijöitä sekä muutoksen vaikutuksia rahapelien markkinointiin. Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan erityisesti vuoden 2010 arpajaislain uudistusta ja vaikutuksia. Rahapelejä on kohdeltu Europpan Yhteisöjen lainsäädännössä eri tavalla verrattuna muuhun liiketoimintaan eikä siihen ole sovellettu palveluiden vapaan liikkuvuuden periaatetta samassa mittakaavassa kuin muuhun kaupalliseen toimintaan. Rahapelipalveluiden tarjoaminen internetissä on asettanut valtioiden vanhat rahapelimonopolit uusien haasteiden eteen myös lainsäädännöllisesti. Suomessa valtio on lainmuutoksilla pyrkinyt turvaamaan vallitsevan tilanteen, jossa rahapelipalveluiden tarjoamisesta suomalaisille vastaavat tietyt yhtiöt ja yhdistykset yksinoikeudella. Tutkielma pyrkii kuvaamaan tätä prosessia käyden läpi sen syitä ja seurauksia. Erityishuomion kohteeksi on otettu lakimuutosten vaikutukset ulkomaisten rahapeliyhtiöiden mainontaan suomalaisessa mediassa. Lähteinä on käytetty pääasiassa viranomaislähteitä, mutta tutkielmassa on pyritty tuomaan esille myös rahapelialan toimijoiden näkökulmia.

Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria.

The stochastic component in choice and regression to the mean

In this article, we illustrate experimentally an important consequence of the stochastic component in choice behaviour which has not been acknowledged so far. Namely, its potential to produce ‘regression to the mean’ (RTM) effects. We employ a novel approach to individual choice under risk, based on repeated multiple-lottery choices (i.e. choices among many lotteries), to show how the high degree of stochastic variability present in individual decisions can distort crucially certain results through RTM effects. We demonstrate the point in the context of a social comparison experiment.