Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.

On legal positivism's word and our 'form-of-(non-)living'

This paper is about two stories. The more reassuring one states that byestablishing that a norm is valid because of its source, not its merit, legal positivism is, in its various forms, perhaps one of the greatest achievements in Western legal theory and practice. From constitutionalism to human rights policies, from criminal to international law and free trade agreements, from contracts to torts and e-commerce, legal validity, predictability, and coherence have found their most powerful ally in positivist thought. This contribution argues that it is time for a different, neorealist story: the metaphysical, ontological and biopolitical essence of its language demonstrates that legal positivism has in fact played a fundamental role in the substitution of action with behaviour, and consequently, in the normalisation of humankind’s self-annihilating animality as post-historical and post-political ‘form-of-(non-)living.’

Challenging the assumptions of positivism : an analysis of the concept of society in Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi people v Western Australia [2010] and Bodney v Bennell [2008]

The requirement to prove a society united by a body of law and customs to establish native title rights has been identified as a major hurdle to achieving native title recognition. The recent appeal decision of the Federal Court in Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v Western Australia [2010] opens the potential for a new judicial interpretation of society based on the internal view of native title claimants. The decision draws on defining features of legal positivism to inform the court’s findings as to the existence of a single Bardi Jawi society of ‘one people’ living under ‘one law’. The case of Bodney v Bennell [2008] is analysed through comparitive study of how the application of the received positivist framework may limit native title recognition. This paper argues that the framing of Indigenous law by reference to Western legal norms is problematic due to the assumptions of legal positivism and that an internal view based on Indigenous worldviews, which see law as intrinsically linked to the spiritual and ancestral connection to country, is more appropriate to determine proof in native title claims.

Shared authority: courts and legislatures in legal theory

This book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

Semantic Web for the legal domain: the next step

Ontology-driven systems with reasoning capabilities in the legal field are now better understood. Legal concepts are not discrete, but make up a dynamic continuum between common sense terms, specific technical use, and professional knowledge, in an evolving institutional reality. Thus, the tension between a plural understanding of regulations and a more general understanding of law is bringing into view a new landscape in which general legal frameworks – grounded in well-known legal theories stemming from 20th-century c. legal positivism or sociological jurisprudence – are made compatible with specific forms of rights management on the Web. In this sense, Semantic Web tools are not only being designed for information retrieval, classification, clustering, and knowledge management. They can also be understood as regulatory tools, i.e. as components of the contemporary legal architecture, to be used by multiple stakeholders – front-line practitioners, policymakers, legal drafters, companies, market agents, and citizens. That is the issue broadly addressed in this Special Issue on the Semantic Web for the Legal Domain, overviewing the work carried out over the last fifteen years, and seeking to foster new research in this field, beyond the state of the art.

Evidence in European Asylum Procedures

This thesis explores the particular framework of evidentiary assessment of three selected appellate national asylum procedures in Europe and discusses the relationship between these procedures, on the one hand, and between these procedures and other legal systems, including the EU legal order and international law, on the other. A theme running throughout the thesis is the EU strivings towards approximation of national asylum procedures and my study analyses the evidentiary assessment of national procedures with the aim of pinpointing similarities and differences, and the influences which affect these distinctions. The thesis first explores the frames construed for national evidentiary solutions by studying the object of decision-making and the impact of legal systems outside the national. Second, the study analyses the factual evidentiary assessment of three national procedures - German, Finnish and English. Thirdly, the study explores the interrelationship between these procedures and the legal systems influencing them and poses questions in relation to the strivings of EU and methods of convergence. The thesis begins by stating the framework and starting points for the research. It moves on to establish keys of comparison concerning four elements of evidentiary assessment that are of importance to any appellate asylum procedure, and that can be compared between national procedures, on the one hand, and between international, regional and national frameworks, on the other. Four keys of comparison are established: the burden of proof, demands for evidentiary robustness, the standard of proof and requirements for the methods of evidentiary assessment. These keys of comparison are then identified in three national appellate asylum procedures, and in order to come to conclusions on the evidentiary standards of the appellate asylum procedures, relevant elements of the asylum procedures in general are presented. Further, institutional, formal and procedural matters which have an impact on the evidentiary standards in the national appellate procedures are analysed. From there, the thesis moves on to establish the relationship between national evidentiary standards and the legal systems which affect them, and gives reasons for similarities and divergences. Further, the thesis studies the impact of the national frameworks on the regional and international level. Lastly, the dissertation makes a de lege ferenda survey of the relationship between EU developments, the goal of harmonization in relation to national asylum procedures and the particular feature of evidentiary standards in national appellate asylum procedures. Methodology The thesis follows legal dogmatic methods. The aim is to analyse legal norms and legal constructions and give them content and context. My study takes as its outset an understanding of the purposes for legal research also regarding evidence and asylum to determine the contents of valid law through analysis and systematization. However, as evidentiary issues traditionally are normatively vaguely defined, a strict traditional normative dogmatic approach is not applied. For the same reason a traditionalist and strict legal positivism is not applied. The dogmatics applied to the analysis of the study is supported by practical analysis. The aim is not only to reach conclusions concerning the contents of legal norms and the requirements of law, but also to study the use and practical functioning of these norms, giving them a practcial context. Further, the study relies on a comparative method. A functionalist comparative method is employed and keys of comparison are found in evidentiary standards of three selected national appellate asylum procedures. The functioning equivalences of German, Finnish and English evidentiary standards of appellate asylum procedures are compared, and they are positioned in an European and international legal setting. Research Results The thesis provides results regarding the use of evidence in national appellate asylum procedures. It is established that evidentiary solutions do indeed impact on the asylum procedure and that the results of the procedure are dependent on the evidentiary solutions made in the procedures. Variations in, amongst other things, the interpretation of the burden of proof, the applied standard of proof and the method for determining evidentiary value, are analysed. It is established that national impacts play an important role in the adaptation of national appellate procedures to external requirements. Further, it is established that the impact of national procedures on as well the international framework as on EU law varies between the studied countries, partly depending on the position of the Member State in legislative advances at the EU level. In this comparative study it is, further, established that the impact of EU requirements concerning evidentiary issues may be have positive as well as negative effects with regard to the desired harmonization. It is also concluded that harmonization using means of convergence that primaly target legal frameworks may not in all instances be optimal in relation to evidentiary standards, and that more varied and pragmatic means of convergence must be introduced in order to secure harmonization also in terms of evidence. To date, legal culture and traditions seem to prevail over direct efforts at procedural harmonization.

Direito e interpretação na tradição do positivismo jurídico: uma análise de John Austin, H. L. A. Hart e seus críticos

O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é examinar as teses centrais do positivismo jurídico de John Austin e de H. L. A. Hart. Analiso inicialmente as críticas que Hart faz à teoria do direito como comando, proposta inicialmente por Austin na primeira metade do século XIX. Em seguida, ocupo-me das críticas de Ronald Dworkin ao positivismo jurídico, bem como das tentativas recentes de se retomar a teoria do direito como comando. Por fim, procuro mostrar de que forma a discussão em torno das críticas ao positivismo legal foi recebido no contexto do debate teórico-jurídico no Brasil.

Prawa człowieka w kontekstach kulturowych

The power of human rights idea and its expansion are connected with the experience of so far unprecedented pain and cruelty caused by man to man during the Second World War. Doctrine of legal positivism strenghtened totalitarian systems. One of the essential goals that were set by totalitarian systems was ethnic cleansing within both one’s and subjugated communities. To achieve this goal, concentration camps were established. This Second World War’s events gave raise to a question: does the common morality of the whole mankind exist? The Nuremberg Trials based on conviction that this common morality of the whole mankind exists. In this lawsuits Nazis were on trials for mass murder and crimes against humanity despite the fact that this crimes did not exist as a criminal offences in international law of that time. Lawyers of Nazis argued that their clients should not have been on trials for crimes against humanity because the rule “lex retro non agit” (“the law does not operate retroactively”) should have been in force. International Military Tribunal dismissed this argument – it was stated they tried Nazis are responsible for acts resulting from breach of the natural law. Therefore, the primacy of natural law over civil law (was approved and they admitted that morality and law are essential components of international reality. Since The Nuremberg Trials, the process of making international relations more ethical proceeded consistently through positivisationi.e. introducing human rights ideas to civil law (this issue is included in the Part I of the book: Positivisation of human rights idea). In this way, contemporary human rights as civil law arose, established on the basis of international agreement. Using them in order to legitimize and validate humanitarian interventions undertaken in various parts of the world became the common standard. However, positivisation of human rights idea did not mean that one common paradigm was accepted. Many interpretation of human rights arose and many new human rights formed in concrete cultures. It gives raise to a question about validity of interventions especially in the context of cultural differences in various parts of the world that influence perception, understanding and interpretation of human rights (this issues are discussed in Part II of this book). At present human rights are not only relativized to cultural contexts but undergo semantic changes as a result of globalisation process as well (Part II of the book: Human rights idea vs globalisation). Moreover, the propositions of establishing institutions and global structures that would strengthen human rights idea appear, interalia new propositions of citizenship defining (ujmowanie jako definiowanie)in response to a decreasing role and significance of nation states in the age of globalization. The idea of human rights dominated present-day law, culture and daily life both in local and global dimension. Human rights issue became essential for philosophy, especially political philosophy.

Autour d’un paradigme juridique de la reconnaissance

Les travaux de l’actuel directeur de l’Institut de recherches sociales (Institut für Sozialforschung (IfS) de Francfort et les commentaires qu’ils se sont attirés posent la question des conditions de possibilité d’une étude scientifique de la vie institutionnelle du principe d’égalité juridique qui comprenne celui-ci comme une composante essentielle de l’infrastructure morale de la société moderne et qui, de cette vie, permette de diagnostiquer les pathologies ainsi que d’indiquer les forces actives de développement. Ce projet de sociologie juridique critique suppose un concept de droit qui dépasse l’opposition traditionnelle, du moins depuis plus de deux siècles, entre positivisme juridique et jusnaturalisme. Par son truchement, un tel concept de droit se présente comme une contribution de la Théorie critique de la société (ci-après « TCS »). Nous verrons cependant que, en raison de l’état d’avancement actuel du projet honnéthien de sociologie critique, la dimension proprement sociologique du présent dossier était limitée d’emblée.

The Secession Reference: A Ruling in Search of a Nation

This short article will address the two following issues: the new vision of the Canadian constitutional order entertained by the Supreme Court in the Reference re Secession of Quebec (I) nd the impact of this new vision. upon the fate of Canada (II)

La réception du concept d'indépendance de la magistrature à Madagascar

Il est connu que ceux qui ne s’informent pas sur leur passé seront toujours condamnés à répéter les mêmes erreurs et pour déterminer où aller il faut d’abord savoir d’où on vient . La thèse se penche sur l’analyse de plus de deux siècles d’histoire de l’appareil judiciaire malgache à la lumière du concept d’indépendance de la magistrature. L’auteur porte une analyse rétrospective sur une assez longue période qui s’étend de la fin du XVIIIème siècle à nos jours au cours de laquelle il essaie de comprendre l’ensemble des situations ayant prévalu dans le pays témoin, avant, pendant et après la colonisation française. Cette thèse tente d’apporter des argumentaires nouveaux et une méthodologie d’approche nouvelle dans l’analyse de l’appareil judiciaire d’un pays anciennement colonisé. Il s’agit de mettre de côté certaines idées reçues sur les situations des systèmes juridiques des pays anciennement colonisés, notamment malgache et africains. L’étude remet en cause quelques préjugés d’antan qui marquent encore les esprits relativement aux situations précoloniales, à l’arrivée des modèles juridiques occidentaux et plus particulièrement au concept d’indépendance de la magistrature et sa consistance actuelle dans les anciennes colonies, à l’instar de la Grande Île. A travers l'étude du cas particulier de Madagascar, la thèse apporte des réponses à plusieurs questions suscitées par l’acculturation du système juridique des anciennes colonies à partir de leur contact avec les modèles juridiques occidentaux. La question spécifique de recherche consiste à déterminer si le concept d’indépendance de la magistrature est déjà entré dans le système juridique des pays anciennement colonisés comme Madagascar. Pour l’auteur, le concept d’indépendance de la magistrature tel que compris en Occident n’a jamais fait son véritable entrée à Madagascar. Le cadre théorique adopté pour la vérification de l’hypothèse combine le positivisme juridique avec les approches anthropologique et sociologique et se distingue des recherches presque exclusivement positivistes antérieures. Dans la première partie, l’auteur propose le cadre théorique de recherche et rapporte les modes de règlements des conflits à l’époque précoloniale. L’analyse anthropologique de la période a démontré que le concept d’indépendance de la magistrature fut inconnu des traditions judiciaires précoloniales même si une certaine influence occidentale imprégnait le processus de métissage spontanée diligenté par les souverains successifs. Dans la seconde partie, l’auteur livre une analyse de la période coloniale et postcoloniale jusqu’à l’époque contemporaine. Pour la période coloniale, l’ouvrage relate, d’une part, les multiples mesures prises durant les années coloniales, qui éloignèrent le modèle juridique colonial implanté à Madagascar du modèle juridique français original de la métropole. D’autre part, il mesure les impacts de l’instauration du modèle colonial sur les traditions juridiques malgaches précoloniales. Contrairement aux idées reçues, le modèle juridique français et tous ses concepts clés, notamment le concept de séparation des pouvoirs et celui d’indépendance de la magistrature ne furent pas transmis à Madagascar par le fait de la conquête. Ensuite, il a survolé la magistrature des trois républiques successives depuis l’indépendance acquise en 1960. En premier lieu, par une analyse résolument positiviste l’auteur analyse les imperfections initiales des choix et des mesures prises lors de la mise en place du nouveau système juridique de la jeune république durant les premières années de l’indépendance et dont la magistrature malgache est encore tributaire aujourd’hui. En second lieu, par une démarche à la fois positiviste et sociologique, il démontre que les valeurs du concept d’indépendance de la magistrature, reconnues par le système politique et timidement repris par le système juridique, n’ont pas réussi jusqu’ici à pénétrer le cœur de ce dernier

The planning theory and natural law

The practical, normative dimension of planning is a plausible source of the ‘family resemblances’ noted by a number of legal theorists between Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory and natural law jurisprudence. Foremost among these resemblances is Shapiro’s contention that the law, necessarily, has a moral aim. The moral aim thesis is at first glance surprising given Shapiro’s intention to defend exclusive legal positivism and unequivocal rejection of what he takes to be the core commitments of natural law theory. Shapiro’s claim, however, is that although the law necessarily has a moral aim, this does not entail that it is successful in satisfying that aim. In order to assess this thesis, it is helpful to compare the Planning Theory with contemporary natural law approaches. Bringing Shapiro’s Planning Theory into dialogue with contemporary natural law theories can demonstrate some of the Planning Theory’s weaknesses as an alternative explanation of the ultimate grounds of the authoritativeness of legal norms. Some of these weaknesses, moreover, are instructive beyond the specific contours of the Planning Theory insofar as they generalise to other legal positivist approaches. In section one I consider Shapiro’s treatment of the so-called ‘Possibility Puzzle’ regarding the grounding relation between authoritative norms and legal authority. Shapiro’s denial of the capacity of earlier jurisprudential theories to resolve this puzzle overlooks what is – I suggest – a plausible solution developed by John Finnis on the basis of Joseph Raz’s theory of practical reason and norms. Section two then demonstrates why Shapiro’s attempt to combine a robust construal of the social facts thesis with a commitment to the thesis that law necessarily has a moral aim is ultimately unsuccessful.

O debate entre Hart e Fuller: uma controvérsia envolvendo veículos no parque

A debate occurred in 1958 at the Harvard Law Review has become a landmark for contemporary philosophy of law. Still under the philosophical and moral impact of the Second World War, Herbert L. A. Hart published his version of legal positivism whitin the article entitled Positivism and the Separation of Law and Moral. The answer came from Lon Fuller’s Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Prof. Hart. Much of the debate took place over a seemingly prosaic exemple: a rule prohibiting vehicles from a park. With this exemple, Hart argued that rules have a core of clear aplications, but this core meaning would be sorrounded by a penumbra of uncertainty. Fuller uses a counter-exemple to instist that legal language, by itself, cannot determine a certain outcome: it is necessary to understand the purpose for wich the rule was suppose to serve. This paper analyses this controversy from its most important features: i) the connection between legal philosophy and philosophy of language; ii) the possibility of legal interpretation; iii) and the different possibles points of view for the analysis of law. This paper argues that the study of these features sheds light on the problems we encounter in contemporary philosophy of law, especialy with regard to theories of legal argumentation and its relation with legal langague and legal interpretation.