Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Has investor protection been rendered obsolete by the Argentine crisis?

Includes bibliography

A Life Cycle Approach to Investor Protection. ECMI Working Paper No. 1/September 2014

The market for investment products, including both securities and investment funds, is fraught with difficulties for consumers in terms of the ease of comparing products, trust in suppliers and consumer satisfaction. A comprehensive approach to investor protection, developed around the lifecycle of a financial product, may offer the investor greater protection during an investment’s life span. This paper proposes a new approach to investor protection, building on a review of major market failures affecting the origination, distribution and sale of financial products and based on a review of the relevant scientific literature and country experiences. The application of a ‘know-your-product’ principle at origination, a narrower ‘default rule’ for best execution and an ex-ante distinction between advice and ‘information-only’ services are among the options discussed in this paper to enhance the investor protection framework over the lifecycle of a financial product.

Securities investor protection act amendments : hearing before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session, on H.R. 8331 ... April 25, 1978.

Mode of access: Internet.

Accounting reform and investor protection : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, on the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, accounting reform and investor protection issues raised by Enron and other public companies.

Shipping list number: 2003-0249-P (volumes 1-2, 4), 2003-0247-P (volume 3).

Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.

Shipping list no.: 88-329-P.

The Economic Effects of Improving Investor Rights in Portugal

The Portuguese economy has performed remarkably well since joining the EU in 1986. Output per worker grew at an annual rate of 2.25%. The relative price of investment has declined. Real investment has increased compared to output, in part fuelled by an increase in capital inflows. At the same time, resource allocation seems to have improved as well: firm-level data shows a significant decline in the dispersion of labor productivity and size across firms. This paper argues that improvements in outside investor rights that have taken place since Portugal joined the EU is a prime candidate to explain this set of facts.

O direito de exoneração do acionista minoritário

This study specifically addresses the situation of minority shareholders after the transfer of control in an listed company. The various underlying interests and reasons that shareholders have for investing in a company can demonstrate shareholders’ reasoning for taking radically different positions on issues relating to the transfer of control of the referred company. This study analyses the current legal system in Portugal and in the European Union in order to assess whether, in the event of a takeover bid of a listed company where there is a transfer of control, minority shareholders have the same appraisal rights as other shareholders to sell their shares and leave the company. The study then examines the European Court of Justice decision on whether a general principle of equal treatment of minority shareholders exists upon a transfer of control (Audiolux) and the Portuguese Securities Market Commission decision regarding the delisting of Brisa - Autoestradas de Portugal, S.A. based on the principle of investor protection. The study concludes that although the principle of equality amongst shareholders has made progress in the European legal system e.g. it is laid down in Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids and the Portuguese Securities Market Code, there is also a need for further improvement, which can be accomplished by allowing minority shareholders to exercise an appraisal right in similar unregulated situations.

O direito de exoneração do acionista minoritário

This study specifically addresses the situation of minority shareholders after the transfer of control in an listed company. The various underlying interests and reasons that shareholders have for investing in a company can demonstrate shareholders’ reasoning for taking radically different positions on issues relating to the transfer of control of the referred company. This study analyses the current legal system in Portugal and in the European Union in order to assess whether, in the event of a takeover bid of a listed company where there is a transfer of control, minority shareholders have the same appraisal rights as other shareholders to sell their shares and leave the company. The study then examines the European Court of Justice decision on whether a general principle of equal treatment of minority shareholders exists upon a transfer of control (Audiolux) and the Portuguese Securities Market Commission decision regarding the delisting of Brisa - Autoestradas de Portugal, S.A. based on the principle of investor protection. The study concludes that although the principle of equality amongst shareholders has made progress in the European legal system e.g. it is laid down in Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids and the Portuguese Securities Market Code, there is also a need for further improvement, which can be accomplished by allowing minority shareholders to exercise an appraisal right in similar unregulated situations.

Earnings management and stock price crashes post-crossdelisting

We test whether cross-delisted firms from the major U.S. stock exchanges experience an increase in crash risk associated with earnings management. Consistent with our prediction, we find that earnings management have a greater positive impact on stock price crash risk post-cross-delisting when compared to a sample of still cross-listed firms. Moreover, our results suggest that this effect is more pronounced for crossdelisted firms from countries with weaker investor protection and poorer quality of their information environment. We further examine whether managers’ ability to manipulate earnings increases post-cross-delisting around seasoned equity offerings. Our evidence shows that cross-delisted firms that engage in earnings management to inflate reported earnings prior to a seasoned equity offering are more likely to observe a subsequent stock price crash.

The real economic effects of cross-delistingfrom the united states: evidence on post-operating performance, financial constraints and stock crash risk

Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências Empresariais.

Equities and inequality

Most US credit card holders revolve high-interest debt, often combined with substantial (i) asset accumulation by retirement, and (ii) low-rate liquid assets. Hyperbolic discounting can resolve only the former puzzle (Laibson et al., 2003). Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) proposed an 'accountant-shopper'framework for the latter. The current paper builds, solves, and simulates a fully-specified accountant-shopper model, to show that this framework canactually generate both types of co-existence, as well as target credit card utilization rates consistent with Gross and Souleles (2002). The benchmark model is compared to setups without self-control problems, with alternative mechanisms, and with impatient but fully rational shoppers.