Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Synopolies: The use of cryptographic technologies to impede competition in multiple jurisdictions

Many jurisdictions have developed mature infrastructures, both administratively and legislatively, to promote competition. Substantial funds have been expended to monitor activities that are anticompetitive and many jurisdictions also have adopted a form of "Cartel Leniency Program", first developed by the US Federal Trade Commission, to assist in cartel detection. Further, some jurisdictions are now criminalizing cartel behaviour so that cartel participants can be held criminally liable with substantial custodial penalties imposed. Notwithstanding these multijurisdictional approaches, a new form of possibly anticompetitive behaviour is looming. Synergistic monopolies („synopolies‟) involve not competitors within a horizontal market but complimentors within separate vertical markets. Where two complimentary corporations are monopolists in their own market they can, through various technologies, assist each other to expand their respective monopolies thus creating a barrier to new entrants and/or blocking existing participants from further participation in that market. The nature of the technologies involved means that it is easy for this potentially anti-competitive activity to enter and affect the global marketplace. Competition regulators need to be aware of this potential for abuse and ensure that their respective competition frameworks appropriately address this activity. This paper discusses how new technologies can be used to create a synopoly.

The Polish Competition Authority Submits a Draft Amendment to the Polish Competition Act: Revolution or Fine-Tuning?

This piece highlights and offers a brief analysis of the most important of the
proposed changes to Polish competition law. The draft proposal envisages introduction of, inter alia, financial penalties for individuals, two-stage merger review process, important changes to the leniency program (including introduction of leniency plus), as well as such new tools as remedies and settlements.

El programa de clemencia como instrumento en la lucha contra las practicas monopolisticas

El programa de clemencia consiste en perdonar la multa a la primera empresa que aporte pruebas sobre las prácticas monopolísticas. Se pone en marcha en Europa en el año 2001 con unos resultados superiores a los previstos. En este trabajo se analiza el programa de clemencia comenzando por el ámbito europeo, continuando con el estatal y acabando en el territorio vasco. Se estudian en profundidad los distintos organismos encargados de velar por el buen uso de la competencia y a su vez se analizan las multas que dichos organismos han impuesto a lo largo del tiempo mediante este programa. Se incluye una interesante y clarificadora entrevista con la presidenta de la Autoridad Vasca de la Competencia. Se prosigue con el análisis del programa de clemencia en referencia al ”dilema del prisionero” original, con sus diferencias y similitudes y se concluye con datos que avalan el buen funcionamiento del programa finalizando con una pequeña reflexión personal.

The Design, Implementation and Outcomes of a Mentoring Program

This paper reports on the design, implementation and outcomes of a mentoring program involving 18 employees in the IT Division of WorkCover Queensland. The paper provides some background information to the development of the program and the design and implementation phases including recruitment and matching of participants, orientation and training, and the mentoring process including transition and/or termination. The paper also outlines the quantitative and qualitative evaluation processes that occurred and the outcomes of that evaluation. Results indicated a wealth of positive individual, mentoring, and organisational outcomes. The organisation and semi-structured processes provided in the program are considered as major contributing factors to the successful outcomes of the program. These outcomes are likely to have long-term benefits for the individuals involved, the IT Division, and the broader organisation